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Abstract
The changing face of South African youth politics and the construction of youth
identities in official discourse has always been an area of interest. During the struggle
against apartheid, the youth category was contested by two diametrically opposed sets

of discourse: the liberatory and the conservative.

This study is about Black youth politics from 1944 to 1994 with especial reference to

the changes in discourses of liberation and the construction of youth within these
discourses. It explores the role of young people in the liberation struggle, how they were
constituted by others and how they constituted themselves.

This study posits a relationship between youth politics, the wider liberation struggle and
the system of apartheid. In view of this interplay between structure and agency, this
study adopts elements of both structural and post-structural theory. This approach

provides an analysis of the structural forces in youth politics as well as a comprehensive
account of young people's experiences of self-formation.

By reviewing a variety ofhistorical and sociological literature, as well as organisational

and goverrunent documents, this study explores the shift in discursive and nondiscursive practices. For analytical purposes, the history of youth politics is periodised
into four phases: the politics of the ANC Youth League (1944-1959); the construction of
young people as units oflabour and the rise of the student movement (1960-1979);
youth politics after the Soweto uprising and the construction of young people as "youth"
(1980-1989); the construction of young people as a "lost generation" in post liberation
politics (1990-1994).

3

Research into the changes in the representation of youth will assist policy and youth
organisations to develop a contextual understanding of youth issues in post-apartheid
South Africa- a view of young people as active in self-formation and aware of their
own history is fundamental to this process.
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ACRONYMS
ANC

African National Congress

ANCYL

African National Congress Youth League

AZASCO

Azanian Students Convention

AZASO

Azanian Student Organisation

AZAPO

Azanian People's Organisation

BC

Black Consciousness

BCP

Black Community Programme

BPC

Black People's Convention

COSAS

Congress of South African Students

COSATU

Congress of South African Trade Unions

DET

Department of Education and Training

JEP

Joint Enrichment Programme

MK

Umkhonto we Sizwe

NAYO

National Youth Organisation

NUSAS

National Union of South African Students

PAC

Pan-Africanist Congress

SACP

South African Communist Party

SASM

South African Student Movement

SASO

South African Student Organisation

SAYCO

South African Youth Congress

TRAYO

Transvaal Youth Organisation

UDF

United Democratic Movement
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1 Introduction
The South African democratic elections in I994 signalled the end of apartheid. The
focus of liberation politics changed from revolution to the construction of a new society.
A change in the role of young people was perceived as a foundation of the new South
Africa. Youth organisations and institutions providing services to young people were
asked to redefine their role and direct their programs to the immediate problems
experienced by young South Africans (Commonwealth Secretariat Report on Human
Resources for a New South Africa, 1992).

There is a general agreement amongst historians, social scientists and political
commentators that Black young people have played a significant role in the liberation
of South Africa. It is somewhat remarkable then, that very little research

into the

history of Black youth politics has been conducted (Seekings, 1992a, 1992b ). Of the
studies that have been undertaken in this area, most have focused on the later period of
the liberation struggle, the 1970s and 1980s, whilst the early development of youth
politics and the active role of young people in constructing their own identity as
political activists has been inadequately researched.

This study is about Black youth politics from the inception of the African National
Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944 to the post-liberation period of the early
1990s. It docwnents the history of Black youth politics with especial reference to the
discontinuities in the discourses of liberation and the construction of young people by
those discourses. Reference is also made to the construction of an apolitical, criminal
identity of

Black youth by apartheid discourse. The study examines changes in

discursive and non-discursive practices and how these were influential in reconstruction
of the youth category through the four phases of Black youth politics. It explores the
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role of young people in liberation politics, how young people were constructed by
others, and how they constructed themsdves.

Although not the first youth organisation in South Africa, the ANC Youth League was
the first African youth organisation to be actively and significantly involved in
liberation politics (Karis & Carter, 1972). The fOrmation of the Youth Lcagw:.; is widely
represented in contemporary historical and social science research as a milestone in the
history of the African National Congress (ANC) in particular, and in the national
liberation struggle in general. Its profound influence on the ANC's approach to anticolonial resistance is the key contribution of the Youth League to the defeat of the
apartheid state.

The formation of the Youth League provided an opportunity for young people to
express their political perspectives and to be actively involved in liberation politics.
Since the 1940s young people have been highly visible in liberation politics. They have
seen themselves as future leaders and regarded the liberation of South Africa as their
responsibility. The ANC Youth League Manifesto states "African Youth must be united,
consolidated, trained and disciplined because from their ranks future leaders will be
recruited" (ANC Youth League Provisional Committee, 1978, p. II).

The term "youth" was politicised and came to refer to young people who were
politically active in the liberation struggle. The understanding of the self as political
was a distinct feature of most Black youth activists, an image which was reproduced at
organisational level. However, the process of self-definition was as inconstant as the
history of youth politics.

Discursive and non-discursive practices inside and outside of the liberation movement
provided the conditions for many young people to take an active role in liberation
politics. For example, in the 1960s, the policy of armed struggle inspired large numbers
8

of young people to involve themselves in the politics of liberation. After the Sowcto
uprising and most of the I980s, large numbers of young people also responded
overwhelmingly to the ANC armed propaganda campaign (Nhlapo, 1991 ).

Political violence wns regarded by most young people as a legitimate form of political
resistance. Studies of Black politics in South Africa (Glaser, 1993; Lodge, 1983; Marx,

1992) found that the policy of armed resistance was more popular to young people than
the policy of non-violent resistance. In 1959 and the 1970s the policies of non-violence
pursued by the ANC and Black Consciousness constituted a political liability for these

organisations in so far as the youth were disenchanted with such approaches.

Optimism about the future and the understanding of the self as a potential leader in a
non-racial society formed the basis of active yuuth involvement in opposition politics.
Explaining youth participation in the liberation struggle in the 1990s, Xolile stated that

"We as the youth know that the future is in our hands because the old men .... will
disappear because they are old. Therefore the people who are going to be responsible for
the future South Africa will be the youth" (interview with Marks, 1995, p. 17).

Following the abolition of apartheid in 1994, liberation discourse shifted, pushing many

young people to the fringes of society. The shift in power was attended by changes in
the way young people were represented. Heroic identities constructed during the 1980s

township unrest were supplanted by representations of youth as criminals and vandals.
This metamorphosis of the youth construct demonstrates that knowledge and discourse

can undergo abrupt and fundamental changes in the transition from one historical epoch
to the next, leading researchers of youth to conclude that the category is merely a
historical and political construct (Keniston, 1971; Kett, 1977; Musgrove, 1964;
Springhall, 1984).
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Power, language and the knowledge of the subject popuh1tion pluycd a major role in
constructing the youth category. The ncxus af the rcprcscntation of youth with the
wider political struggle means that the youth category can not be adequately analysed
without a critical examination of the politics of liberation organisations, the system of
apartheid and the political activities of young people.

Methodological approaches
In view of the nexus between youth politics and the historical structures of South
African liberation politics, theory triangulation has been adopted by this study. Patton
(1990, p, 187) explains theory triangulation as "the use of multiple perspectives to
interpret a single set of data."

This approach facilitates the investigation and

documentation of diverse aspects of the subject.

Elements of both structural and post-structural theory have been combined in this study.
Both approaches deal with the concept of power and examine shifts in historical and
political relations. Post-structuralist analysis of history as disjointed epochs is not
comprehensively inconsistent with the Marxist analysis, based on modes of production.
Structural approaches are associated mainly with Marxist theories of emancipation,
political economy and class analysis. The main focus of this approach is on the
relationship between the individual and social structures. The concept of class analysis
is presented as a universal and unchanging phenomenon (Kamenka, 1986).

Post-structural approaches have shifted from the emphasis of bi-lateral relationships to
investigate the complexity of social relationships. As Best and Kellner (1991, p. 20)
points out, post-structuralism "favoured instead a thoroughly historicaf view which sees
different fonns of consciousness, identities, signification, and so on as historically
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produced and therefore varying in diftCrcnt historical periods." 'J'hc distinction between
structuralism and post-structuralism is largely one of emphasis. This study attempts to
merge both perspectives without privileging either.

The combination of these two approaches provides for a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between youth politics, social structures and the wider struggle, as well as
accommodating discussion as to how young people were active in constructing their
own identities. The focus of the study is based mainly on Black young people's
interaction with the self, youth organisations, and the liberation movement.

Structural approaches.
Most literature in the area of Black youth politics m South Africa is based on the
political economy of Marxist analysis. According to Marxism, class tensions play the
pivotal role in the struggle for power. This analysis views political organisations,
workers, the economy, the state and its machinery as constituting the field of power.
Within this approach the lumpenproletariat category consisting of the unemployed and
criminals are not regarded as part of the class analysis. They are seen as reactionary, a
view which corresponds to the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s construction of the tsotsi
Guvenile) identity in South African politics (Brown, 1984; Kamenka, 1986; Sargent,
!983). As Sercombe (1993, p. 8) points out "the tendency is to want to reduce all social
inequality to class".

Structural studies in South Afnca were common during the 1984-87 township revolts.
The main area of study was the relationship between deteriorating material conditions in
urban Black communities and the increase in political resistance. Since the economic
situation of Black communities had an essential part in the liberation struggle, the
analysis of this aspect is critical to the study of youth politics. The economic aspect was
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highlighted in the early formation of the ANC as the basis of the struggle against
colonialism (Mcli, 1988). Coupled with the lcgalisation of racism in 1948, the
deteriorating material conditions of Black communities provided the conditions for an
overt confrontation with the state. The state, its apparatus and the bourgeois class were
all constructed in liberation discourse as political targets.

This study views the history of youth politics and that of wider liberation struggle as
inextricably linked - an approach which requires the examination of the interaction
between structure and agency. The structural approach is helpful

in analysing the

interaction between youth politics, mainstream liberation organisations and the state.

On the other hand, this study attempts to transcend the victimological and reductionist
aspects of structuralism. Victimology posits the subject as a powerless victim whose
actions are directed by external forces, and fall short in acknowledging the power of the
subject to initiate action and influence history. Traditional approaches to studies of
youth operate within the paradigm of structuralist victimology. Springhall (1983/84)
notes that young people "are seldom seen as active participants in their own history,
more as passive recipients of adult authority" (p. 20).

Structural analysts present the struggle in terms of the oppressed versus the oppressor,
and hence imply that both parties are monolithic entities. Lack of emphasis on the
interaction at a micro level is a conceptual flaw in the traditional structural approaches.
The limitation of structural analysis also lies in its conceptualisation of power as a
phenomenon occurring only at the site of production. Changes in power relations are
only explained in terms of developments in macro rather than micro levels of society. In
the South African context the exercise of power through political resistance at all levels
of society makes the structuralist analysis of power, by itself, inadequate.
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Foucault post-structural analytics
In this study, post-structural approaches facilitate an analysis at the micropolitical level.
Foucault asserts that the notion of micropolitics locates the struggle for power

throughout society "where numerous local groups contest, diffuse and decentred forms
of power spreading throughout society" (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 56). As the politics of

liberation evolved in South Africa, numerous autonomous organisations proliferated and
dispersed the struggle throughout the nation. The struggle was fought in townships,
rural areas, farms, shops, workplaces, public transport vehicles, schools, hospitals,

prisons and homes. In the South African context the focus of the struggle was mainly

based on bringing changes in the macrosystem.
According to Foucault (1970) contemporary history must be understood as disjointed

periods characterised by discontinuities rather than continuities. The focus of
contemporary history is based on distinct shifts in discursive practice. This approach
was adopted in the current study and enabled the periodisation of the history of youth
politics for analytic purposes. While focusing on discursive shifts, the study also makes

references to non-discursive changes. Each period is analysed as a distinct point in
history to detennine discontinuities in discursive and non-discursive practices. The
periodisation process is largely derived from the focus and purpose of individual

studies.

Discourse formation and the constitution ofthe subject
The constitution of the subject population is a complex process and involves the

consideration of a diverse set of social, political, historical and economic factors.
According to Foucault, the production of power, knowledge and discourse at different
points of history is central to the construction of the subject population. The formulation

of discourse is entwined with the production of power. In Foucault's view, "power and
discourse make up a unity" (Munch, 1994, p.17).
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For Foucault, the construction of the subject population must be understood within a
context of power, discourse, language and knowledge. The generation of discourse
influences the way that the identHied population is represented and treated in
institutions of social control. Ideas about youth were embodied in the language of the
milieu and informed discourses regarding youth. As the language and perceptions

change so are the discourses that shape the identity of the subject population.
Foucault's concept of power as dispersed and productive provides a useful conceptual
framework for understanding the process of self formation and the active involvement

of young people in the liberation struggle. Foucault argues that

power isn't localised in the State apparatus and that nothing in society will be
changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside
of State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also

changed (Foucault, 1980, p. 60).
The concept of power as "not localised in the State apparatus" and the dictum that

change must come from below and within the subject itself were both ideas emphasised
by Steve Biko (1978) during the rise of the philosophy of Black Consciousness and the
student movement in the 1970s.

Paul Rabinow interprets Foucault as suggesting three modes by which "human beings
are made subjects." These are "dividing practices", "scientific classification" and

"subjectification" or self-formation (Rabinow, 1984, p. 7-11). This study focuses mainly
on the first and third modes - the two are most relevant to the task of determining how
young people were constituted by others and how they constituted themselves.

Dividing practices and the scientific classification.
The dividing and scientific classification modes are linked to structural theories in that
they view the subject as not active in defining him/herself. Through dividing practices

the subject "is objectified by a process of division either within himself [herself! or from
others" (Rabinow, 1984, p. 8). In South Africa dividing practices and scientific
classification instilled a culture of racial hierarchy in which Blacks were constructed as
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inferior. These practices were the cornerstone of the apartheid system. As a univc:rsity
professor wrote

One of the outstanding achievement of this volk is that in the midst of

overwhelming barbarism, it succeeded in remaining white. This achievement
can be ascribed ... to its racial feeling in terms of which there is a clear dividing
line between the races which must not be crossed (cited in Herbstcin, 1978, p.
83).

However, South African discourses generated by the practice of division and scientific
classification were inconsistent with the subject population's actions. Through
resistance imposed identities were altered by anti-apartheid activists and used as
instruments of mobilisation. The imposition of identities is analysed in this study in

terms of young people's capacity to challenge, resist, subvert and negotiate officially
constructed identities.

The implementation of dividing practices was facilitated by the generation of discourses
concerning the subject population and supplemented especially by scientific
classification discourse. These discourses were reproduced at an institutional level - m

teaching institutions, hospitals and even churches. According to Bloom, studies of
childhood in South Africa such as that of Lindell eta!. (1991) criticised "clinical and
psychometric biases of South African developmental psychology. which they assert
supported negative views of African abilities and mental health, and that pathologise
African children ... " (cited in Bloom, 1996, p. 151). As Foucault explained discourse
formation "must be seen as a major phenomenon of social power, and not simply a way

of describing the world" (Jary & Jary, 1991, p. 166). It was through the process of
discourse formation and categorisation of the subject that Black young people were
subjected to particular forms of treatment.

Subjectification/Self-formation
The mode of self-formation alludes to the "way a human being turns him- or herself into
a subject" (Rabinow, 1984, p. II). The focus of this process is one of the main
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distinctions between structural and post-structural approaches. In this process the
subject takes initiatives and constructs his or her identity. According to Foucault "This
self·fommtion has a long and complicated genealogy; it takes place through a variety of
operations on [people's] own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their
own conduct" (Rabinow, 1984, p. II). It is a spiritual awakening process which
involves self-dctinition and understanding. In South Africa, this process was most
evident in the 1970s during the rise of Black Consciousness and the student movement.

In some cases the process of self-fonnation conforms to established patterns of power
relations. However, as a subversive process it often conflicts with underlying traditional
values. For example, young people's action to radicalise the liberation movement in the
1940s conflicted with the traditional power pattern within the ANC.

The self.fonnation process is manifested at different levels of the historical
development of Black youth politics. Although there are marked differences between
dividing practices and self.formation, the two modes are commonly identifiable in that
they both construct the subject as the "Other". For example, in the process of selfformation young people classified themselves as different from "other" sections of the
community and spoke of "we, the youth of South Africa" (Bundy, 1987, p. 31 0)
However, as Rabinow (1984) argues, analytical distinction can be made between the
two modes.

In the current study the two modes have been combined as analytical tools. However,
the self-formation mode has a more significant analytic role in the second and third
phases of this study than the first and the fourth phases. It is used to analyse the active
role of young people in defining themselves and others during the rise of student
activism and the proliferation of youth organisations in the 1970s and 1980s
respectively. The self-formation mode is also used to assess the extent to which young
people were active in resisting and inverting imposed identities.
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While Foucault's theories of history and power arc relevant to this study, they have
limitations as well. Foucault's lack of emphasis on historical continuities and nondiscursive practices limits the application of his analysis in some aspects of the South
African context. Continuities are as '.;ritical as discontinuities in assessing the impact of
perennial political problems and what they reveal about current and future social
relations. In South Africa, continuities in the system of racism and in youth resistance
are important factors in the analysis of youth politics.

For Foucault the question of power is not something that is pursued through physical
force but through the generation of discourse and the construction of the subject within
these discourses. The system of social control is developed and maintained discursively
and not physically. While discursive forms of social control were critical in South
Africa, physical force was the predominant strategy for maintaining apartheid. Power
can be also gained by physical aggression and economic status. In the South African
context these factors must be taken into consideration.

Foucaultian analysis is also not appropriate for analysing the interaction between the
structure and agency. This makes it insufficient for analysing liberation situations in
which the impact of structure must be analysed. Tl'.us in the current study aspects of

structural and post structural analysis were used. This provides a tool for comprehensive
analysis which overcome the limitations of both types of approach.
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Sources
The current study provides an analysis of written documentation. Sets of written
material

wer\~

categorised and analysed in relation to each phase. The data used in this

study included material written by historians, social scientists, liberation organisations,
the state, journalists and by young South Africans. These sources were obtained from
libraries, Internet files and personal collections. As in all situations processed and
unprocessed data raises questions of reliability. Compte and Goetz note that "absolute
validity and reliability are impossible in any research model" (cited in Cobb &
Hegemaster, 1987, p. 142).

The data from these multiple sources was cross-checked to establish consistency.
Through the application of external criticism historical and social science sources were
critically evaluated and cross-checked with original organisational documents. Internal
criticism was also applied to determine the author's position in relation to the data
(Bedolla, 1992).This extensive cross-checking was carried to marginalise the bias of
organisational documents as well as the subjectivity of the researcher.

Limitations of the study_
The study was hampered by time constraint and the scarcity of literature on South
Africa at the university library. Sources accessed elsewhere were patchy in that studies
of youth were concentrated around the Soweto uprising and the 1980s. Very little
information was available in regards to the early and late period of youth politics.

Also there was a notable lack of documentation of the role of women in the liberation
movement. Past research (Biehl, 1994; Dawber, 1984; Glaser, 1988/89; Seekings, 1993)
testifY to the invisibility of women in this field. These studies found that although
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young women participated in the struggle, youth politics was associated mainly with
young males.
Although an ANC Women's League was formed at the same time as the Youth League,

it remained on the peripheral of opposition politics. As in all patriarchal systems,
women's role in the struggle was relegated to issues relating to the family. As
Bunlender et al. (1984, p. 34) point out women's organisational role mirrored that of
wider society." Thus it may be accurate to explain the under-representation of women in
liberation politics in tem1s of restrictions imposed by gender roles, cultural and political
values of the observer.
Due to the under-representation of women in the documentation of liberation history, it
was envisaged that the literature used in the current study would largely refer to males.
The dependence of this study on existing documentation, means that this study also
reproduces the inadequacies associated with the documentation of the history of women
within the liberation movement. This is regrettable and will hopefully be remedied by
future studies.

Content arrangement.
For analytical purposes, the fifty year period of youth politics covered in this study is
periodised into four phases and each phase was analysed as a distinct historical period.
This allowed the exploration of both discursive and non-discursive discontinuities in
youth as well as in mainstream liberation politics. The first phase investigates the
emergence of Black youth politics from 1944 to 1959. The second phase covered the
1960s and the 1970s period while the third phase examines the shift in the youth
category after the Soweto uprising in 1976/7 to 1989. The fourth phase assesses the
impact of the changes in the balance of power on youth organisational process and the
reconstitution of the "youth" in post-liberation discourse - 1989 to the early 1990s.
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Phase one: The emergence of the African National Congress Youth
League: the rejuvenation of the ANC by the Youth League.
The first phase explores and documents the cmcrgcncc of the ANC Youth League, the
politics of it).! relationship with the mother body and the wider liberation struggle. The
conditions under which the Youth League emerged, its philosophical framework and the
kind of youth category it constructed are examined. Within this phase, the study briefly
explores the institutionalisation of racism in 1948 and assesses its impact on youth
politics.

In the 1940s a group of young intellectuals emerged in opposition politics. In 1944 they
formed a youth wing of the ANC, the ANC Youth League. The Youth League was to
rejuvenate and "remould the historic national organisation, the ANC" (Karis & Carter,
1973, p. 100).

Five years after the ANC Youth League emerged, it produced a Programme of Action
which took the struggle to a new phase. The Programme of Action called for mass
action. This represented a change in liberation discourse as the ANC had previously
confined itself to constitutional approaches. Some members of the ANC old guard
opposed the radical approach proposed by the document. This situation created a power
conflict between the League and the old guard of the ANC (Johns & Davis, 1991;
Pampallis, 1991).

In the mid 1950s the Africanist philosophical framework of the ANC and the Youth
League was challenged by the new concept of multi-racialism. The adoption of the
Freedom Charter and the abandonment of African nationalism in favour of multiracialism in 1955 was foJlowed by a major discursive conflict within the liberation
movement. A split occurred, leading to the formation of the Pan-African Congress
(PAC) in 1959. Developments in the 1940s and 1950s are significant in the study of
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youth politics in that they suggest a power struggle between the generations. These
developments also revealed the diverse politi,.::al positions wilhin the youth movement.

Phase two: The construction of young people as units of labour
and the rise of the student movement
.This phase investigates developments in youth politics in the 1960s. After the split in
the ranks of the ANC in 1959 youth politics took a new direction. The PAC was fanned

and its core constituency was youth most of whom were former ANC Youth League
members. The PAC generated new discourses of liberation which were more militant
and confrontational than those generated by the Youth League.

Through these changes a radicalised new generation of youth emerged and took the
liberation struggle to a new political terrain. This chapter briefly explores the politics of

the PAC and how it provided an alternative construction of the 'youth' subject. The
1960 Sharpeville massacre, the adoption of the policy of anned resistance and the

subsequent state crackdown were distinguishing historical features of the 1960s period.

In the 1960s hegemonic and Protestant nonns were institutionalised in the state's system
of African education which was to become the principal device in the new system of
social control. This new system was developed through the introduction of the policy of
mass schooling and the implementation of the Bantu Education policy. The Bantu

Education system functioned as a subtle fonn of social control and young people were
constructed within this system as units of labour.

The Bantu Education system subdued political resistance in most part of the 1960s.

However, the emergence of the Black Consciousness philosophy and the rise of the
student movement challenged the hegemonic values enshrined in apartheid policies.
Political resistance was renewed. The chapter examines how young people took
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initiatives in defining themselves and how they constructed a political identity with the
methods of Black Consciousness.

Phase three: Youth politics after the Soweto uprising and the
construction of young people as "youth".
The third phase explores changes in youth organisational process after the Soweto
uprising and analyse the affect of these on the formation of discourses concerning youth.
Changes in the representation of youth in both liberatory and state discourse will be
examined. Seekings ( 1993) found that in the 1980s two competing discourses about
Black youth activists existed. The liberation movement represented young people as
"heroes", "young lions" and "comrades". On the other hand, young people were
represented in conservative discourse as ••criminals" and "vandals". The study analyses
the role of liberation strategies and youth activities in the generation of these discourses.

The chapter explores the conditions under which these discourses occurred, how young
people were constituted by others, and how they constituted themselves. Political
initiatives taken by young people during the struggle show that they were not merely
passive object but were active in constructing themselves and others. In addition the
chapter examines a number of developments in the liberation struggle that occurred in
the 1980s. These include the emergence of liberation organisations that had been
inactive since the 1960s, the shift from Black Consciousness to the non-racialist
approach, the proliferation of autonomous political groups, the township revolts, the
dispensation of the struggle and the escalation of violence during the campaign to make
South Africa ungovernable.
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Phase four: From liberation to formal party politics: Black youth politics
and the construction of young people as a "lost generation".

The fourth phase focuses on the shifl in the balance of power that occurred after the

legalisation of political activity in 1989. The ramifications for internal youth politics are
assessed. Following the change in state policy, exiled political organisations such as the
ANC, SACP and PAC were re-established inside South Africa. A new liberatory
language revolving around the politics of negotiation and fonnal organisational process

emerged from the new milieu. Policies of violent resistance were jettisoned. These
changes within the liberation movement led to changes in the representation of youth.
Because young people resisted the shift from anned resistance to a negotiated political
settlement they were constructed by the new discourse of liberation as a ''lost
generation" and "maginalised".

Phase four explicates the increasing tendency in South Africa to represent the "youth" in
social rat.l'ter than political terms. The depoliticisation of the youth identity is interpreted
as an attempt to modify the field of power by institutionalising new values of social
control.
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2 The formation of the African National
Congress Youth League, 1944: the
rejuvenation of the ANC by the Youth
League.

Introduction
There exists a virtual consensus amongst historical and political analysts that the
formation of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) was of profound
significance in the liberation struggle of South Africa. An analysis of the shift in the
discourse of liberation that occurred in the 1940s and its political ramifications is
required to understand how youth politics developed. The emergence of the ANC Youth
League created the conditions for the representation of young people as "y.outh" in
liberation politics.

The term "youth" was politicised and discourse of liberation such as the "new
generation of political thinkers", "young blood" and "new breed" emerged. With these
discourses, an identity of the ANC Youth League constituency was constructed. Young

people represented themselves as "the brain-trust and power-station of the spirit of
African nationalism" (Provision Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p.17).
These discourses challenged established power relations within the liberation
movement, and hence are regarded here as part of the broader struggle for power.

The history of black youth politics is punctuated by abrupt and fundamental
developments, creating what Foucault calls historical epochs. Such paradigm shifts
often attended changes in the apparatus of political repression. Yet it would be a gross
distortion to view changes in youth politics as being purely contingent upon state
discursive activities. Discontinuities in liberation politics are an essential component in

the history of youth politics and in the construction of the youth category. Although it is
acknowledged that state and the liberation movement policies are key influential
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elements in the formation of discourses concerning the youth, this chapter fOcuses on
the active role of young people in shaping their own history and identity.

This chapter explores and documents the emergence of the ANC Youth League, as well
as the politics of its relationship with the mother body and the wider liberation struggle.
The first section explores the fOrmation of the African National Congress and the
emergence of the philosophy of African nationalism. These two events provide a
departure point for a study of the historical development of B!ack youth politics. The
second section examines the fonnation of the ANC Youth League, its organisational
process and its political activities. This includes a discussion of how the philosophy of
African nationalism was translated into organisational practice, how the League
challenged both internal and external patterns of power relations, and what kind of
youth category was constructed. In the third section discursive shifts within the
liberation movement and their implications will be explored.

The formation of the ANC and the emergence of the
ideology of African nationalism.
In 1909 the British House of Commons passed the South African Act of Union that
restricted the participation of Africans in political and economic processes. The Act was
ratified by the South African Parliament in 1910 after "independence". Additional laws
aimed at sustaining colonial power relations between Europeans and Africans were also
passed. In response to the repressive legislature a group of professional African men
began to mobilise Africans into an tmprecedented organised opposition. Following this
campaign and consultation with the African community, a national liberation
organisation- the African National Congress (ANC) was formed and launched in 1912
(Meli, 1988).

Participation in liberation politics at this time was dominated by activists who were
male, intellectual and of at least middle age. The rural masses were represented in
opposition politics only by the co-option of traditional leaders into the ANC. Young
people and women were largely excluded from opposition politics. Although the 1919

25

ANC Constitution op!!ned membership to men over the age of' l K "belonging to the
aboriginal races of Africa" and women as "auxiliary members", in practice young
people and women remained invisible (Karis & Carter, 1973, p.IOI). This limited the
support base of the ANC.

Due to insufficient popular support the ANC did not develop into a broadly based and

responsive organisation. In 1941 Mbeki, an ANC member, wrote that 'The Transkei is,
to be frank, politically in midnight slumber." (Mbeki, cited in Meli, 1988, p. 88). A year

later, another ANC representative gave a pessimistic report on the Natal province,
stating that "Congress is dying in that province .... There are no branches which are
alive" (Calata, cited in Meli, !988, p. 88).

As traditional African authmity was undermined and invalidated by colonial power, the
will to retain the right to self-definition became a central political issue amongst
Africans in the 1800s. According to Meli (1988), the 1800s industrialisation drew large

numbers of Africans to urban areas, where they lived and worked in poor conditions.
This milieu

made most people conscious of the power exerted on the African

population by colonialism.

Inspired by discourses of national identity, a sense of commonality emerged and gave
rise to the philosophy of African nationalism. Meli (1988, p. 2) observed that this

development "was a prerequisite for an all-embracing African nationalism" and became
the main theoretical framework upon which the African identity was discursively

constructed. The aim of African nationalism was to reinstall African confidence,
identity, authority and unity. While the philosophy of African nationalism was directed
at uniting all Africans under one political identity, it did not retrench ethnic identities.

The resistance to colonialist perceptions of Africans was part of the self-formation
process that characterises the history of resistance in South Africa. The philosophy of

African nationalism fonned the basis of liberation organisations such as the African
National Congress and its youth wing. The spirit of African nationalism was imbued in
organisations such as the Pan-African Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness
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Movement (BCM) and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). It was also
reflected in the thinking of liberation philosophers such as Anton Lcmbcdc and Steve
Biko (Karis & Carter, 1972; Marx, 1990). Like all discursive frameworks, African

nationalism went through a process of development and evaluation. Its relevance, and its
capacity to enable the people to assert their political position, was re-assessed by the

ANC in 1955, who consequently forsook African nationalism in favour of other dogma.

Political strategies adopted by the early ANC were based around non-confrontational
approaches and focused on challenging the legal and conceptual framework of various
segregative statutes. The ANC presented itself as a pressure group working within the
established colonial constitution to express the grievances of the African community,
rather than as a liberation movement. Its approach, as stipulated in the 1919
constitution, was "to record all grievances and wants of native people and to seek by
constitutional means the redress thereof..." (Karis & Carter, 1972, p. 78). Gcobo (1963)
described the early ANC as "largely a grievance redressing body" (p. I).

As state power became more pervasive in the period 1944-1961, radical developments
occurred within the ANC including the emergence of a young generation of radical
activists. The radicalisation of the organisation's strategic approach and the shift from
Africanism to multi-racialism in the 1950s, were amongst the non-discursive and
discursive developments of this period.

A number of historical sources consulted for this study refer to a lack of organisational
and political effectiveness in the ANC prior to the 1940s. Troup (1972) writes that in "
these confusing years the ANC, short of cash and disorganised, failed to give the people
a strong, practical lead" (p.276). However, after its campaigns to recruit young people in
the late 1930s and early 1940s, the ANC improved its status (Mzala, 1987).

Although there is a general agreement among historians that the fom1ation of the ANC
Youth League in 1944 provided the conditions for the revival of the ANC, some
historians such as Meli (1988), argue that the process began in I 939 when a nation-wide
political consultation was conducted by the ANC leadership. Karis & Carter (I 972)
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suggest that the process occurred at the time of the I 935- I 936 campaign led by Fort

Hare University Professor Jabavu in opposition to colonial Jaws that discnffanchiscd

Ati"icans. During this campaign university students, mainly young men, were drawn into
opposition politics and "some of the men who were later to join the Youth League

became active members of the ANC allcr I 93 7" (Karis & Carter, I 972, p. 99).

Historical background to the emergence of youth politics
and the formation ofthe ANC Youth League.
!n the 1940s, there was an increase in political activism amongst Black youth. Most of
the young people who became politically active at this time were university students and
young professionals. Their interests in politics developed through involvement in

student associations. From there, many broadened their perspectives beyond campus
politics.

Most of the young people were inspired by national and global political discourses

associated with the fight against fascism in Germany and the rise of trade unionism and
Leftist politics in South Africa. Italy's attack on Ethiopia in World War II was also

critical in that it heightened African nationalist sentiment amongst South African young
people. A number of these young people joined the ANC and also participated in the

political activities of the radical and action oriented African Teachers Union. From these
activities emerged a vibrant and radicalised generation of political activists (Benson,
1985; Jobns & Davis, 1991; Karis & Carter, 1972; Meli, 1988; Troup, 1972).

Gcobo (1963) asserts that, because of their exposure to World War II politics, this new

generation was more conscious about race politics than its predecessors. Consequently,
they became disenchanted with the ANC leadership's attempts to effect changes through
constitutional means. They felt it their responsibility as potential leaders to rejuvenate

the national movement and give it a political meaning. The young generation "wanted to
see his new approach articulated" and began to lobby for support within the ANC ranks
(Gcobo, 1963, p. 1).
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A pro-ANC youth movement emerged as an internal pressure group lohbying f{lr
political change within the ANC. At this time the ANC was politically marginaliscd and

widely perceived by youth activists as ,"an organisation of the privileged JCw - some
Professionals, Small Traders, a sprinkling of Intellectuals and Conservatives of all
grades" (Provisional Committee of the ANC Youth League, !978, p. 16-17). Rather

than developing as an opposition to the ANC, members of the youth movement pointed
out that, "In response to the demands of the times African Youth is laying its services at
the disposal of the national liberation movement, the African National Congress, in the
firm belief, knowledge and conviction that the cause of Africa must and will triumph"
(Provisional Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p. 16-17).

<allowing the lobbying of progressive ANC elders by young people to support the
establishment of a youth league, the December I 943 annual conference of the ANC

passed a resolution in favour of the formation of the league. The resolution was seen by
many young people as a milestone in African politics and a triumph over traditionalism.
The conference cleared the way for young people who were, according to African

tradition, too immature and inexperienced to actively participate in public issues. Gcobo
(1963) points out that the, "young men themselves were beginning to feel that their

energies and fresh ideas and outlook were needed in the movement" (p. I).

Some conservative ANC members opposed the formation of the youth league. For
example, Champion argued that the league would undermine the leadership of the ANC.
At the conference, he warned ANC President Dr Xuma "that his association with the
youth will bring about his downfall from the ANC presidency" (Champion, 1943 cited
in Mzala, 1987, p. 51). However, in his presidential address, Dr Xuma called on young
people to become actively involved in ANC politics (Meli, 1988; Mzala, 1987).The

conference also resolved to form a women's league.

Unlike the youth league, the Women's League remained under-represented in African
politics, a situation reflecting wider patriarchal patterns. Bundlender et al., (1984, p. 25)

asserts that the function of women in early political organisations such the ANC "was to
organise catering and entertainment for ANC meetings. Nor did the fommtion of tlte
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National Council of African Women, mainly concerned with wt.:lfUre, take their political
role further."

After the conference, a group of young people embarked on the process of establishing a
youth wing of the ANC. On February 21, 1944, a deputation sought an audience with Dr
Xuma to clarify constitutional issues. Drafts of the League's constitution and manifesto
were presented and discussed with Dr Xuma. Although he expressed concerns about the
radical approach of the League and its criticism of the ANC leadership, he gave his
assent to the documents. In April 1944 the Youth League was launched as a formal
political youth wing of the African National Congress (Mzala, 1987; Pampallis, 1991),

Although there had previously been a number of political youth groups, such as the
Transvaal Indian Youth Congress, the Young Communists and the National Union of
African Youth, the ANCYL was the first substantial African youth political organisation
to exist in colonial South Africa (Karis & Carter, I 972), Many of the League's veteran
activists became prominent figures in the ANC leadership from the I 950s to the I 990s,

The ANC Youth League and African nationalism,
Under the influence of Lembede- an advocate of Africanist ideology- the Youth League
was set up to promote African nationalism and to act as a recruitment agent for the
ANC. The manifesto states that the League, "must be the brains-trust and power station
of the spirit of African nationalism; the spirit of African self-detennination; the spirit
that is so discernible in the thinking of our Youth" (Provisional Committee of the ANC
Youth League, 1978, p.l7). African nationalism and anti-foreign ideological sentiments
were strong amongst Youth Leaguers. These sentiments were expressed in verbal
political discourses as well as in the League's documents. The CREED, a manifesto
published by the League, emphasises the organisation's belief

... that the national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans
themselves. We reject foreign leadership of Africa. "We may borrow ... from
foreign ideologies, but reject the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies
into Africa (The Provisional Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p.
19).
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The 1948 Basic Policy Document of the Youth League and the 1949 ANC Programme
of Action document reiterate this position by stressing the need fOr Africans to define
themselves and to lead their own struggic. In reference to sympathetic white liberals, the

Basic Policy Document stated that their rhetoric "is negligible, and in the last analysis
counts for nothing" (National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p.

26). Concerns about communism were raised earlier by the Provisional Executive
Committee of the League. Members were warned to be vigilant "against Communists
and other groups which foster non-African interests" (Provisional Executive Committee,
cited in Karis & Carter, 1972, p. I 00).

Although the South African Communist Party (SACP) had organised against the
principles of colonialism and capitalism, it was still regarded as the 'Other'. Its
allegiance to "foreign" ideologies caused the Youth League members to be suspicious of
the SACP for a number of years. However, not all members of the ANC and the
ANCYL shared this view. For exarople, in the 1920s the Transvaal ANC branch
supported SACP and workers' political protests. Individuals associating themselves
with Communists or groups not promoting the cause of African nationalism were often
criticised and ostracised (Paropallis, 1991 ).

Concerns about communism in South Africa were expressed by Africanist activists as
we1l as by the state. To Africanists the idea of communism conjured up an image of a
'foreign ideologue' who did not appreciate the notion of African self-determinism. Yet
there was an apparent hypocrisy in the ANC's and the League's adoption of Christian
and Western educational values. Furthermore, as Johns and Davis (1991) point out, in
the 1940s and 1950s the ANC "continued the pre-Union practice of seeking backing
from Britain" (p. 9).

The state's concerns about communism were rather different. State discourses about
Communists developed during the Party's involvement in organising workers against
what they described as capitalist and imperialist exploitation of the working class.
Another factor which concerned the state was the non-racial egalitarian perspective of
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communism. A Communist was defined in state Jaws as a "bad' person engaged in
subversive and terrorist activities. Mzala ( 1985) argued that the state created an image
of a Communist as "'anybody who opposes apartheid, whether this is done in the form of
a sermon from the church pulpit, a funeral oration at the graveside or anti-apartheid
campaigning in the cultural field" (p. 88 ).

The state feared not only communism but also the growing popularity and subversive
ideology of Ati"ican nationalism. As Troup (1972) observes "white fears of Black
Nationalism had been spelled out with the apartheid policy in the election campaign" (p.
323). The popularisation of Africanism through the activities of the Youth League posed
a challenge to the master/slave power dynamic that existed between Europeans and
Africans. By its appeal to African nationalist sentiment, its rejection of the inferiority
status and colonial authority, the philosophy of Africanism was subversive in its
approach. In the early years of the Youth League's political activity, Africanism formed
the power base and the identity of young people who were involved in the recruitment
campaign. According to Mandela (1994), former League member, "African nationalism
was our battle cry" (p. 114).

The social position of the Youth League organisers and their ability to articulate a
radical political position attracted a substantial number of young people into formal
opposition politics (Meli, 1988; Pampallis, 1991 ). Yet there were also limitations
associated with the social identity of the League organisers. Their social status as
intellectuals and their background in student activism confined the Youth League
recruittnent activities within particular boundaries (Glaser, 1988/89).

The recruitment campaign and the construction of the
'youth' category.
The ANC Youth League manifesto committed the organisation to establishing a mass
youth movement. The League aimed to overcome the limitations of the ANC by
creating a broad based youth membership. There was a strong emphasis on

~onstructing

a disciplined youth constituency that would promote the principles of tho national
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movement. The image of the youth category envisaged by the League was reflected in
its manifesto: "African Youth must be united, consolidated, trained and disciplined
because from their ranks future leaders would be recruited." (The Provisional
Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p. II). The League was to operate as a
recruitment and training ground for ANC membership and leadership.

In pursuit of its goal to create a nationally unified youth movement, the League targeted
existing youth groups and all young people who were exposed to racial segregation and
state oppression. The League's Constitution states that membership is

open to all African men and women between the ages of 12 and 40" .... Young
members of the other sections of the community who live like and with
Africans and whose outlook on life is similar to that of Africans may become
full members with [the same] age limits ... (Provisional Executive Committee
of the ANC Youth League, 1973, p. 312).

In practice the League targeted educated urban Africans. Studies of the Youth League's
early recruitment process (Glaser, 1988/89, 1993) examine the 'youth' category
constructed by the League in the 1940s and 1950s. Literacy, urbanisation, discipline,
gender and political association with the philosophy of Africanism appear to have been
influential considerations in the recruitment process.

Glaser (1988/89) found that the recruitment network of the League in the 1940s was
concentrated mostly around urban African locations in the Rand region. Glaser studied
the heterogeneous composition of the youth population in this region and identified two
distinct social groups that existed in the 1940s and 1950s. These were the school-going
youth with a Christian bac......ground and the 'illiterate' or '' ... semi-illiterate, tsotsi
dominated world which generally rejected schooling" (Glaser, 1988/89, p. I). According
to Glaser, the former constituted a minority of the youth population in the Rand region.

The term 'tsotsi' emerged during the influx of Africans to urban areas and the declining
youth employment of the 1940s and 1950s. It referred to delinquents or 'street'
criminals who developed distinct subcultural identities. The term was widely associated
with unemployed urban African young males. Female delinquency was defined in
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moralistic and sexual terms. For example, Mager and Minklcy (1993) describe African
female delinquents as those who "displayed a new aggressive sexuality and flagrantly
violated the role of the respectable Aii·ican woman". They added that the status of

female delinquents "depended on a sexual relationship with a tsotsi or a group of
t~otsis"

(p. 241). Machismo and lack of education were also associated with the term

tsotsi.

Discourses about the two youth social groups (the educated and uneducated) created a
polarised youth population - 'Us' and 'Them'. Generally, tsotsis were critical of
izifzmdiswa (the educated) and ba excuse me (middle class or Westemised Blacks).
Previous studies (Bonner et al., 1993; Glaser, 1988/89, 1993) show that the proliferation

oftsotsis occurred in a context of historical, social, political and economic change.

As a part of the process of self-formation, most young people who were labelled as

tsotsis or deviants developed alternative cultures. They were resentful of authority and
avoided contact with disciplinary institutions such as schools. It is claimed that in the
1950s unemployed and out of school young Africans were increasingly drawn into tsotsi
groups rather than to the ranks of the ANC Youth League (Bonner, 1993; Glaser,
1988/1989). Their activities ranged from informal political and cultural resistance,

promotion of a group identity to securing an income through various 'illegal' means.

As Mager and Minkley (1993) show, tsotsis exercised a degree of autonomy from

African culture and mainstream disciplinary institutions. Due to their unwillingness to
make themselves available for discipline by traditional as well as colonial laws, they
were regarded as anti-social and the 'Other'. They were despised by the African
community and regarded by the ANC Youth League as undisciplined, uncontrollable,
and almost completely apolitical.

While the tsotsi and non-student or unemployed constituted the majority of young

people who lived under conditions of extreme economic deprivation, they were not
classified by the League as constituting a potential political 'youth' constituency. In
order to avoid the negative label of tsotsi being attached to the organisation, the League
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dissociated itself from tsotsis. As Mphahlclc points out, "meddling with tsotsis" was
discouraged and criticised within the ranks of the ANC Youth League. According to
Mphahlele, "Most ANC members recoiled from the idea jof politicising and recruiting
tsotsis] because tsotsis couldn't be controlled ... " (cited in Glaser, 1988/89, p. II).
Instead the League participated in anti-tsotsi activities aimed at ridding the townships of
such ·criminal elements'.

League organisers preferred to concentrate on school-going youth. Due to their exposure
to education, students were regarded as more amenable to politicisation and discipline.
The League's stated aim of unifying and mobilising all African 'youth' was, in practice,
translated into mobilising students.

Many young school attendees came from financially advantaged homes. Education in
South Africa at that time was a privilege and did not attract large numbers of young
people from poor families. Furthermore, there were limited school places for African
children in the 1940s and 1950s (Hyslop, 1993). Thus, the ANC's focus on schools as
recruitment grounds meant that it did not have a diverse and mass-based youth
constituency.

Secondary schools on the Rand and Black universities such as Fort Hare became a
traditional mobilising and recruitment ground for the ANC Youth League. Sympathetic
teachers, and those who were members of the League such as Sobukwe, Pitje,
Mothopeng, and Tambo, were active in politicising students in schools. By the 1950s,
most Black secondary schools on the Rand had at least one or two sympathetic or
politicised teachers who acted as recruitment agents for the League. However, this
process was restricted by the hostility of school authorities to the politicisation of
students in schools. Active political involvement could result in sanctions for teachers
and students (Glaser, 1988/89).

In order to avoid detection, many teachers and students organised outside school. Other
forms of covert political mobilisation in schools included the formation of student
associations and the distribution of pamphlets. Political incentives, such as the
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encouragement of new members of the League to establish autonomous Youth League
branches, were also employed as a recruitment tactic. Most students were responsive to
the ANC campaign and took an active role in the popularisation of the League's and the
ANC's political cause (Glaser, 1988/89; Karis & Carter, 1973). Intellectuals and
students became the 'youth' of the 1940s and 1950s. As students formed the core

constituency of the emerging youth category, the distinction between 'youth' and
'students' became blurred, making it difficult to conceive of the youth as a distinct and
static category.

The schools provided a climate conducive to the perpetuation of the intellectual culture
and disciplined membership that had been main characteristics of the ANC. Aspiring
students who displayed a high level of discipline rose to prominence in ANC politics.
There were regarded by the League intelligentsia as part of 'Us'. On the other hand,

those who operated outside the traditional ANC culture were identified as 'Them', and
remained outside the Youth League organisational process.

The insider/outsider classification was expressed in discourses, such as "izifundiswa"
(generally referring to those who attained Western education) and "uquqaba
olungafundile" ( the masses which had not been to school), that polarised the African
youth population. While the "izifundiswa" were held in high esteem by some Africans,

most were contemptuous of their association with Western culture. They were described
as "abelungu abamnyama" (Black Europeans)- an identity that created unease between
the uneducated masses and the League intellectuals (Ia Hausse, 1993). The League
remained largely an intellectual based organisation and removed from the rest of the
youth population.

However, following the institutionalisation of racism in 1948, shifts in discursive and
strategic approaches began to show in Youth League politics. Under the leadership of

Mda, the Youth League set up a programme to review its tactics and strategies. In the
1950s the struggle moved to a new phase when the League organised a defiance and

mass action campaign against discriminatory laws.
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The institutionalisation of racism and youth politics.
In 1948 the National Party was elected into office and introduced a formal system of
racial segregation: apartheid. Through the usc of executive, legislative and judicial
powers, the new government reinforced the concept of racial and cultural superiority of
Europeans over identified sections of the population (Troup, 1972; Johns & Davis,
1991).

A year after the introduction of apartheid, a series of discriminatory and repressive laws
were enacted. These included the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act (which
outlawed intermarriages), the 1950 Group Areas Act that classified South Africans into
four racial groups - "White", "Native", "Coloured" and "Asiatics". In addition to the
Group Areas Act, the government passed the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952

prohibiting Africans from living in metropolitan areas and or close proximity to white
areas. The Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act of 1952 obliged all
Africans aged seventeen and older to carry a reference book at all times. This book

became known as a 'pass book' and contained detailed personal information. The Bantu
Education Act and the Extension of University Education Act were passed in 1953 and
1959 respectively to provide a separate education system for 'non-whites'. The Criminal
Law Amendment Act of 1953 criminalised political activity by classifYing it within the
sphere of law and order while the Public Safety Act, enacted in 1953, allowed the
government the discretion to declare a state of emergency (Brookes, 1968; Marx, 1992;
Benson, 1985).

The Suppression of Communism Act, enacted in 1950, was w!dely publicised and
challenged by the liberation movement. Under this law, the Communist Party was
banned and " ... as amended in 1954, the Minister of Justice was empowered to ban
individuals deemed by the Minister to be promoting any one of the aims of
Communism" (Brookes 1968, p. 204; Johns & Davis, 1991; p. 22-24). Under this law,
activities related to communism were classified as criminal rather than political
offences.
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The introduction of apartheid provoked discursive reforms within the ANC and the
Youth League. The League

ci·.~velopcd

the Basic Policy Document. The document

ascribed to the League the task of ''rallying and uniting African youth into one national
Front on the basis of African Nationalism". According to the document, two streams of
Africanism existed:

One centres round Marcus Garvey's slogan-' Africa for the Africans' .It is
based on the 'Quit Africa' slogan and on the cry 'Hurl the White man into the
sea'. This brand of African Nationalism is ~xtremt: and ultra revolutionary.
There is another stream of African Nationalism (Africanism) which is
moderate, and which the Congress Youth League profess. We ... take account of
the concrete situation in South Africa, and realise that the different racial
groups have come to stay. But we insist that a condition for interracial peace
and progress is the abandonment of white domination ... (National Executive
Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1978, p. 20)

In a letter to Pitje, Mda emphasised the need for racial coexistence and insisted that the
ANC and the Youth League position on Africanism did not imply racial hatred. Mda
stated that " ... we only hate white oppression and white domination, and not the white
people themselves!" (Mda, 1973, p. 321 ).

In the context of the publication of the Basic Policy Document and increasing repression
under the new system of apartheid, a consolidation of democratic forces was envisaged.
According to Troup (1972) and Mandela (1994) members of the Youth League began to
establish political relationships with Indian and liberal white students. The ANC
leadership was also forging political co-operation with members of the Communist
Party who had gone underground. The Apartheid laws, such as the Suppression of
Communism Act and the Group Areas Act, were meant to crush state opposition and
divide the subject population, but actually became the cause of power and unity.

With frustration and mass action sentiment increasing among the African, Indian and
Coloured communities, the Youth League developed a radical programme to challenge
repression. The programme required the approval of the ANC Congress, and the
Leaguers had to lobby support from conservative and moderate ANC members. Even
though the ANC President Dr Xuma had earlier given his support to the Youth League,
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he was opposed to boycotts and mass protests proposed in the programme (Karis &
Carter, 1973; Troup, 1972).

The young people played their numbers and threatened not to endorse Dr Xuma as
president in the December elections if he maintained his opposition to the proposed
Programme of Action. Expecting the young people to interact with him in a traditional
child/parent relationship, Dr Xuma was angry at being threatened and told them that
they "were young and arrogant, and treating him without respect" (Mandela, 1994, p.

131).

Having failed to convince Dr Xurna, the Leaguers turned to Professor Matthews as an
alternative candidate but were described by Matthews as "too radical ... naive firebrands
[who] would mellow with age" (Mandela, 1994, p. 131). Eventually, Dr Moroko was
endorsed by the Youth League and elected as president. The Programme of Action was
adopted by the 1949 December annual conference. Two Youth League members, Sisulu
and Tambo, were elected onto the ANC Executive Committee. Commenting on the
Youth League's political manoeuvring, Calata stated that

These Youth Leaguers were students and teachers and professional men - as
petite bourgeois as their predecessors. They were men thrown up by the
national struggle, and not the class struggle, and More significant still, although
they were not communists when they initiated and carried through their militant
policies, many of them were afterwards drawn towards Marxism and the
Communist Party (cited in Meli, 1988, p. 118).

The adoption of The Programme of Action and the election of its members into ANC
leadership enabled the League to have a greater influence in the ANC's decision making
process. The aims and "principles of the Programme of Action were inspired by the
desire to achieve National freedom" (National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth
League, 1973, p. 337). The fundamental aspects of the Programme of Action
emphasised principles such as self-determination, the promotion of self-confidence, and
African identity. It rejected white paternalism and domination. Its call for " immediate
and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience and non-co-operation" (The National
Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1973, p. 338).
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The shill from the ANC reformist approach to the muss defiance strategy, constitutes a
significant historical break. These developments altered the organisation's composition,
power structure. strategies and tnctics. According to Mandel a ( 1978), the d1angcs, "laid
the basis for the national campaigns of direct action and refusal to collaborate in
structures provided by the government for blacks" (p, 30).

In 1950, the Youth League and the ANC began to implement the programme in co-

operation with other organisations, such as the Indian Congress and the multiracial trade
union- the South African Congress of Trade Unions. A number of mass political
protests occurred in the 1950s prompting the enactment of countering legislation.
Significant political actions included the National Day of Protest and Mourning and the
Defiance Campaign (Pampallis, I 99 I).

The "Defend Free Speech" meeting, chaired by ANC President Dr Moroko, set the pace

for mass protest and defiance campaigns. The meeting attacked the government for
violating fundamental human rights and demanded the end of colour bar Jaws and the
denial of freedom of speech and movement It called for a general strike on May Day
(International Workers' Day May I) 1950. The police responded with brutality, killing

eighteen Africans. As May Day was associated with communism, the strike was
described by the state and some ANC members as being orchestrated by Communists.
An ANC Youth League member criticised Dr Moroko for presiding over a communist

organised protest and argued that "the May Day demonstrations were intended to be part
of a world campaign engineered by the Communists

t~

help advance the cause of

Communism and not of the oppressed African" ( Ngubane, 1973, p. 441). Although
there was an emerging trend towards multiracial unity in the struggle for freedom, there
was still scepticism amongst hard-line Africanists. In the late I 950s disagreements on

the issue developed into an internal ideological conflict within ANC ranks.

The state responded to the May Day demonstrations by introducing the Unlawful
Organisation Bill, which later became The Suppression of Communism Act. The state

definition of communism, as mentioned earlier, extended beyond the Communist Party
and its members. Many political activists felt threatened and supported a unified
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approach against the Bill and other repressive Jaws. A joint emergency conference
organised by the ANC was convened to mobilise political support against the Bill. The
positive response to this call was regarded as an encouragement to the formation of a

multiracial alliance (Karis & Carter, 1973; Johns & Davis, 1991; Meli, 1988).

A number of leading organisations attended the conference. They included the ANC, the
Youth League, the South African Indian Congress, the African People's Organisation,

the Communist Party of South Africa, and the Transvaal Council of Non-European
Trade Unions. At the conference, Tambo argued that "Today it is the Communist Party.
Tomorrow it will be our trade unions, oP Indian Congress, ... , our African National

Congress" (cited in Meli, 1988, p. 119-120). The conference described the Bill as
leading South Africa to "a fully fledged fascist state" and pledged "to take immediate
steps to mobilise all sections of the South African people to offer concrete mass
opposition to this vicious Bill with the aim of defeating it" (Conference of

Representatives of the Executive Committees, 1973, p. 442-443).

After consultations and joint planning, the leading organisations declared July 26 1950
as "The National Day of Protest and Mourning". Because of its political standing in

opposition politics, the ANC and Youth League played a leading role in organising the
national protest and in building the alliance. The ANC president issued a mass stay-at-

home protest call and appealed for joint co-operation. According to Benson (1985, p.
132), "nearly three quarters of the African workers stopped work, Indian shopkeepers
closed their shops ... "

Prior to the protest, the Youth League leadership had expressed its support for a joint
approach. It asserted that

IfMak:ina, Dingana, Khama and Sekhukhuni had defended their country
jointly, Africa would have been served for posterity. Now, for the first time in
the history of South Africa, the people intend to offer a joint National
Opposition at all costs .... The name of organisations can be banned, leaders can
be imprisoned, but the spirit and aspirations of a people can never be subdued"
(Central Executive Committee of the Transvaal ANC Youth League, 1990, p.
51).
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The endorsement of a consolidated mass approach and a willingness to sacrifice and
face imprisonment represented a radical non-discursive shift in the history of Black
politics in South Africa. This was evident in the Defiance Campaign when many people,
mostly youth, volunteered to violate the new laws with full knowledge that they could
be persecuted or even killed. This became a new form of resistance and mobilisation
against the state (Frederikse, 1990; Meli, I 988; Pampall is, I 991 ). According to the
ANC seventy fifth anniversary statement, " The spirit of defiance engendered by this
campaign produced, though indirectly, the riots of 1953 at Port Elizabeth, East
London ... and elsewhere" (1987, p. 9). Militant struggles in this campaign include the
1950s women's struggle against the extension of passes to women.

As the campaigns advanced, multiracial discourses became more common in political
speeches and organisational documents. For example, in a statement on the Day of
Protest, the League's Traosvaal braoch stated that "The African people have pledged
themselves to liberate South Africa - black, white and yellow - and to that end the
impending national crisis presages the shape of things to come" (Central Executive
Committee of the Traosvaal ANC Youth League, 1990, p. 51). Political actions were
planned jointly with other political organisations. These actions included the defiaoce or
civil disobedience campaigns against segregative laws, bus and train boycotts, and
protests against the Bantu system of education. These campaigns enjoyed substantial
support from young people, including the tsotsi youth constituency that was previously
regarded by the League as apolitical (Glaser, 1988/89; Johns & Davis, 1991; Pampallis,
1991).

Although tsotsis became actively involved in campaigns orgaoised by the League- such
as the protest against the desttuction of Sophiatown 1 aod school aod bus boycotts- the
ANC Youth League did not formally endorse their mobilisation. The tsotsis maintained

their autonomy aod participated informally in most campaigns. Glaser's (1988/89) study
on tsotsi youth shows that this category of young people were the "stonn troopers" of

I Sophiatown was an African township which was destroyed and African residents were forcefully
removed under the Group Areas Act to give way to the development of"White" only residential zone

(Troup, !972).
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boycotts in that they ,"identified closely with certain cnmpaign issues and took their
own initiatives to enforce adherence to boycotts" (p.ll ).

Unlike the school boycott and the Sophiatown protest, the Defiance Campaign of I 952

was a planned and disciplined activity. It was taken up by volunteers selected by a
disciplinary process. According to Meli (1988), the campaign received support from

Africans, Indians, Coloureds and the new pro-ANC white organisation- the Congress of
Democrats. With the move towards fonnal alliance receiving popular support among
moderates, the 1950s was marked by a shift in the discourse of liberation.

From Africanism to Charterism.
The ANC continued its commitment to the issue of multiracialism and the founding of a
democratic alliance. In co-ordination with other anti-apartheid organisations, the ANC
embarked on a nation wide consultation to solicit the people's views on the issue of
democracy. Political, social and economic demands were collected from all sectors of
the South African population and presented in the Congress of the People. Political

discourses such as "togetherness", "multiracialism", "freedom", "peace", "equality and
equity", were prevalent during the consultation process. Appealing for popular
participation in the consultation process, a leaflet stated that

ALL OF US TOGETHER- African and European, Indian and Coloured. Voter
and voteless. Privileged and rightless. The happy and the homeless. All the
people of South Africa; of the towns and of the countryside.

LET US SPEAK TOGETHER OF FREEDOM. And of the happiness that can
come to men and women if they live in a land that is free.

LET US SPEAK TOGETHER OF FREEDOM. And how to get it for ourselves,
and for our children" (National Action Council of the Congress of the People,
178, p. 47).

"Freedom" and "togetherness" were dominant themes of the consultation campaign. The
concept of emancipation became the main focus of the liberation movement. The term
"freedom" referred not only to political but also to social and economic emancipation.

By the mid 1950s, it was obvious to most anti-apartheid activists that multiracialism
was a viable approach to national liberation. The "Charter of Freedom" (later The
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Freedom Charter), entailing the doctrine of multiracialism , was adopted by a Congress
of the People in June 1955. It was reported that about 3, 000 delegates representing all
sections of the community attended ( Troup, 1972; Karis & Carter, 1973; Mandela,
1978a, 1990b; Lodge, 1983; Meli, 1988; Johns & Davis, 1991). The pr"amble of the
Charter states that

South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no
government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the
people; ... That our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people
live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities ... That only a
democratic state, based on the will of the people can secure to all their
birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief (Sub-committee of
the National Action Council, 1978, p. 50).
The Charter of Freedom was widely accepted and became the ideological bulwark of the
anti-apartheid alliance. With its liberal approach and its emphasis on civil rights, the
adoption of the Freedom Charter was a critical juncture in the history of the liberation
movement. Discursive approaches to the struggle for political, social and economic
freedom shifted from the confines of African nationalism to the broader parameters of
internationalism and multiracialism. The alliance was referred to in specific political
terminology as the 'Charterist movement'. Led by the ANC, it became the symbol of
the broadly defined 'anti-apartheid movement' (Pampallis, 1991).

When the ideology of African nationalism was abandoned by the ANC and the Youth
League, the new political culture produced new political identities and strategies. Most
League members began to relate to the principles of the Charter rather than Africanism.
The Youth League became an advocate of the Freedom Charter and were represented in
liberatory discourses as "Charterists". (Meli, 1988). This illustrates the impact of
changes in organisational practice on discourse fonnation and the construction of the
subject. As the discourse and organisational practice that construct the subject changes,
so too the identity of the subject population (Foucault, 1965, 1977).

The economic policy entailed in the Charter, which called for the nationalisation of key
industries and an equitable re-distribution of wealth, was received with enthusiasm by
disadvantaged groups, but described by the state as well as liberals as a form of
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commumsm (Lodge, 1983 ). Using the Suppression of Communism Act, the state
arrested and banished prominent anti-apartheid activists "for having engaged in an
allegedly communist-inspired conspiracy ... " (Johns & Davis, ]991, p. 30). While those
arrested were later

releas,~d

due to a lack of evidence, banishment orders remained,

creating a crisis in organisational coherence. Yet this did not enervate opposition to the
system. Instead the 1950s political trial was a cause of mobilisation (Sechaba, I 956,
cited in Frederikse I 990, p. 70).

Although the ANC gained popularity as a result of the trial, internal conflict escalated
with pro-Africanist young people opposing the shift to multiracialism and the alliance
with the Communist Party. According to Ngubane (1964), the younger African

Nationalists argued that these developments "reduced" the ANC "to a minority group in
the alliance ... " (p. 170). An anti-multiracial alliance campaign was launched, accusing
the ANC of violating the principles of the Programme of Action. Pro-Charterist ANC

activists were regarded as "self-confessed lackeys and flunkeys of the white ruling class
and the Indian merchant class" (Meli, 1988, p. 13 7).

The rallying point against the shift in discourse of liberation was the principles of the
Freedom Charter which regard South Africa as belonging "to all who live in it, black
and white". The policy of the Freedom Charter on land, which states that "land shall be

shared among those who work it", was another source of conflict. Pro-Africanist young
people considered the land as a birthright and an essential part of indigenous African
identity (Marx, 1992).

The concept of land as a symbol of African identity appealed to large sections of the

rural community and was used to mobilise support against what was regarded as a threat
to African self-determination. Lodge (1983, p. 202) claims that the appeal to nationalist

sentiments created an " .. .ethnonationalist popular consciousness." The ANC persevered
and defended its position on the land issue. At the Morogoro Conference in 1969 it
argued that "The White people, who monopolise the land, have made South Africa their
home and are historically part of the South African population and as such entitled to
the land" (ANC, 1969, p. 9).
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Organisational split and the emergence of the Pan African
Congress (PAC).
In the context of this ideological conflict, a splinter organisation Jed by Robert Sobukwc

emerged in 1959. Reflecting the aspiration of Africanism, the new organisation was
called the Pan-Alricanist Congress (PAC). The PAC founding members reiterated the

ANC Youth League's earlier position that the struggle for liberation must be achieved
and led by Africans themselves. It opposed the ANC's alliance with the Communist
Party and adopted the name Poqo (going it alone) as its political identity (Gcobo, 1963 ).
Most of the PAC's policies mirrored those of the Youth League. The PAC Constitution

states that the aim of the organisation is

To unite and rally the African people into one national front on the basis of
African Nationalism. To fight for the overthrow of White domination, and for
the implementation and maintenance of the right of self-determination for the
African people ... To wage the struggle ... under the banner of the Programme of
Action of 1949 adopted in Bloemfotein (PAC National Executive Committee,

1973, p. 524-531 ).
In his analysis of the PAC philosophical framework, Ngubane (1964) concluded that
PAC was a reflection of the Youth League " ... Because [it] set out to assert purely
African initiatives as a dominant influence in South African political life" ( p. 51).

At the launch of the PAC, Robert Sobukwe referred to the destruction of white

supremacy as a precondition for democracy in South Africa. He asserted that ''the
illiterate and semi-illiterate African masses constitute the key and centre and content of
any struggle for true democracy in South Africa. The African people can be organised
only under the banner of African nationalism ... " (Sobukwe, cited in Frederikse, !990, p.

76). The construction of the "illiterate and semi-illiterate" categories was an attempt by
the PAC to transcend the League's limitations by constituting the subject differently.

In its programme of action, the PAC set 1960 as the year for the liberation of Africa.

Soon after the launch, it embarked on a major recruitment and mobilisation drive.
Although it also used schools as a site of political recruitment, the PAC moved to new
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terrain. It aimed to exploit the political potential of the unemployed township youth who
had remained politically unorganiscd. With its rhetoric of armed confrontation, the PAC
identified itself with the anger and frustration of many unemployed youth who were
members of the tsotsi subculture (Glaser, 1993). Within three months the PAC claimed
a membership of about twenty-five thousand, and a majority of young people.
Comparing the ANC and PAC membership, Gerhart (1978) argued that

without doubt, age and not class was the most distinguishing characteristic of
the PAC's following. At every level of organisation, from the national
learl~rship down to the least regimented non-card carrying supporter, the people
associated with the PAC were at least a decade younger on average than those

in the ANC ( p. 221).
The fonnation of the PAC and its strategy of anned struggle provided an environment
for the mobilisation of large numbers of young people. As tsotsis were drawn into
fonnal political opposition, the liberation movement became more radicalised and
militant in its approach. The radicalisation and militarisation of political activism
brought the struggle against apartheid to a new phase. The production of political
discourse fanned the broader part of the construction and deconstruction of the youth
category in Black South African politics. Several social control measures were
developed by the state to depoliticise the youth constituency and minimise their political
potential.

Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter was to document the emergence of the ANC Youth League
and the politics of its relationship with the ANC and the wider struggle. The process of
youth self-formation and the impact of the formation of the Youth League on liberation
politics was examined. Shifts in the discourse of liberation in the 1940s and 1950s were
more visible than were shifts in the discourse of youth. While Leaguers defined
themselves as "the brain-trust and power-station of the spirit of African nationalism",
the traditional perception of young people as "immature" and "firebrands" persisted.
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The overt challenge to the traditional authority of the ANC old guard by Leaguers w""
part of the wider conflict between traditionalism and changes in organisational practice.
Most of the League founding members were exposed to contemporary 1940s race
politics and wanted to institute a radical approach to the struggle against colonial values.
They regarded the liberal and reformist approach of the traditional ANC as overly
passive and ineffective. The radical and assertive League transcended cultural and
organisational boundaries within which young people and women had been constrained
to a peripheral position in the political process. While young people (male) transcended

these boundaries, women remained entrapped.

Some of the ANC old guard resisted the youth advance by opposing League initiated
actions such as the 1959 Programme of Action. The formation of the League itself was
received with caution. The conflict was not confined to a dispute between generations young people too were polarised. This was evident in the 1950s when young people
were divided by the issue of multiracialism.

The power conflict that characterised the 1940s and the 1950s can be understood in
terms of Foucault's analysis of power. According to Foucault (1984), power cannot be
monopolised or located in one site but must be understood as "the multiplicity of force
relations." It is exercised "through ceaseless struggles and confrontations ... " (p. 92).
Foucault also argued that "where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1984, p.
95). These Foucaultian principles are borne out by the political developments of 1949
and the 1950s.

Discourse formation plays a major role in the process of power and the constitution of
the subject population. For example, dominant discourse that described students as
amenable to politicisation and discipline was influential in the Youth League's
construction of young people as 'youth'. The existence of these discourses meant that
the ANC Youth League's goal to construct a broadly based youth organisation was, in
practice, narrowed to a specifically identified subject population.
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Studies of African youth politics in the 1940s (Bonner, 1993; Glaser, 1988/89 1993)
show that large sections of the youth population who operated outside the Youth League
political culture remained outside formal opposition politics. These sections include
young women, tsotsis, the unemployed and the rural youth. The core constituency of the
League was urban male students. Thus participation in youth politics in the 1940s was
detennined by intellectual, urban and patriarchal prerequisites, a process representing a
continuity in ANC organisational practice.

This chapter also examined the organisational discursive and non-discursive
discontinuities that occurred after the introduction of apartheid. The radicalisation of the
anti-apartheid movement was evident in the 1950s when the ANC Youth League
organised a campaign against segregative laws. The Defiance Campaign, the shift from

Africanism to multiracialism, and the political split of I 959, all changed the landscape
of African politics. As African youth politics entered the I 960s period, the youth
category was polarised into pro-Africanist and pro-Charterist or multiracialist activists.
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3 Black youth politics in the 1960s and the
1970s: Young people and underground
politics.

Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the emergence of the African National Congress Youth
League, and developments in the discourse of liberation and organisational practice. A
number of changes within the liberation movement and the Youth League occurred after
the institutionalisation of racism in the late 1940s, including the radicalisation of the
ANC's strategic approach by its adoption of the Programme of Action in 1949. The
shift from Africanism to multiracialism and the split within the ANC and Youth
League's ranks were two further watersheds of the 1950s.

Changes in the discourse of liberation in 1955 and 1960 also had a major impact on
youth politics. Following the adoption of the Freedom charter and the formation of the
multiracial alliance, the Youth League abandoned the philosophy of African
nationalism. The emergence of discourse of armed resistance in the early 1960s marked
a strategic shift within youth politics and the liberation struggle generally. Such
discourses had more influence on the youth constituency than any other section of the
population (Glaser, 1993; Lodge, 1983; Meli, 1988).

Since the formation of the ANC Youth League, youth politics was directly related to the

liberation struggle: developments in youth politics were responses to changes or
perceived stagnation in the liberation movement. At the very start, it was the lack of
change in the ANC reformist approach to political resistance that precipitated the Youth
League.

Youth politics were also influenced by discursive shifts within the apartheid system. In
the 1960s, large numbers of young people, including unemployed and tsotsi youth, were
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mobilised into tormal opposition politics. The visibility of Black young people in antiapartheid activities meant that they became an issue for social policy makers.
Discourses about youth which described them as ' 1loafcrs", "juveniles", "out~ot:-works"

and "out-of-school" were generated by state institutions of social control (Glaser, 1993 ).
These discourses informed the policies of the Bantu mass schooling programme that
was introduced in the 1960s. As we shall see, the state policy of mass education had
diverse ramifications for youth politics.

This chapter examines the process of change experienced by the liberation movement,
the political context of this process, and its influence on the constitution of the youth
category in the 1960s and 1970s. First, the chapter explores the prolonged campaign
against aprutheid laws in 1960 that culminated in the Sharpeville massacre. Then, the
crack~down

on political dissent and the adoption of armed resistance will be examined.

Thirdly, the paradoxical role of Bantu education in South African politics will be
investigated. Previous studies (Diseko, 1990; Herbstein, 1978; Hyslop, 1993) show that
the system of Bantu education became one of the main pillars of apaJtheid in the 1960s.
Yet it was in this same milieu that young people were socially remobilised. Finally, this
chapter explores the rise of the student movement and Black Consciousness in 1969 and
the ensuing decade.

Anti-Pass Laws campaign
The growing popularity of the PAC and its radical Africanist rhetoric among urban
youth was thought by the government to underlie incidents of militancy and criminality
amongst the youth population. State laws, such as the 1952 Pass Laws, were designed to
constrain the movement of the subject population and were vigorously enforced. As
mentioned in Chapter One, the Pass Laws required all African adults over the age of
sixteen to carry a reference book or 'pass' at all times, and to produce this item
whenever government officials or employers required them to do so. As the 'pass'
contained comprehensive personal information, it functioned as a surveillance device
(Johns & Davis, 1991).
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Due to the high rate of youth unemployment, most young people moved from place to
place in search of employment, making them vulnerable to 'pass' related police

harassment, and reinforcing their opposition to the Pass Laws themselves. Mager and
Minkley (1993) found that tsotsis in particular "were quick to join any action or to react
to police violence" (p. 239).

Pass Laws were often defied by individuals or in organised protests. The restrictions
imposed by these laws on the growing African urban population made them the main
theme of the 1960 anti-apartheid campaign, which involved large numbers of people. In
view of the persistent and collective opposition to the Pass Laws, the ANC declared

March 31" 1960 a national day of "Anti Pass National stoppage of work" (Pampallis,
1991). In a case of political rivalry, the ANC was pre-emptied by the PAC: a protest
rally was called by PAC President Robert Sobukwe ten days prior to that scheduled by
the ANC. Sobukwe issued a statement calling the people to gather outside police
stations in their respective areas on 21" March in protest of the laws (Meli, 1988, p.
140).

Sharpeville township, where a large population of young people provided a stronghold
for PAC, responded positively to the PAC call. According to Lodge, in 1959
"Sharpeville's population comprised nearly 21 000 children, nearly 7 000 adult women
and 8 600 men. It was therefore a predominately youthful population ... " (cited in
Glaser, 1993, p. 308).

When Sharpeville residents- women, children and men- gathered peacefully outside the
police station to express their opposition to these laws, the police responded with

gunfire, killing sixty-nine people. Sharpeville was the largest single massacre of
Africans since the Battle of Blood River in 1838.1 The massacre sparked a wave of
revolts throughout the country. These revolts were represented in government

propaganda as orchestrated by "Communists" and "criminal" elements (Pampallis,
1991). A State of Emergency was declared on the 301h of March, nine days after the

1 The

Battle of Blood River was fought between the Zulus and the Boers in 1838. The Boers triumphed
over the Zulus. (Manzo, 1992).
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shooting, and more than 20 000 suspected ''communists" and "criminals" were detained
and isolated. By mid 1960 both the ANC and the PAC were banned under the
Suppression of Communism Act (Meli, 1988; Pampallis, 1991).

International Consequences ofSharpeville and the
construction ofthe communist and terrorist categories.
News of the unrest travelled quickly throughout the world, panicking the international
stock market which slumped as foreign investors pulled out of the country in fear of a
'communist' insurrection or a revolt that enforced the PAC Africanist slogan, 'Hurl the
white man into the sea' (Davis, 1987). Just a year after the PAC was launched it had
established a strong presence among the unemployed and the militant urban tsotsi youth.
It had issued a protest call of profound consequence that had changed the international
perception of the struggle for freedom in South Africa. Commenting on the aftermath of
the Sharpeville massacre, Simons states that

It was the shooting that made March 21st a red letter day. The shots echoed
around the globe, caused a panic in ruling circles, sent the share market
rocketing downwards, unleashed a storm of criticism of racial policies,
produced the State of Emergency, precipitated the banning of the ANC and

PAC, and changed life for many people (cited in Meli, 1988, p. 140).
Following these events the UN, for the first time in its history, resolved to interve11e in
the South African situation. Whil't the member states of the United Nations Security
Council voted overwhelmingly for the UN's intervention in the political situation in
South Africa, the two African colonial empires, Britain and France, abstained
(Pampallis, 1991 ).

Meanwhile, severe measures of overt social control were taken under the State of
Emergency. The institution of emergency powers was justified through the construction
of the 'communist' and 'terrorist' categories. Although these terms have distinct
denotations, they were used as synonyms in South Africa and the West. Anti-terrorist
and anti-Communist writers such as Sterling and Netanyahu define these terms as
"whatever seemed inimical to the West, Israel, the Judo-Christian tradition and
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Goodness"(cited in Said, 1988, p. 48). The South African government's antiterrorist/anti-Communist rhetoric thus found sympathy in the West during the Cold War

era, leading to a relaxation in official Western criticism of racist South Affican
institutions. Manzo ( 1992) asserts that the purpose was "to retain Western support for
the regime by playing ur the country's Western character and anticommunist

orientation" (p. 72).

In the wake of the changing strategy and tactics of the ANC, official discourses emerged
to constitute the 'terrorist' subject, keeping the regime's political practices closely

aligned with those of capitalist Western powers. In Western capitalist countries, antiimperialist struggles were represented in official discourse as terrorism. As late as the
1980s Western foreign policies were still dominated by ant-terrorist discourses. For

example, in 1987 the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher claimed that "The ANC
is a typical terrorist organisation" (cited in Nicoll, 1996, p. II). Terrorism was

constructed in Western discourse as "violent", "mindless", "barbaric" "irrational" and a
threat to "civilised society" (Said, 1988). In twentieth century modernism, the "savage"
is replaced by the "terrorist" and new fonns of social control are invented to keep the
activities of the subject population under control.

The publicity accorded to the 'threat of terrorism and communism' during the Cold War
caused global panic and changed the global power relationships from mutual cooperation to hostility and mistrust. This shift was "a major factor in keeping South
African social practices aligned with those of Western powers" (Manzo, 1992, p. 73).

The constituted 'terrorist' and 'communist' subject in South Africa attracted the interest
of security intelligence organisations such as the CIA and the South African Intelligence

Service. Most of these organisations "devoted considerable energy to determining the
extent of SACP [South African Communist Party] 'infiltration' of the ANC" (Dauth
(I992, 4). In response the what was regarded as a social threat, the apartheid regime

embarked on a crackdown operation.
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The internal security crack-down.
Following the shooting at Sharpcville, spontaneous riots occurred in a number of towns
in the country. Police violence escalated and the number of detained political activists
increased. In response to this situation, the PAC led a march of close to 30 000 people
in Cape Town to protest against state violence (Pampallis, 1991 ). The increasing
popularity of the PAC, especially amongst young people, prompted the regime to
respond with unprecedented force. A crack-down operation was conducted to 'clean the

streets' of'terrorists' and 'criminals'.

Both the ANC and the PAC were greatly affected by the crack-down. The State of
Emergency gave the police power to detain suspects without trial or justification. The
entire PAC leadership was arrested (Davis, 1991; Meli, 1988) devastating organisational
coherence. The unemployed and tsotsi youth who formed the core constituency of the
PAC were the principal targets ofthe police operation. Tire Golden City Post stated that

Systematically and with massive forces ofheavily-anned men, the police have
raided their way through most of the densely-populated African areas in South
Africa during the past week. They are not raiding for 'passes', the deputy
commissioner of Police for the Witwatersrand, Colonel J.C. Lemmer, told the
Post- they are trying to clean up 'out-of-works, criminals and loafers' "(Tite

Golden City Post, cited in Glaser, 1993, p. 308).

Despite Colonel Lemmer's commentary, the operation functioned mainly to uproot the

political base of the PAC and to criminalise young people. Police resources were
concentrated in places such as Alexandra and Sharpeville, that were PAC strongholds
and had large youth populations. Glaser (1993) asserts that "the timing of this crackdown could olso suggest that the state perceived the extent to which the PAC had
penetrated the wider youth constituency" (p. 309). The politicisation of urban youth was
apparently a major concern of the state.

The youth category become a target in the struggle for power and social control in South

African politics. It was a contested constituency amongst liberation organisations
because of its size and its history of activism. It was feared by the apartheid
establishment and subjected to control measures. This fear emanated from entrenched

55

stereotype of Black youth as inherently violent and prone to criminality. As in most
multiracial and multicultural societies, delinquency and criminal behaviour in Soutl}
Africa was explained not merely in terms of socio-economic status but also in racial,
gender and cultural terms. According to Mukherjee (1985), "most of the theories of

delinquency are based on the assumption that criminal behaviour prevails primarily
among the young, urban and lower-class males" (p. 19). It is this assumption that
propels criminological studies and social control policy makers to the category of youth
as a subject of study.

Compared with the PAC, the ANC escaped the political onslaught despite a wholesale

loss of its most senior leadership in a police swoop at Rivonia farm. The ANC
established an external network in response to the new measure of repression. Tambo,
the then ANC Deputy President and Youth League member, was entrusted with the task
of establishing an international network (Johns & Davis, 1991).

The international network became a strong external support base for the ANC,
especially in the Eastern Bloc and the newly independent African countries. Political
solidarity was also established with anti-colonialist struggles in Algeria, Angola,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The ANC's experience as the longest running

liberation organisation contributed to its survival. Its alliance with multiracial
organisations was also crucial in establishing an underground and international network
(Lodge, 1983; Meli, 1988).

The armed struggle and the Youth as a freedom fighter.
By the end of 1960 both the ANC and the Communist Party had been seriously

considering the option of adopting armed resistance against state aggression. According
to Larnbart (1993), in its Annual Conference in December 1960, the Communist Party

decided that existing fonns of non violent resistance were inappropriate in the
face of the full might of fascist repression: a new, more appropriate, fonn of
struggle should be adopt(:d, The form should be one of economic sabotage as a
first stage, moving to full-scale guerrilla warfare (p. 288).
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Almost a year later, in November 1961, the ANC leadership agreed that the struggle
could not be advanced through non-violent resistance alone. The struggle was to move
beyond the politics of non-violent protest to a policy of armed resistance (Mandcla,
1978). While the adoption of the policy of violence was a product of discursive
processes, it did not constitute discontinuity in the ideological framework of lhc
organisation. The major discontinuity occurred within the strategic and tactical
approaches of the movement.

After deliberations on the issue of armed struggle by Congress, December 16 1961 was
chosen as the day of an ned insurrection. December 16 was the day that the Afrikaners
defeated the Zulus at the Battle of Blood River in 1838. The first armed insurrection
operation was accompanied by pamphlets which outlined the policy of the newly
formed armed organisation, Umkhonto weSizwe - MK (The Spear of the Nation)
(Lodge, 1983). The pamphlet established that the policy of the military organisation was
to

carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods, which are
necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation
movement, and our members, jointly and individually, place themselves under
the overall political guidance of that movement (African National Congress,
!961).

The pamphlet also stated, that although the people had been patient and used only
peaceful methods, their

patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there
remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South
Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means
within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom ... We
are striking out along a new road for the liberation of the people of this country.
The Government policy afforce, repression and violence will no longer be met
with non-violent resistance alone (Umkhonto we Sizwe High Command, 1961 ).

As part of the effort to confuse state intelligence, the name of the movement was not
revealed in the pamphlet. It was disclosed by Mandela in a court statement in 1964 that
MK was formed by some of the former ANC Youth League members together with a
few Communist Party members. Mandela declared that

57

At the beginning of June I 961, after a long <1nd anxious <~Ssessmcnt of the
South African situation, I and some of my colleagues, came to the conclusion
that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be wrong and
unrealistic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at
a time when the government met our demands with force (Mandcla, 1978,

p.l60).
The launching of MK marked a radical shift in the ANC's strategic and tactical
approach which brought to an end a fifty year tradition of non-violent resistance. A
major historical break had been reached, as the MK manifesto states, "the methods of
Umkhonto weSizwe mark a break with the past" (Umkhonto we Sizwe High Command,
1961). This historical discontinuity was to change the perception of the ANC among the
militant urban youth constituency which had previously found the organisation's nonviolent approach incomprehensible and ill-conceived.

Compared to previous ANC structures, such as the ANC Youth League and the
Defiance Campaign Volunteers of the 1950s, the formation of MK and its immediate
impact on the system attracted a significant number of urban Black male youth to the
ANC. Recalling his early years of political activism, Dingake states that, following a
nwnber of successful MK sabotage attacks, there was "an overwhelming response from
the youth" (cited in Glaser, 1993, p. 311 ). This response came mainly from the tsotsis,
unemployed young people and militant members of the South African Congress of
Trade Unions (SACTU). Mattera, an ex-tsotsi, stated that "ex-gangsters joined the
exiled ANC in large numbers during the 1960s". Mattera further commented that the

... influx of ex-gangsters into the ANC influenced the ANC from within and
moved the organisation in a more violent and militant direction. They
reinforced the policy of armed struggle. The violent arena was not new to the
gangster. He could kill now for a more worthwhile cause (cited in Glaser, 1993,

p.311).
MK became the ANC structure with which most young political activists identified. It
represented an alternative rite of passage in that it provided an environment for young
people to grow and to be regarded by others and themselves as adults. Discourses of
anned struggle were generated and articulated in organisational propaganda. Within
these discourses students and tsotsis became guerrillas and freedom fighters. This
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identity was taken up by young people and regarded as an honour. However, it
reintbrced the stereotype of Black youth as violent and hence justified measures of
social control.

Increasing MK activity attracted a concerted response from the regime. The police, the
army and the intelligence organisation developed plans to crush the organisation. MK
was infiltrated by government spies. Legislative measures were passed to legitimate the
operation. As Lodge (1983) points out "the police were also assisted by legislation

which enabled them to detain people for long periods in isolated confinement without
charging them" (p. 237). The sabotage campaign collapsed under the weight of state

aggression and MK structures were decimated.

The high visibility of young people in political protest led to the youth population being

seen by the state as a potent support base of the liberation movement. Accordingly,
social control programmes designed to mute and disintegrate the liberation power base
were developed. Prominent among these programmes was the introduction of mass
schooling through the system of Bantu Education.

Bantu Education and youth as an object of labour
The term "Bantu" emerged in official discourse after the shift in state policy in 1948.
After the introduction of the Bantu Authority Act in 1951 the tenrn Bantu became
widely used in state policies. Historically the tenrn "abantu" (people) refers to a
culturally defined group of Bantu speaking tribes (Curtin, 1978). However, in state

policy the term was used in derogatory terms to connote an inferior subject population.

In the 1960s there was an increasing number of 'out-of-school' and politicised urban
black youth. This was seen as a threat to the stability of the system, and became a major
concern of the regime, which introduced a policy of mass schooling under the 1953

Bantu Education Act. Mass schooling was seen as a solution to the need for social
control. The De Villiers Commission reported that
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A number of witnesses, including responsible municipal officials contended,,,
that juvenile delinquency amongst Natives WilS assuming ah~r~ning proportions
especially on the Rand, nnd that compelling all Native children of school age to
attend school would reduce the incidence of delinquency (De Villicrs, cited in

Hyslop, 1993, p. 396-397).
In addition to its role of social control, the policy was also designed to precipitate a pool
of cheap labour. For this latter purpose, Protestant and Euroethnocentric values were
injected into the system of Bantu education. In its manifesto, the Institute for Christian
National Education, which was entrusted with the task of developing education
programmes for "Natives", stated that

Native education should be based on the principles of trusteeship, non~equality
and segregation; its aim should be to inculcate the white man's view of life,
especially that of the Boer nation, which is the senior trustee,,., Only when he
has been Christianised can he and will he be truly happy and secure against his
own heathen and all kinds of foreign ideologies which promise him sham
happiness ... we believe that he can be made race conscious if the principle of
apartheid is strictly applied in education just as in his church life (cited in
Herbstein, 1978, p. 84).

Tne imposition of Christian and Euroethnocentric values was part of the effort to
manufacture a disciplined and "civilised' subject population willing to collaborate in its
own exploitation. Herbstein describes Bantu education as an education designed "as an
assembly line for the production of black labour units" (Herbstein, 1978, p. 99).
Previous studies (Diseko, 1990; Karis & Carter, 1973; Hyslop, 1983) all show that the
system of Bantu education did not provide an environment for self advancement, but
rather an environment for greater discipline. In the 1960s the policies of Bantu
education enabled the growth of the juvenile justice control network into close knit sites
of surveillance.

The Bantu Education system was to become the major form of social control by which
the identified subject population ('out-of-school and unruly urban youth') was closely
policed and controlled. The 1957 Van Schalkwijk report on the Abuse of Dagga stated
that ""the absence of compulsory education in towns ... results in greater freedom from
supervision of non-European juveniles" (Van Schalkwijk, cited in Hyslop, 1993, p.
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397). The report exemplifies how social control policies arc informed by the formation
of discourses regarding the subject population.

The debate relating to the introduction of compulsory schooling therefore alluded to the

imperatives of surveillance and control. The debate was based on the causal effect
paradigm and assumed that juvenile crime would increase if "non-European juveniles"

are left unsupervised. The system of mass schooling was seen as an effective means of
policing 'trouble-makers' and 'loafers'. Studies of the practice of youth control show
that policies directed towards mass schooling have "indirectly enabled a greater
surveillance and regulation of youthful behaviour" (Muncie, 1983, p. 136). In South
Africa the task of policing the "youth" was extended to Africans who were employed by
the state as teachers, school administrators, local and regional school committee
members.

In accordance with the Bantu Education Act and the requirement of industry, the school
syllabus was developed to teach practical subjects. Emphasis was put on

primary

school education over secondary school education. The structure of the school syllabus
aimed to ensure that a cheap, semi-skilled workforce was produced at minimal cost.
Through the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools, the
system of Bantu Education was also directed at asserting the hegemony of Afrikaner
culture.

Past studies (Diseko, 1990; Hyslop, 1993; Karis, 1973), found that the implementation
of Bantu Education was made possible by the political and economic conditions of the
1960s. These include the unavailability of schools for blacks in urban areas, the
increasing population of urban youth considered by the government as a social
'problem', the growing need for semi-skilled labour by the industrial sector, and the
incapacity of the missionary institutions to absorb large numbers of African children
into their schools.

The influence of the missionary institution as an authority of knowledge among the
African conununity began to diminish in the late 1940s. Lack of funds due to state
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subsidy cuts reduced the capacity of mission schools to provide adequate Jhcilities. The
economic situation of missionary schools was described by the De Villiers Commission
as "tinancial starvation" (De Villicrs, cited in Hyslop, 1993, p. 397). This situation
forced many missionary schools to close down, thus ending the hegemony of the
missionary institution in the sphere of knowledge production. Following this
development, the number of African children who could not be accommodated in
schools increased rapidly. School statistics ( 1952 estimates) revealed that on the Rand
region 58 138 school-aged young people were attending school, whilst 116 276 were
not (Hyslop, 1993, p. 396-397).

This situation enabled the government to gain support from provincial African schools
administered by white officials who surrendered the administration to the central
government. However, Africans were opposed to the policy of a separate education
system (Herbstein, 1978). While the African community was concerned about the future
of the education system, the government was more interested in establishing its
monopoly over the sphere of knowledge production. This monopoly gave the
government the power to structure the education system in accordance with Eurocentric
and Protestant values. Verwoerd, the then minister of Native Affairs and architect of
Bantu Education, stated that education for the 'Natives' "should be in accordance with
government policy as seen in its broadest sense" (Verwoerd, 1953, p. 52).

Verwoerd explains his version of 'Natives' education

Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in
life, according to the sphere in which they live .... Education should have its
roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment and Native
community .... There is no place for him [the ·santu'J in the European
community above the level of certain forms of labour.... education should not
clash with Government policy .... if the Native in South Africa today in any
kind of school in existence is being taught to expect that he will live his adult
life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake (Verwoerd, 1953,
p. 48-51 ).

The use of the term "Native" implies that the identified subject population was
conceptualised in official discourse as a homogenous entity. In developing the policy
the government ignored the diverse needs of diverse African communities. The
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confinement of Bantu Education to 'Native areas' reinfOrced the 1950 Group Areas Act
policy that saw public areas reserved for particular races. Jt was to ensure that the
'Native', according to Verwoerd's argument, could only be allowed in European areas
atler demonstrating certain abilities compatible with Protestant values.

When the Ilantu Education Act was passed in 1953 it was placed under the Department
of Native Affairs and not the Department of Education, suggesting that this type of
education was not regarded as a system of self advancement but one through which
conformity to ethnocentric values could be taught. This was also evident in the teaching
of non-academic subjects in Bantu education schools. For example, the Eiselen report
recommended subjects such as

Religious knowledge and attitudes ... Literacy in one, or preferably, both
European official languages to serve as a means of communication with
Europeans, as a help in economic matters .... Knowledge of technical skills in
agriculture .... Social patterns and values which make a man a good member of
his community, a good parent and a useful member of society (Eiselen, 1968, p.
46).
Important parallels can be drawn between the system of Bantu Education and Foucault's
analysis of the workhouse which developed in Europe during the great confinement
period in the seventeenth century. Like the Bantu Education policy, the workhouse

aimed at social control of the unemployed 'delinquent' youth population and the
installation of a Protestant work ethos. The objective of moral based institutions is to
create a panopticon system through which self regulatory practices can be instituted.

According to Foucault (I 965),

In England, the W1 \:house regulations devote much space to the surveillance of
morals an religiou. lucation .... workhouses- throughout Protestant Europe,
fortresses ofmoralnr --~r were constructed, in which ['vagabonds'] were taught
religion and whatever was necessary to the peace of the State" (p. 61-62).
In South Africa, 'the peace of the State' was perceived to require the absence of political

resistance to the hegemony of apartheid. Bantu Education was to play a critical role in
ensuring that 'the peace of the state' was maintained. Architects of the system believed
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that in order for 'peace' to be maintained, young people had to bt: 'kept o1f the street'
and 'moulded' into "useful members of society".

As part of the apartheid government's agenda to expand the web of social control,
entrench the system of Bantu education and to minimise education costs, local
communities were given nominal control of schools. Hcrbstein (1978) points out that
Africans' 'control' "meant the hard work of running the schools, without any say in the
fonnulation of policy" (p. 86). Although the government subsidised Bantu Education

schools, a large part of the financial burden was transferred to local communities.

The transference of Bantu Education to local and regional African authorities was
received with mixed feelings and divided the African community on the issue of
education. Some Africans welcomed this arrangement, whilst others opposed the entire
system of Bantu Education. Students and teachers who protested against the system
were intimidated and subsequently expelled from schools by the Native Affairs
Department (Herbstein, 1978; Karis & Carter, 1973). These expulsions, and the absence
of an alternative fonn of education, enabled Bantu education to establish itself. The
1960s period was therefore characterised by a decline in political resistance (Karis &
Carter, 1973).

After early successes, the implementation plans were hastened and "by the end of 1963

the Bantu Education structures were firmly installed" and extended to rural areas
(Diseko 1990, p. 119). With the crusbing of the liberation movement, pro-Bantu
education local school committees operated without fear of being challenged. The

absence of political resistance enabled the system to flourish. According to Harson
(1984) school intake doubled "from one million to over two million" (p. 63). Hyslop
(1993) observes that "for the first time the state was able to draw the majority of black

urban youth into its education system and to maintain their attendance at school for a
longer period than previously" (p. 400). According to official labour market statistics, a

massive number of semi-skilled 'graduates' of Bantu education were released into the
economy in the 1960s (Diseko, 1990; Herbstein, 1978). This gave the government the
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notion that the system had wide support among Africans. The youth became the main
source of cheap labour for expanding industries.

An education that extended beyond the acquisition of skills necessary to perform semiskilled jobs was regarded as the 'wrong type of education'. Verwoerd stated that he
would reform the system of Bantu education "so that natives will be taught from
childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them. Race relations cannot
improve if the wrong type of education is given to natives." He asked "What is the use
of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?" (Verwoerd,
1953, p. 50).

According to Brookes (1968), a minority of African young people were enrolled in
secondary schools and tertiary institutions. Access to higher education was restricted by
the limited number of higher learning institutions accessible to Africans. As part of the
surveillance process, potential 'trouble makers' were identified and vetted from students
who applied for tertiary admission. The Extension of University Education Act passed
in 1959 entrusted the Minister of Education with the power to "refuse admittance to any
person who applies for admission as a student of a university college if he considers it to
be in the interests of the university college concerned to do so" (Parliament of the Union
of South Africa, 1959, p. 62).

Writing on the system of Bantu Education, McConkey comments that

Bantu Education is a unique system- the only education system in the world
designed to restrict the reproductivity of its pupils in the national economy to
lowly and subservient tasks, to render them non-competitive in that economy,
to fix them mentally ... and to 'teach them', in Verwoerd's phrase, that equality
is not for them (McConkey, cited in Brookes, 1968, p. 57)

Although Bantu Education appeared unique, its type of social control is analogous with
the compulsory and mass schooling in some Western countries. In most of these
countries, the introduction of mass schooling was informed largely by fear of rising
"youth" crime and social disintegration. The need to alleviate the 'threat' of juvenile
delinquency and to enforce social conformity became the prime concern of mass
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schooling policies. In his analysis of the education restructuring programme m
Australia, White ( 1990) argues that the idea of compulsory mass schooling "was
intimately tied to the wider project of fostering confOrmity and obedience in the
interests of a status quo divided along class, gender and ethnic lines" (p. 78). A
corresponding analysis is presented in Willis' (1970) ethnogrdphic study in which he

claims that continuous attempts in the Midlands secondary school were made ,to induce
conformity, discipline and obedience. In South Africa, the violent identity of urban
Black young people created the conditions for the implementation of the system of
Bantu education in which the teaching of values, rather than self-advancement, were
central.

The new site of struggle.
While the Bantu Education policy might have succeeded in perpetuating apartheid in the
1960s, it later created the conditions for the revival of political activism. In the 1970s,

conditions in Bantu schools deteriorated at a rapid rate. Students together with parents
and the African community expressed their concerns about the poor quality of the
sr.hools. Education became a new site of political conflict and ca..11e to be regarded by
the urban African community as "an important terrain of conflict for the first time"
(Hyslop, 1993, p. 398).

The struggle for control over the reproductive role of education, illustrates Foucault's
view that power is not centralised but rather dispersed and exercised at every point of
social relationships. The shift in power relations indicates that Africans were not passive
recipients of state policies but were active in challenging them. As Foucault (1980)

points out "individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application"
(p. 98). The conflict also shows that "there are no relations of power without resistance"
(Foucault, cited in Sercombe, 1993, p. 8).

The politics of Bantu education ferruented for the rest of the 1960s, erupting in two
events: the 1972-74 Black student university revolt, and the 1976-7 Soweto student
uprising (April, 1988). These developments, the Soweto uprising in particular, are
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important historic events in that they mark a revival of political resistance against the
system of apartheid.

The policy of mass schooling, which in the 1960s saw a dramatic increase in the school
retention rate, created the conditions for youth grouping and mass politicisation. Due to
inadequate funding, the quality of education under the system of Bantu education
continued to decline. This fuelled dissent within the African community and overt
clashes with the state were inevitable. The struggle for control began in the 1970s when
the government attempted to restructure the school syllabus to meet the changing needs
of the industrial sector (April, 1988; Diseko, 1990).

The restntcturing process was extended to tertiary institutions by the 1959 Extension of
University Education Act. Under this Act, a separate education system for 'non-white'
tertiary students was developed, encouraging 'non-white' professionalism. However,
'non-white' professionalism was to develop only within the established social order, to
"find its highest fulfilment in the enrichment of its own social group" (Majority Report,
cited in Ministry of Education, Arts and Science, 1968). Political commentators saw this
Act as an extension of the system of Bantu education (Brookes, 1968; April, 1988).

The term 'non-white' developed from the pre-apartheid term - 'non-Europeans' which
referred to Africans, Indians and Coloureds as an undifferentiated category. It emerged
after the enactment of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 which
outlawed interracial social interaction by reserving public places for whites and 'nonwhites'. The term became part of the official discursive vocabulary used in policy
development. Thus the separate universities policy was discursively developed within
sets of discourses relating to colour and race. In accordance with the Extension of
University Education Act, 'non-white' students were not permitted to study in White
universities unless they were granted permission by the Department of Natives Affairs
(April, 988). Under the Act, White students were also prohibited from studying in nonwhite institutions. The Minister of Education, Arts and Science argued that
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It is fatal, and it will alway:-; remain fatal, to try to turn a non~ White into a

White and conversely to try to turn a White into a non- White. Consequently we
must ensure that the racial groups arc separated on a racial basis and that their
education fits in with their own national character (Minister of Education, Arts
and Science, 1959, p. 66).

The education system became a major instrument of social engineering and propaganda
tOr the apartheid system. The schools and university were only allowed to teach
syllabuses and use "textbooks which [projected] the white man's vision of the world"
(Herbstein, 1978, p. 99). The purification and reproduction of the white identity was to
be ensured through the process of separate education and control. Because knowledge
produces power, the production of knowledge was strictly controlled and directed
towards the maintenance of the established social order.

Non-white students were viewed in deficit terms and considered less intelligent than
white students and therefore an education system that '"fits" with their "'character" was
seen as appropriate. In the Minister's view equal education was ""fatal" to the
maintenance of the cultural ethos of apartheid. Ironically, it was inequality in education
that proved fatal to apartheid.

A decade after the Extension of University Education Act was introduced, it became the
object of intellectual 'md political struggle in 'non-white' universities. The 'non-white'
identity and the policy of separate education was challenged and resisted by university
students. April shows that not only was the system of education a focus of student
protest but so was the entire cultural ethos of separate development. She states that
students resistance extended to "wider structures of society, challenging the power
relations on campuses, and articulating alternative vision of a university" (April, 1988,
p. II).

The inferior status of 'non-white' education as well as the issue of identity became a
cause of political mobilisation. As part of the process of building an identity, 'nonwhite' students, Africans in particular, initiated a breakaway from the National Union of
South African Students (NUSAS) in 1969. NUSAS was a multiracial organisation
dominated by white liberal students. Following the breakaway, African university
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students, led by Steve Biko, limned an 'all-Black' organisation. In 1970 the derogatory
label non-white was rejected and replaced by the term Black. The use of the term 'nonwhite' in youth politics was seen as "totally inconsistent with efforts to promote an
aggressively positive self-image among Africans" (Gerhart, 1978, p. 277). The term
Black was politicised in the 1970s and became a political identity for Africans, Indians
and Coloureds.

The politicisation of this term began in the 1960s Civil Rights movement in the United
States of America. It was more an intellectual exercise in self-consciousness than an

ideological framework for political revolution. Gerhart observes that

Transferred to South Africa through American writings and news magazines,
the tenn 'Black' in its new sense of 'status-more-than colour' found rapid
favour with a few African, Indian an Coloured intellectuals, but gained broader
acceptance only gradually over the years from 1968 on. Among radical
Africans it was not unusual to hear the term 'black' applied to Africans alone,
and its use as a synonym for 'Africa' continued to be common, and a source of
confusion, long after the wider meaning began to gain ground (Gerhart, 1978,

p. 277).
In the 1970s the term "Black" became a model of intellectual development, selfformation and psychological emancipation for young people. Black pride, self-reliance
and consciousness of the African identity replaced the negative connotations of the
"non-white" label. It was from this self-formation process that the philosophy of Black
Consciousness (BC) emerged, giving rise to the Black Consciousness Movement

(BCM).
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Black Consciousness and the rise of student radicalism.
The emergence of the student movement and the changing identity of' Black as inferior'
to Black as powerful marked the birth of a new political culture shaped by a process of
mental decolonisation and self formation. Precedents of the .Black Consciousness

philosophy in South African politics are to be found in the 1940s and 1950s youth
politics. While evidence on the development of Black Consciousness points to the

influence of American literature, the philosophy of Black Theology and writers such as
Fanon (1952) and Cleaver (1968), there are common links with the philosophy of

African nationalism. The ideas of self-reliance, self-determination and critical awareness
which formed the core discursive framework of BC was embodied in the philosophy of

African nationalism.

On the other hand, distinctions are to be made between the two. First, BC was more

inclusive than Africanism in that it opened its membership to Indians and Coloureds.
Second, the philosophy of Black consciousness had an internationalist approach, while
Africanism evolved around national and African politics. Sono (1993) notes that

"African consciousness is rooted in Africa, while black consciousness finds its

lo~;ale

whenever whites were problematic to blacks" (p. 61 ). Biko' s early writings assert that

The surge towards Black Consciousness is a phenomenon that has manifested
itself throughout the so-called Third World. There is no doubt that
discrimina\"ion against the black man the world over fetches its origin from the
exploitatiw attitudes of the white man (Biko, 1978, p. 49).

The emergence of Black Consciousness and its subsequent prominence in Black politics
marked yet another discursive shift in South African liberation politics. Just as
Africanist liberation discourse was influential in mobilising Pass Laws opposition in
1960, so too was Black Consciousness discourse in the 1970s anti-Bantu Education

campaign. What then, is Black Consciousness and how did it influence the constitution
of the 'youth' category in the 1970s?
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The South African Student Organisation (SASO) Manifesto stales that "Black

Consciousness implied the awareness 'by the people of the power they wield as a group,
both economically and politically"'. It added thal "Black Consciousness is an attitude of
mind, a way of life" (cited in Sono, 1993, p. 42-47). Thus Black Consciousness can be

understood as a process of self-formation in which the self is discursively constructed.
The concept of knowledge as power was central to the philosophy of Black

Consciousness.

The Black Consciousness philosophy underpinned the emergence of SASO in 1969.
SASO was an all-Black university student organisation that began as a breakaway from

NUSAS. It acted as a conscientising, spiritualising and inteliectualising forum for Black
young people. In the wake of the ban on Black political organisations, NUSAS was seen
by African students as a potential political home. However, as NUSAS was based on
White university campuses, most of its activities were inaccessible to Black students.

The liberal ideological framework of NUSAS was a further cause of dissent. African
students found the passive liberal approach adopted by NUSAS to be patronising,
artificial and paternalistic (Biko, I 97R).

By 1972 the South Africon Student Organisation (SASO) had grown in significance and
disseminated Black Consciousness to schools. Gerhart (1978) argues that it was evident
to many people that "SASO in a remarkably short period had become the most
politically significant black organisation in the country" (p. 270). Like the ANC Youth
League, SASO and BC suffered the constraints that resulted from concentrating the
political campaign within the educated section of the youth population. Mkhatshwa, a

fanner BC activist, recounted, "the movement 'only reached the educated and
sophisticated segment of the population" (cited in Marx, 1992, p. 59).

Although BCM was largely seen as a movement of the intellectuals, it took limited

initiatives in its self-reliance campaign to develop grassroots participation. Projects such
as those carried out and sponsored by the Black Community Programmes (BCP) and the
Black People's Convention (BPC), enabled the movement to extend its influence to
cultural youth groups and youth clubs. Furthermore, the theological influence within
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Black Consciousness attracted the interest of religious youth organisations such as the
Student Christian Movement and the Young African Christian Movement which had
been widely perceived as apolitical. The politicisation of the youth Christian movement
was a remarkable development in the history of youth politics which neither the ANC
Youth League nor the PAC were able to precipitate (Brooks & Brickhill, 1980; Sono,
1993).

The reconstitution of the subject population as an active participant in the construction
of its own identity and history was the central theme of the BC vocabulary. Discourses
such as "pride", the inner discovery of the "self', the rejection of the "inferiority" status
and the assertion of"Black" identity, were seminal to the language ofBC. BC aimed to
construct a subject population unwilling to present itself to the system for discipline and
control. As Biko explained

At the heart of this kind of thinking is the realisation by the blacks that the most
potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. Once
the latter has been effectively manipulated and controlled by the oppressor as to
make the oppressed believe that he is a liability to the white man, then there
will be nothing the oppressed can do that will really scare the powerful masters

(Biko, 1978, p. 68).
Douglas observed that "The limits of tyrants is prescribed by the endurance of those
whom they oppress" (cited in Mathabane, xiv, 1986).

BC's campaign targeted the mind rather than the body. Violence was rejected and the
struggle was confined to the rediscovery of the Black identity through intellectual and
spiritual awakening. Biko stated that Black Consciousness "seeks to infuse the black
conununity with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems,
their culture, their religion and their outlook on life" (Biko, 1978, p.49). Black young
people in particular were encouraged to think critically, to develop their own
interpretation of the world, and to study and write their own history.

The campaign to raise consciousness succeeded in bolstering student self-esteem,
activism and heightening awareness of political issues. The process of self-formation

72

and critical thinking prepared most young people for political action during the rise of
the student movement. As Ramphclc points out "We tried to lay the foundation for
effective political action so that people could be aggrieved and be energised by it"
(Ramphele, cited in Marx, 1992, p. 53).

Although the Black Consciousness philosophy was historically linked to radical African

Nationalism, it now promoted unity amongst the oppressed population and promoted the
notion of a non-racial South Africa. Like the early ANC Youth League, it sought to

create a common identity and a mass based movement. As a BPC leaflet challenging the
division of Africans, Indians and Coloureds stated

we are not different from each other~ it is only the white man who makes us
feel this way by separating us and by paying us different wages. All Africans,
Coloured and Indians alike, are affected by apartheid, Group Areas, Job
Reservation ... the injustices are endless. Our suffering is the same. WE ARE
ALL BLACK PEOPLE. And in the eyes of the white oppressor we are
KAFFIRS, COOLIES, BUSHES, etc. Our survival against the white man's
oppressive laws DEPENDS ON OUR JOINT ACTION AS BLACK PEOPLE
(BPC Leaflet cited in Nyameko & Singh, 1977, p. 37).

This approach undermined the state attempt to impose artificial ethnic divisions between
Africans, Indians and Coloureds. However, like Africanist hard liners, BC rejected the
inclusion of Whites in Black politics, adopting an 'all-Black' position.

The "all-Black" position caused tension between BC and Whites sympathetic to the

Black cause. Critics of Black Consciousness accused the organisation of enshrining the
same doctrine of separatism as the apartheid system itself. The East London Daily

Dispatch stated that the promoters of Black Consciousness "are entrenching the idea of
racial exclusivity and therefore doing the Government's work."(August 10, 1971).

Steve Biko defended the construction of a common identity among the oppressed,
arguing that "what blacks are doing is merely to respond to a situation in whi"h they
find themselves the objects of white racism .... We are collectively segregated against what can be more logical than for us to respond as a group?" ( Bike, 1978, p. 25). Biko
claimed that, through structures such as Bantu Education, Black people had been denied
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intellectual freedom and were conditioned to respond to the leadership and the world
view of the white man. Black people's confidence and their intcllcctual ability to
imaginatively project their own future had been eroded by years of colonialism and a
version of history that described traditional values as superstitions and African heroes as
savages. Biko argued that Black Consciousness restored that potential by encouraging
self~reliance,

critical awareness and intellectual

independence~

'Black man you are on

your own', 'Black Pride' and 'Black Power' became popular slogans within the Black
Consciousness Movement ( Buthelezi, 1991 ).

Explaining the concept of Black Consciousness, Biko stated that

the first step ... is to make the black man [and woman] come to himself[herself]
with pride and dignity, to remind him [her] of his [her] complicity in the crime
of allowing himself[herselt] to be misused and therefore letting evil reign
supreme in the country of his birth. This is what we mean by inward-looking
process. This is the definition of Black Consciousness (Biko, 1978, p. 29).

Black Consciousness' ultimate aim was the liberation of South Africa, but its immediate
objective was to raise the consciousness of the people rather than engaging in direct
political confrontation with the state. The self formation pro-.:ess as a "first step" to
liberation was predicated on the notion that attempts to institute political change would
fail without a prior change in common consciousness. According to Black
Consciousness, revolution driven by 'false consciousness' is likely to slightly alter the
make-up of entrenched values, while largely retaining the existing structures of power
relationships.

Contemporary global political relationships between former colonies and colonists,
between the wealthy Northern and the impoverished Southern hemisphere, demonstrate
this point. Although formal colonialism ended in the 1970s, economic, political and
social policies in former colonies are still shaped by colonial discourse of power. Most
of these countries are locked in a perpetual cycle of dependence and, as Gerhart (1978)
observes, "are now wrestling with problems of cultural and political identity" (p. 272).
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During the 1970s, the deteat of colonial and imperialist powers in Mozambique, Angola
and Vietnam inspired many young people and increased their impatience with the
system. This global context, together with SASO's conscious raising campaign,
provided the conditions for the Black Consciousness Movement to flourish in the 1970s
(Marx, 1992).

In 1975 the Portuguese colonial power in Mozambique, backed by the South African

Government, collapsed under the weight of the anti-colonialist insurrection waged by
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). The events in Mozambique,
as well as the defeat of the apartheid army in Angola in 1976, were influential in South
African youth politics, as they functioned to undermine the myth of South Africa as
'Africa's superpower' (Deutschmann, 1989; Munslow, 1985).

These changes in regional power relations increased confidence and optimism amongst
Black young South Africans. As BC leader Ben Khoapa commented, "We thought if
[FRELIMO] can do it, so can we; it just needs another push" (Marx, 1992, p. 64). A
militant generation emerged from the Black student movement and began to challenge
the BC policy of non-violence. There were cost' as well as benefits for Black youth
politics resulting from the shift in the global and regional geopolitical landscape. The

growing disenchantment with BC's non-violent politics created divisions and
undermined BC's influence with the youth constituency. Furthermore, the overt
solidarity with FRELIMO expressed through a rally organised by BPC in 1975,

attracted the attention of the security forces. Some BC leaders and activists were
arrested and BC activities fell under the gaze of security authorities (Nhlapo, 1991;
Sono, 1993).

The harassment, arrests and trials experienced by BC activists antagonised the trend

towards rhetoric more radical than that popularised by Black Consciousness. As Khoapa
observed, young people "bega'l to formulate their own description of what BC was"
(cited in Marx, 1992, p. 65). Marx explains that in this event
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The ideology of BC was boiled down by these angry youngsters to an
emotional core identified by the students us Black Consciousness, even if it
only resembled the set of complex ideas that had been elaborated by the
movement's leaders. The leaders subtle description of whites as historical
oppressors who could be included in a post liberation South Africa was largely
drowned out by the denunciations of whites as ascriptivcly distinct enemies ...
(Marx, 1992, p, 65).

This process of radicalisation and transfonnation resembles the 1940s transformation of
organisational discourse in which League members took a radical approach that was
inconstant with the ANC philosophy.

By the mid 1970s a portion of the BC membership were mooting armed struggle and an
affiliation with the exiled liberation movement, calling for a programme of action to be
formulated. This initiative is analogous with that of the ANC Youth League in 1949 in
which a militant approach, albeit not violent, was adopted to move the struggle to a new
phase. The philosophical basis of BC made it difficult for such a programme to be
developed. The ANC and PAC, with their internal structures hardly in operation, were
also not "in a position to provide the organisation for the youth." (Brooks and Brickhill,
1980, p. 80).

In 1974 economic recession changed the political climate in which BC operated. The
Black population and institutions such as schools were hard-hit by the recession. This
situation intensified the call of militant students and youth for more confrontational
politics and a focus on the material conditions of Black people (Brooks & Brickhill,
1980; Gerhart, 1978).

The growing political challenge to BC led to a number of developments in Black youth
politics in the mid and late 1970s. One such event was the development of a process that
enabled the mobilisation and conscientisation of non-student young people. This was
facilitated through the formation and strengthening of cultural, religious and social
youth organisations. The "youth" category, as distinct from the "student" category, was
constructed, and referred mainly to young people who had left school or university.
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However, most former students who remained politicolly active continued to regard
themselves as students and involved themselves in student politics. Due to the
politicisation of the term "student", the student category was viewed by many young
people as synonymous with political consciousness. Attempts to construct a distinct
youth category did not succeed as most young people continued to seek their political
home in student organisations (Seekings, 1993 ),

Another important development which occurred in the students politics of the 1970s

was the redefinition of the student category to include students in primary and
secondary schools. Through SASO's influenc" a school based student movement- the
South African Student Movement (SASM) was formed and acted as a catalyst in the
student uprising of June 16 1976 dubbed the "Soweto Uprising". Since the uprising was
the first of its kind, it is an important event in the history of Black youth politics, and

has been the subject of nwnerous studies, so there is no need to thoroughly examine the
event here. However, the processes that culminated in the uprising will be briefly
examined to show how students dealt with the limitations associated with the lack of
planned organisational action within the BC movement. The organisational process was
to provide the student movement with a political platform in which their opposition to
the inferior system of Bantu Education could be expressed.

Youth and student organisational process and the lead up
to the Soweto uprising.
Two closely linked but different organisations emerged out of the process to build an
organised political protest - the National Youth Organisation (NAYO) and the South
African Students Movement (SASM). The philosophical framework of these
organisations was informed by BC rhetoric. Yet their strategy differed from that of BC

in that they pursued a policy of mass action and direct confrontation with the state
(Brooks & Brickhill 1980; Marx, 1992; Seekings, 1993). Due to the dearth of

information on these organisations, there are conflicting accounts of their formation and
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political orientation. For example, Seeking (1993, p. 24) argues that NA YO and its
regional branches were "ANC-oriented" while (Buthelezi, 1991; Marx, 1992; Sono,

1993). maintain that SASO and BC were behind the formation of these organisations.

Brooks and Brickhill (1980) show that NA YO had developed links with the exiled

liberation organisations. However, because of the divcisity ofNAYO's approaches, it is
impossible to clearly establish which organisation it was oriented towards. Nevertheless,
Brooks and Brickhill (1980, p. 84) point out that it, "is clear, though, that some NAYO

members were connected with the ANC." Brooks and Brickhill also provide evidence of
SASM links with the ANC. A SASM member states that

In 1974 small organised groups of students were created which used to meet in
secret places ... they were initiated by the national liberation movement, that is,
by the ANC ... We in SASM did not actually think of forming such things. We
were operating legally and tried to keep SASM as a broad legal organisation.
But some of us listened to our elders from the ANC when they said we needed
more than just legal organisation. Hence we founded these underground cells

(Brooks & Brickhill, 1980, p. 87).
The ANC links were evidenced by SASM' s adoption of the mass action approach and
by NAYO's policy of armed struggle- both of which alluded to the ANC 1949
Programme of Action and the 1961 policy of violent resistance.

NA YO and SASM filled the vacuum created by the lack of formal organisation and

mass action within the Black Consciousness Movement. They provided organisational
leadership to young people as well as to primary and secondary students . NA YO was a
broadly based youth organisation which aimed to unite existing youth clubs and to

provide a political home for young workers, unemployed young people and ex-students.
Its activities involved the construction of a radical and defiant Black youth population.
The Constitution of the Transvaal Youth Organisation (TRA YO), a NA YO affiliate,
exhibited this process by declaring, "no-allegiance and lack of loyalty to white

structures, value systems, organisations and patronage" (cited in Brooks and Brickhill,
1980, p. 82).
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The process of organising under the "youth" category became risky, mainly because of
the government's perception of Black youth as 'delinquents' and 'trouble makers'.

NA YO found itself under the constant gaze of security fOrces, and the target of arrests
and constant police harassment. Many of its leaders were accused of planning acts of
terrorism and were charged under the Terrorist Act of 1966 (Brooks & Brickhill, 1980;
Seekings, 1993). NA YO's political development was limited by these repressive

measures and, unlike SASM, "did not manage to become a national youth movement"
(Brooks & Brickhill, 1980, p. 84). The organisation was isolated from the political

scene, leaving SASM and SASO to provide a organisational home for youth activists.

As part of the campaign to redefine the student category to include secondary and
primary students, SASO encouraged the formation of SASM in the early 1970s. SASM
was part of NA YO, but developed as an independent organisation and focused its

energies on the mobilisation of school students. The immediate concerns of SASM was
a campaign against the imposition of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction
for mathematics in secondary schools and a protest over the deteriorating conditions of
Black schools. The imposition of the Afrikaner language was interpreted by students as

an attempt to invalidate African languages and undermine the cultural identity of
Africans. This sentiment was embodied by placards waved by students during the
Soweto anti-Bantu education demonstration of June 16 1976:

DOWN WITH AFRIKAANS
BLACKS ARE NOT DUSTBINS -AFRIKAANS STINKS
AFRIKAANS IS A TRIBAL LANGUAGE
BANTU EDUCATION- TO HELL WITH IT!
(Brooks and Brickhill, 1980, p. 8).

Although there was evidence of a non-discursive shift within the student movement,
Black Consciousness rhetoric of stndenthood, unity, Black self-assertion and Black
Power was more popular in 1976 than ever before. Students' anger exploded in a
spontaneous uprising in June 16 1976 when police opened fire on demonstrators. This
incident followed a student demonstration organised by SASM's Action Committee in
protest against the imposition of Afrikaans in African schools- a protest mainly directed
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at the segregative education policy. The June 16 crisis was a turning point in the hh;tory
of Black youth politics and alluded to both discursive and non-discursive
discontinuities, ending the sixteen year period of non-confrontational politics.

While the idea of mass protest conflicted with the BC philosophy, the demonstrators
adhered to the Black Consciousness principle of non-violence. Young people who took
part in the demonstration gave the ""peace sign" and shouted "peace!", "We are not
fighting", "Don't shoot" (Brooks & Brickhill, 1980). According to the Cillie
Commission, before the procession to Orlando stadium where the rally was to be held,
organisers appealed to students to keep the demonstration peaceful. They advised
students not to react against police provocation. One of the leaders who addressed the
demonstrators said

Brothers and sisters, I appeal to you- keep calm and cool. We have just
received a report that the police are coming. Don't taunt them, don't do
anything to them. Be cool and calm. We are not fighting ( Cape Times, 22/9/76
reporting evidence given at the Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the Soweto
uprising, cited in Brooks & Brickhill, 1980, p. 8).

The Government Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere,
reported a different account ofthe situation. It stated that

According to the available evidence, they [the demonstration organisers] gave
advice on what should be done if the police should dare to stop the marching
crowds; the advice was not that they should disperse peacefully (The
Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1980, p. I 04).

The Govenunent Commission also expressed concern about the 'freedom' of the
demonstrators and stated that ''such a mass demonstration would mean that
schoolchildren would march unrestrainedly through the streets of Soweto with its street
urchins and lawless idlers ... " (The Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1980,
p. 104). Similar concerns about "'unrestrained" youth and the implicit criminalisation of
Black youth activists as "urchins and lawless idlers" were frequent in early government
reports such as the Van Schalkwijk Commission of 1957. The Van Schalkwijk report
also expressed concerns over the lack of "supervision" for "non-European" youth. The
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1950s and 1960s official discourses concerning Black young people remained
influential in shaping government policies in the 1970s, right through to the collapse of

the apartheid government in 1994.

The ideological continuity in the representation of Black youth in social policies reflects
the state's earlier perception of Africans as inherently deviant and violent- a perception
manifest in the government Report on the Soweto uprising in which the "Black Power''
slogan was linked to 'acts of violence'. The Report stated that "lt happened repeatedly
that the Black Power cry was given by persons who were rioting and committing

violence" (The Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1980, p. 509). The

classification of young people into deviant and violent criminal categories in 1960 and
1976legitimised the excessive use of state force against youth dissent on each occasion.

Because of the regime's association of youth dissent with criminality, what was planned

as a peaceful demonstration on June 16 1976 turned out to be a bloody uprising when
the armed forces responded with sheer violence. With thousands of youth deaths, the
1976 number of Soweto casualties surpassed that of the 1838 Battle of the Blood River
and the 1960 Sharpeville massacre combined. Among those who fell were prominent
student and youth leaders such as Steve Biko. Following the riot all student and youth
organisations were banned and tens of thousands of young people were either

incarcerated, banished or forced into exile (Mokoape et al., 1991).

Soweto inaugurated a culture of violence that persisted into the 1980s and the 1990s.
Unlike the Sharpeville crackdown, the Soweto revolt proved impossible for state
security to crush. Although not physically prepared to confront the regime's force, most
young people were prepared to face up to state violence on an emotional and

psychological level. The sense of unity, confidence and determination among young
people to assert their rights provided the conditions for the sustenance and
intensification of political protests.

Black Consciousness described the Sowcto uprising as a demonstration of the young
people's readiness to assert their emotional anger. Manas Buthelezi stated that the event
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marked the transformation of Black Consciousness from "being an intellectual exercise
for SASO, to a programme of action for the youth of' 1976" (cited in Marx, 1992, p. 66).
The uprising not only transformed the strategic position of BC but was a catalyst in the
revival of the liberation movement, characterised by the ANC and the PAC, which had
been dormant for a':nost two decades.

Conclusion
This chapter discussed changes in state and liberation discourse in the 1960s and 1970s.
The role of young people in opposition politics and how they were constructed by others
and constructed themselves was examined. The 1960 Sharpeville massacre which
precipitated the adoption of the policy of armed resistance by the liberation movement
was a turning point in the history of youth politics. Through the generation of armed
struggle discourses large numbers of young people including tsotsis were drawn into
formal opposition structures. Within these discourses, young people were constructed as
"fighters" and political "activists".

In response to the growing politicisation of the politically volatile section of the youth
constituency, the tsotsis and unemployed youth, the state embarked on a massive crackdown operation. As part of the crack-down operation the policy of ma'iis schooling was
introduced and implemented under the system of Bantu education. This was seen by
apartheid authorities as a viable fonn of social control through which internalised selfregulatory values can be instituted. It could be argued that the main aim of this policy
was to mute and fragment the youth constituency which provided the support base of
the liberation movement. Indeed this goal was achieved, albeit temporarily, as political
resistance declined in the 1960s. Within the system of Bantu education young people
were constructed as units of cheap labour.

However, in the 1970s the policy of mass schooling turned out to be a policy disaster for
the government as it provided the conditions for young people to regroup. The
emergence of the philosophy of Black Consciousness and the subsequent rise of the
student movement was a watershed in the history of youth politics. Through the
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teachings of Black Consciousness, the South African revolution was remade,
culminating in the Soweto uprising and the revival of national political resistance in the
1980s.

Although the material base of the system remained intact after the Sowcto riots, its
political and cultural hegemony was undermined. The state attempt to create an
internalised sense of Black inferiority via Bantu education was subverted by the Black
Consciousness awakening campaign. The teachings of Black Consciousness continued
to have an impact in youth politics in the 1980s. To many young people, Soweto
represented the birth of Black power and an inaugural overt rejection of apartheid.
Soweto also marked a paradigm shift in power relations, not only between the system
and the Black population but also between the young people and their Black elders. The
struggle for power was diffused, and occurred at both macro and micro levels of society.
In a manner reminiscent of the 1940s and 1950s Black politics, the 1976 crisis elevated
youth politics from a peripheral position to a key role in the liberation movement.

The students' initiatives and their active role in building their organisational structures
can be understood in terms of Foucault's third mode of"subjectification", in which the
subject actively initiates and defines his/her identity and situation. Foucault argues that
this process entails an understanding of the Self. The process of "self-formation has a
long and complicated genealogy; it takes place through a variety of 'operations on
[people's] own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own
conduct"' (Rabinow, 1984, p. II). This analysis corresponds with BC's teaching that
the rediscovery of the 'Black' identity entails a long process of spiritual awakening,
self-understanding and self-assertion. According to the philosophy of Black
Consciousness, this process requires patience, awareness and an understanding of Black
political history.

However, as the physical conditions ·of Bantu Education worsened, the patience and
commitment to non-confrontational resistance waned amongst the new militant youth
population. Growing disenchantment with BC's position of non-violent resistance
became apparent in the mid 1970s and culminated in the Soweto revolt. The relevance
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of BC to the politics of the day was critically evaluated and subsequently abandoned by
many young people in the 1980s. Most young people felt that the political conditions

under which BC emerged and flourished had changed and that new discursive
approaches were required. BC's failure to respond to the changed environment resulted
in SASM taking independent initiatives to institute a programme of action that Jed the
student movement to Soweto. As more young people were exposed to alternative

political approaches, massive depletion of BC's ranks occurred in the 1980s. This was
reminiscent of the 1950s period leading up to the Sharpeville massacre when the
ANCYL lost its influence among militant young people.

A number of abrupt political changes precipitated by escalating political violence

occurred in the 1980s. Inspired by the discourses of liberation such as ''People' Power"
and "People War" large numbers of young people were drawn into the liberation
struggle. Bantu education worked to the advantage of the subject population by

providing conditions for young people to unite and develop a common political identity.
MK, the ANC military wing which had lain dormant for over a decade, revived and

gave rise to youth militancy in the 1980s. These

dev~lopments,

which are discussed in

chapter three, were a radicalisation of Black people's unwillingness to co-operate with a
racially divisive system.

The reconstruction of the subject population as "powerful" raised young people's
confidence and gave them the courage to take an active role in building their own
identity. It was this belief in Black as powerful and the rejection of the inferior identity
that created the conditions for the demise of the ar.artheid disciplinary and control
machinery in the early 1990s. Biko's argument of the 1970s was borne out by political
developments of the 1990s. Biko argued that, " ... white power would be lost as soon as
Blacks asserted their unwillingness to abide by it, regardless of the intentions of those in
power, or the balance of material forces controlled by the state and its opponents" (cited
in Marx, 1992, p. 47).
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4 Youth politics after Soweto and the
reconstitution of young people as "youth".

Introduction
In the 1980s the political landscape of South Africa was altered by new developments in
organisation and thinking that grew out of the student revolt of 1976. Young people

became increasingly active in anti-apartheid politics and this allowed them to negotiate,
resist and invert imposed identities. The will to institute violent resistance and changes

in the perception of the self created a new political culture- a culture which was defiant
of dominant values. Militant youth activities in the 1980s threatened the traditional
power arrangement within the Black community as much as is it did the apartheid ethos

that was its target.

With the shift in power relations between youth and state, Black elders felt they had
lost their traditional authority, especially in respect to the younger generation. The
"youth" identity of the new politics subverted the "child" paradigm of the old society.

The prominent role of young people in the decision making process- a spectacle readily
visible in the opposition politics of the 1980s - was inconsistent with the African
cultural patterns in which political debates are largely entrusted to male adults. As
Mager and Minkley (1993) observe, in order to become patriarchs, young people had to
meet culturally defined rites of passage.

By the mid 1980s, discourses linking youth activism and social breakdown began to
emerge from the townships. Bundy (1986) found that there was a pervasive concern
amongst "disgruntled" elders and teachers with the seizure of power by students in
schools (p. 54). Ramphele (!992) argues that

once children were thrust 'onto the front-line', it became difficult to sustain
traditional social relations between adults and children, and this had serious
implications for family life. Children became used to power and control, and
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refused to yield to the authority of adults whom they despised ~ their parents
and teachers. Conflict became inevitable (p. 17).

lnlluenced by the Black Consciousness philosophy of self-assertion, the student politics
of the 1970s created a generation that was more militant and defiant of adult and state
authority than was its predecessor.

Official discourses dating from the 1960 state crackdown re-emerged in the late I 970s
to dominate the representation of Black youth in government policies and conservative
media. In the 1980s both the official discourse and the identity that it imposed upon
youth were resisted and inverted by young people. Seekings identifies two diametrically
opposed sets of discourse regarding

pro~Congress

Black youth

~

the "apocalyptic",

which depoliticised and criminalised youth activities; the "liberatory", which elevated
Black youth by representing them as "heroes" and "Young Lions" of the struggle
(Seekings, 1993, p. 5-9), Both sets of discourse developed from the premise that Black
young people were a homogeneous entity and passive in the fonnation of discourse.

In the context of the conflict in the 1980s that arose from the deteriorating material
conditions of the Black community, this chapter combines a structural approach with
Foucault's technique of understanding discourse formation as a source of power.
Foucault's concept of power provides a relevant analytical framework for the 1980s
period in which a multitude of autonomous youth and community organisations
emerged. Through the emergence of these organisations, the liberation struggle was
dispersed to different sections of the community.

Foucault's third mode of "subjectification", (Rabinow, 1986) in which the subject
population actively participates in

it~~

own subjectification, is used here to examine the

role of young people in the formation of discourses that constructed their identities. The
structural approach explores the nexus between political practice and the formation of
discourse. This will involve the investigation of discursive and non-discursive
developments within the liberation movement. Therefore, this chapter explores political
developments in organisational processes, the generation of discourses and the
constitution of youth within those discourses.
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Firstly, the chapter examines the historical background to the Sowcto uprising and the
emergence of official discourse which constituted the youth as criminal. Secondly,
discursive changes within the system of apartheid and their implications arc briefly
examined. Thirdly, the chapter investigates the re-emergence of the student movement
and the change in discursive practice within the liberation movement. The reconstitution
of young people as "youth" and the transitional process from student to youth
organisational practice will be examined.

Background to Soweto and the construction of the
criminal identity within official discourse.
The disruption of schooling and the increase in state violence in 1976 and 1977 kept
many students outside school boundaries. Scores fled the country. In Soweto, as in
Sharpeville, the Soweto crack-down weakened political resistance. At the time of the
uprising, the student movement led by BC was the only active internal anti-apartheid
force. Its philosophy of identity awareness and its opposition to violence and mass
action meant that it was relatively free from police surveillance for almost seven years.

Cultural and intellectual oriented organisations such as BC were tolerated and not
regarded by the state as a threat to apartheid values. However, state attitudes towards
BC changed after the 1976 revolt. It was alleged that BC was directly involved in
instigating the uprising. Accordingly state tolerance of BC as a "tribal consciousness"
movement was ended by the perceived threat to 'law and order'. The "student" identity
was supplanted with a criminal identity (Gerhart, 1978; Marx, 1992).

During and after the Soweto uprising, student resistance was represented in official
discourse as a consequence of external 'terrorist' and internal 'criminal' influences. In
an analysis of official discourses that emerged during the uprising, Molteno (1979) cites
Hitchcock's (a former policeman) account of the Soweto process in which Hitchcock
states
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Within minutes of the 1irst stones being thrown, the students .... werejoined by
thousands ofSoweto's roughnecks. Among them were big-time bandits, tsotsis,
drug addicts, drunkards and won't-works. The 'rioters' were soon, amongst
other things, looting bottle stores 'for hard liquor'. By the next day, 'the angry
drunken mobs were armed with pick-axes, iron bars, shovels, sticks and the
inevitable stones and half-brick' (cited in Molteno 1979, p. 58-9).

Similar representations of students were made in the governmental Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere. Reporting on the
participation of'youth' in the riots, the Commission states that

Apart from staging marches they enacted barricades and participated in stonethrowing and violence. When they joined the scholars, the intensity of the
rioting usually increased. Witnesses declared that they were responsible for the
serious acts of violence such as looting and arson at shops and liquor outlets

(Government of the Republic of South Africa I 980, p. 4 19).
This representation emanated from the conceptualised 'truth' that the subject population
was inherently violent. It denounced the revolts, criminalising young people by
describing them as 'mindless criminals', 'bandits' and a 'drunken mob'. The production
and dissemination of wide ranging discourses enabled the state to justify the use of force
against 'bandits'. In the 1980s other state measures were taken to control radicalism in
schools and universities. SASPU reported that, "universities are

threaten(~d

with subsidy

cuts unless they crack down on militant students" (SASPU, 1988, p. 11). The perception
of the student movement as one infiltrated and influenced by the 'lawless and violent
youth' and "big-time bandits" became a seminal 'truth' that subjected the student
movement to severe state repression.

The 'truth' that discourse produced was essential to the creation of laws and policies
directed at regulating the activities of the subject population in the 1980s. Foucault
argues that our participation in the production of truth makes us susceptible to the laws
that truth creates. He argues that "In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified,
determined in our undertakings, destined to a mode of living or dying, as a function of
the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power" (Foucault,
1980, p. 94). In South Africa, the rationale of"truth" re-established emergency powers
under which youth activists were judged and condemned.
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State laws which had been in abeyance for more than a decade - such as the 1962
General Law Amendment Act (Sabotage Act), the 1965 Criminal Procedures Act and
the 1967 Terrorist Act- were re-enforced. The Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act of

1974 and the Security Act of 1976 were responses to the perceived increase in "terrorist'
und 'criminal' activity. These laws, along with numerous other legislative measures
passed in the 1980s, were meant to closely discipline the subject population. Law

enforcement agents such as the police and the army were strengthened to contain what
came to be perceived as a growing social threat (Brooks & Brickhill, 1980).

Post-Soweto politics and the reconstruction of the youth
category in Iiberatory discourse.
The panopticon and the political reforms of the 1980s
In response to the developments of 1976-80, including the upsurge of political revolts
and the spectre of international sanctions, the Botha government introduced
constitutional reforms. These reforms were to 'modify' the political and economic

systems by making them 'accessible' to the Black community. The refonns became a
subject of political debate and created confusion both locally and internationally. Meli
(1988) shows that as a result of this confusion the reforms were portrayed in

international media and foreign policies "as belated 'benevolence' towards the blacks or
as the end of apartheid" (Meli, 1988, p. 193). By this latest modification to the state

system, the machinery of social control was to be dispersed to members of the subject
population. The process was to create a panopticon effect that rendered the coercive
powers of the state less visible.

In 1982 the government unveiled its constitutional reform package that pretended to
enfranchise Indians and Coloureds. The reforms introduced a new parliamentary system
known as the "Tri-Cameral Parliament". Indians and Coloureds were to participate as
junior political partners in a racially designed parliamentary system. In keeping with the
1953 Reserved Separate Amenities Act which prohibiled the interaction of different

races in public areas, the tri-cameral parliament had three separate chambers reserved
for the three racial groups.
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Africans remained constitutionally disenfranchised as their participation in the political
process was relegated to local community power structures known as township council
administration. These structures were established under the Black Authorities Act of
1982. Under the council system, urban African residents were to elect community
councillors whose main function was to administer the state infrastructure. The
administrative role of these councillors included maintenance, rent and rates collection.
They were also to co-operate and assist the security forces in maintaining law and order
in the townships, not least by providing information about individual members of the
community. These reforms were met with massive resistance from the anti-apartheid
coalition organised under the United Democratic Front • UDF (Lodge, 1991; Murray,
1987; Seekings, 1982).

The reforms and the worsening economic conditions of the townships created the
conditions for political violence. Black people who co-operated with, or were co-opted
into, the state's social control machinery were regarded by anti-apartheid activists as
representatives of the state. Deep divisions formed in the Black community as
councillors and Black police came to be seen by political activists as "informers",
"stooges" and "sell-outs" and were ultimately defined as 'enemies' of the people
(Mu=y, 1987, p. 240). In the UDF ideology of 'People's Power', the term 'people'
denoted pro-liberation and anti-apartheid activists.

The council system can be viewed in tenns of the panopticon concept dest:ribed in

Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977). Foucault describes the panopticon as a
mechanism of social control in which members of the subject population are
individualised and held under the invisible 'gaze'. The 'extension' of administrative
power to the council made state control less visible and Blacks were expected to
exercise self government. As in Foucault's panopticon, the township dwellers were
individualised and kept under an invisible gaze. Lodge observed that the system was
"trying to shift from an order based largely on coercion, to one where ideology,
consensus, and incorporation could play rather larger roles" (Lodge, 1987, p. 4).
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The state's attempt to create a panopticon failed in that the councillors' role as invisible
agents of social controi was revealed to the subject population. As Scekings ( 1992, p.

18) points out "Cotmcillors were increasingly seen as responsible for a range of
unpopular state policies ... " The system also failed in its attempt to institute an
intemalised form of self-regulation in which state physical intervention was to be
minimal. The subject population remained defiant and active in resisting the system.
Acknowledging its failure to institute an ideological form of social control, the state
reverted to overt physical coercion by moving troops into the townships during the
1984-87 revolts.

The re-emergence of the student movement
Despite state initiatives, post-Soweto politics is characterised by increasing incidence of
youth resistance. The power vacuum created by the Soweto crack-down was short lived
as political regrouping took effect in 1979. When schooling returned to normal in 1978,
school yards once again became mobilising grounds. The regrouping process involved
the emergence of the Charterist movement, the student, the civic and youth
organisations. The establishment of the United Democratic Front gave rise to a
proliferation of youth congresses. The hidden agenda of the tri-cameral and council
systems was exposed and became the target of political protest (Lodge, 1991; Seekings,
1993; Beinart, 1994; Johnson 1988).

The return to nonnal schooling in 1978 created a context conducive to the re-emergence
of the student movement in 1979. Students who survived the 1976 uprising and
remained inside the country regrouped under a new national organisational nan1e - the
Congress of South African Students (COSAS). Unlike previous student organisations,
the new organisation moved beyond the politics of intellectual liberation to more
materialistic discourse. Moodley (1991, p. 150) observes that "A focus on psychological
liberation and 'blackness' gradually gave way to more talks of 'socialist', 'anticapitalist' alternatives."

Many post-Soweto youth and student activists questioned the relevance of BC's
emphasis on changing values and

non~confro:mtational

mass resistance to the changing
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economic and political climate of the 1980s, in which they perceived a need to engage
the body. Different forms of discursive and

non~discursive

practices were sought. As

one of the student leaders put it

BC was important. The people needed a psychological reawakening, but not as
an end in itself. Then we needed a political strategy. BC was necessary fOr the
previous generation due to the opposition having been crushed, ... but for the
generation growing up [in the eighties], at a time of mass resistance, the people
already felt confident... BC was a foundation, a launching pad (cited in Marx,

1992, p. I03 ).
The student movement

re~emerged

with a broader political outlook. Its focus was not

only on school issues but also on transforming youth politics to address broader
community issues. Part of this shift in political focus was the active role taken by young
people in the establishment of alternative community systems that functioned partly as
undercover mobilisation devices and partly as agents of transformation. These systems the civic associations, the defence street committees and the people's courts - became
the power base of the liberation movement and gave rise to discourse in which young
people were referred to as "young lions", "foot soldiers", "comrades" and "heroes" of
the struggle (Bundy, 1987; Johnson, 1988; Seeking, 1993).

Organising within the Congress tradition, COSAS adopted the Freedom Charter as its
ideological basis. Political approaches involving formal organisational process, mass
action and defiance campaigns were adopted by the revamped student movement.
COSAS was largely composed of post-Soweto activists who had links to the ANC.
Immediately after the uprising, ANC political literature, including copies of the
Freedom Charter, began to circulate in South Africa. Most student activists were
inspired by the ANC philosophy of the Freedom Charter and MK 'armed propaganda' .1
Zenzile, a student and COSAS leader, points out that "in 1979 already there was ANC
literature coming up ... there was an ANC vibe growing inside the country. ANC started

I MK the anned wing of the ANC started infiltrating guerrillas into South Africa in 1979 to build up its
internal network. It carried out a number of attacks on economic installations. The biggest MK operation
was on the SA SOL oil-from~coal refinery in June 1980. These operations were "to acquire great symbolic
and psychological importance" especially among the youth who identified themselves closely with MK
w

(Lodge 199, p. 24).
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intensifYing 'armed propaganda'. Now this was helping to

~ort

of change the mood"

(Frederikse 1990, p. 168).

The concept of racism was not only understood in terms of apartheid but also in terms
of BC philosophical opposition which excluded whites from the liberation struggle. As
the ANC was gaining popularity among white youth, notably the multiracial National
Union of South African Students, non-racialist discourse became a mohilising force and
a source of political competition. Young people were constructed in pro-charterist
discourse as the 'vanguard of non-racialism'. Non-racialist discourses were taken up by
student and youth organisations such as COSAS, whose constitution states "we are
striving towards a non-racial and democratic education ... (COSAS, 1990, p. 168).

With the formation of COSAS, many of the young people returning from exile were
exposed to the ANC liberation philosophy. Mokoape (et al., 1991) estimate that by the
early 1980s "more than 60 per cent of the active members of BC organisations were to
be found in the ranks of the ANC or MK". They point out that "approximately 60 per

cent of the youth who were not necessarily members of these organisations, were
indirectly influenced by them and finally found themselves also in the ranks of the ANC
or MK" (p142). These students and young people were to play a fundamental role in the

rebuilding of mass and anned resistance in the 1980s.

With the increasing popularisation of nonracialist rhetoric, the Freedom Charter was
embraced by a wide range of inclusive organisations. Lodge (1991, p. 24) points out
that "By the beginning of the 1980s, 'charterism' was generally understood to mean that

the struggle was nonracial." The shift in political discourse was regarded by young
people as a "breakthrough" and was linked to the 1955 shift from Africanism to
multiracialism (SASPU, 1987, p. 7).

Although most COSAS members were ex-BC advocates, they saw the materialist and
nonracialist approach of the Freedom Charter to be relevant to the political and
economic conditions of the 1980s. Class discourses which had emerged in the mid
1970s became influential in post-Soweto youth politics. The ANC class analysis, unlike
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the traditional Marxist analysis, viewed the youth category as consisting of many subcategories. In its 1981 statement the organisation used the term "youth" to refer to
"students", "young women", "rural youth", "young Christians" and "working youth".
However, more emphasis was put on the "working youth" than the other groups
(Seekings, 1993, p. 7).

Along with the philosophy of non-racialism, the class analysis redefined and
reconstructed the "enemy" in class, rather than racial terms. Jolobe, a founder member
of COSAS, explains that before he was exposed to the concept of non-racialism he

thought that the whites in South Africa are the enemy and as a result I said to
one of the SSRC chaps, 'Why don't we give our parents who are working as
domestic workers some poison to kill all the whites?' Fortunately I said that to
a very progressive and clear person, because he said to me, 'But not all whites
are enemies, you know- we have democratic whites' .... l...understood that not
every white is an enemy, especially when he explained to me about the two
opposing classes, the working class and the bourgeois class .... (cited in

Frederikse, 1990, p. 168-169).

The shift from Black Consciousness to non-racialist politics did not occur without
resistance within the student movement. Zenzile commented that "it was not as easy as
that to introduce non-racialism - it now meant that COSAS had to start moving people
away from Black Consciousness and start showing them the non-racial way" (cited in
Frederikse, 1990, p. 168).

Young people opposed to the concept of non-racialism began to mobilise differently. A
split between pro-BC and non-racialist youth occurred and resulted in the formation of a
pro-BC student organisation- the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO). Conflicts
and competition for political space within student and youth movements arose. This
division reflected the diversity of political opinion within the student and youth
movement. In a broader sense it was reminiscent of the 1950s split between Charterist
and Africanist activists which saw the formation of the PAC.
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Like SASO before it, AZASO concentrated its organisational activity

111

tertiary

instiVJtions. While COSAS constructed the youth in terms of non-racialism, AZASO's
perception of the youth was based on the philosophy of Black assertiveness and
psychological independence from white authority. Both COSAS and AZASO

established high political profiles within student and youth constituencies and township
communities. COSAS in particular drew a large membership from students and
provided a political home for ex-students and unemployed township youth. The
vigorous campaign conducted by both organisations to re-mobilise and conscientise
students put the education issue back on the political agenda (Bundy, 1986; Frederikse,
1990; Lodge, 1991; Seekings, !993).

In 1980 students in Cape Town boycotted classes to protest the deteriorating conditions
of the school system. The boycott soon spread throughout the country and involved
Coloured, Indian and African schools, colleges and universities. Although there were
similarities between the 1976 and the 1980 school unrest, there were also remarkable
differences. The 1980 school unrest was supported by different sections of the
community. Bundy (1986, p. 52) points out that "hundreds of black teachers carne out in

public and organised support of the boycott" whereas in 1976 teachers were cautious
about supporting student protest.

At the time of the boycott, MK had augmented its propaganda campaign with attacks

on key economic installations. Many of the students who were arrested during the
boycott were detained on suspicion of collaboration with 'terrorist' organisations. The
main concern of the security forces, as one former detainee explained, appeared to be
the presence of 'youth' or 'non-students' in COSAS leadership (Seekings, 1992, p. 34).

The categorisation of the 'youth' under the 'terrorist' label subjected many young
people to laws such as those of the Terrorist Act of 1967, which afforded the police

wide ranging powers to detain suspects indefinitely.

However, the arrests did not act as a deterrent but instead worked to increase resistance.
The 1980s period is characterised by a wave of school and township unrest. In the

context of increased repression and the call for a unified non-racial approach, AZASO
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jettiso..<..t the BC philc>ophy. In a resolution of its July 1981 Conference, AZASO

adopted the nonRracialist approach to liberation and announced its support for the nonracial Charterist movement. The conference resolved that "Since the success of our

struggle depends upon effective mobilisation of all people committed to democracy, we
call tbr genuine unity of oppressed against the oppressive state" (AZASO cited in

Frederikse, 1990, p.171 ).

Inspired by the policy of the Freedom Charter on education, COSAS and AZASO

embarked on a discursive project to develop an "education charter" which became their
campaigning platform (Lodge, 1991, p.36). The Freedom Charter states that" The
doors of learning and culture shall be opened to all ... Education shall be free,
compulsory, universal and equal for all children" (Sub-committee of the National
Action Council, 1978, p. 52). The education charter was aimed at developing an
alternative system of education via a process of self-assertion. It represented an

evolution from protest to construction as students, along with the rest of the apartheid
movement, were no longer solely concerned with the rejection of "gutter education" but
were "now also saying 'Forward with People's education, Education for Liberation!'"
(Sisulu, 1991, p. 339).

With the intensification of state repression during the 1980s and the changing attitudes
of young people towards education, the school culture collapsed in 1986. Discourses
promoted under the "Education for Liberation" campaign changed radically. A new,
more militant generation of young people emerged after the 1984 revolt with new

discourses of liberation. Campaigning under the slogan "Liberation before Education",
formal schooling was deferred and students developed their own "street sociology" and
pursued the "practical science of making a petrol bomb" (Bundy, 1987, 321). One youth

activist commented upon formal education as not teaching them "the tactics and strategy
of urban war, how to make petrol, acid, phosphorus bombs, etceteras, how to organise
students effectively, how to run community organisations" (Bundy 1986, p. 52). A
campaign "proclaiming 1986 as 'The Year Of No School'" was launched and supported
by many young people (Johnson, 1988, p. 116).

Advancing the nonracialist approach, COSAS established political co-operation with the
well resourced multi-racial students organisation (NUSAS) in 1980. In 1981 COSAS
and NUSAS were joined by AZASO and the "non-racialist student movement" was
complete (Frederiksc, 1990, p. 174). With a refocussed approach the student coalition
created a mass based approach to political resistance. The importance of the '~mdent

movement in liberation politics was expressed by the NUSAS president in 1982 when
he stated that he regarded

... the student movement as .... important. First it acts as a recruiting ground for
activists ... The second reason is that people involved in the education process;
in thinking, analysing, questioning ... Students see things that the rest of society
doesn't see .. .I think a lot of the progressive analysis that the trade unions and
the community organisations have assimilated actually originated in the student

movement ... ( Lodge, 1991, p. 37-38).
The above analysis shows how young people were active in creating an identity and a

power base that distinguished them from the wider community. Through the practices of
self~fonnation,

young people were able to differentiate themselves and to express

independent thoughts.

This overt assertion of power created tension between loosely organised movements,

such as the student movement, and bureaucratic organisations which promoted the idea
of a disciplined working class as a vanguard of the struggle. Seekings (1993, p. 30)
found that, "The belief among students that they could serve as a political vanguard was
diagnosed [by the elders] as a mistake." This was expressed as

dangerous and reactionary 'theories' [which) have been embraced by a tiny
section of the South African youth ... All South African youth must be
mobilised and made to understand the policy, strategy and tactics of our
movement ... Only this way can we ensure that our youth does not allow itself
to be deceived that it has any important role to play outside the national
liberation movemeut (Sechaba, 1981 , p. I I).

Terms such as "dangerous", "reactionary" and "tiny section" are usually deployed to
constrain and prohibit the expression of thought that contradicts organisational
procedures. Munch (1994, p. 19) asserts that "prohibitions close out objects, certain
times and people from discussion ... Anything that threatens the organised life within the
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power system is treated as ['reactionary']. It therefore needs controlling." The process
of self-formation is subversive and poses a constant danger to established power
relations.

The reconstruction of young people as "youth".
With a view to creating an organised "youth" movement, the ANC campaigned for the
formation of youth congresses. In 1980 the use of the term "youth" was promoted in
liberation politics to denote a political, rather than a sociological or psychological
meaning. "Youth" came to refer mainly to young people who had left school and

remained politically active. Age was not an issue, but rather the political potential of
"youth" to challenge the system.

As early as 1980, the ANC promoted the image of the 'youth' rather than that of the
'student'. Commenting on the school boycott of 1980, ANC president I ambo referred
to 'youth' rather than students (Tambo, 1981). The ANC designated 1981 as "The Year
of the Youth". Emphasising the need for discipline, I ambo stated that "The youth must

be drawn in even greater nwnbers into the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe, inside and
outside the country, to become part of the disciplined vanguard forces of our revolution"
(Tan1bo, 1981, p. II}.

Youth and the United Democratic Front.
I ambo concluded his speech on the declaration of the Year of the Youth by calling

upon the anti-apartheid movement to "smash the institutions of separate development
including the community councils and the local management committees" (Tarnbo,
1981, p. 13). His call was taken up- mostly by township youth- and the council system
becaroe the target of township political protest in the mid and late I 980s. As youth

organisations and alternative community structures proliferated in mid 1980s, township
politics entered a state of ferment. The situation erupted in 1984 when localised issues
overliving conditions became a national issue (Murray, 1987).
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The United Democratic Movement, the Civic Associations and the South African Youth
Congress were among the organisations fOrmed in the early and mid 1980s. The mass
action and militant approach adopted by these organisations influenced the formation of
liberatory and state discourses regarding youth. In the South African context, the
formation of discourse about young people is inextricably linked to organisational

practice and youth behaviour. As the struggle intensified during the 1984-1987 revolts
and the 1989 'ungovernability' campaign, young people became highly visible in
political violence and defiance campaigns. Named by liberatory and conservative
discourses, the youth identity once again became contested.

The majority of the 1980s youth activists were of a post-Soweto generation that had
little organisational and political experience outside the school terrain. Most of them

were politieised mainly through their participation in student politics. Since the
emergence of the student movement in the 1970s, schools and universities were

"liberated territories "and hives of youth political activity (Bundy, 1987, p. 304).

The transition from an established political terrain to one less familiar was a challenge

to youth activists. With the support of COSAS, ex-student young people involved
themselves in trade unions, as well as community based and political organisations such

as the civic movement and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The history of such
organisations and their role in the struggle has been extensively documented in a
number of studies and will not be explored here. However, the conditions of their

inception and their role as a post-school organisational home for youth will be briefly
examined.

In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched as a national pressure
organisation to oppose the tri-cameral constitutional reforms and the Black Local

Authorities Act of 1982. Under the slogan, "Apartheid Divides, UDF Unites", the UDF
mobilised a large number of politically and racially diverse organisations into a united

front (Swilling, 1987, p. 28). This directly undennined the system's attempt to divide
the subject population by introducing minimel political reforms.
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The reaction to the proposed reforms demonstrated the ability of the subject population
to invert certain forms of control to its own advantage. The government's attempts to
institute a subtle form of coercion and its resort to overt physical control had the effect
of enhancing the organisational solidarity of the anti-apartheid movement. Commenting

on the reforms , a UDF leader stated that "The Tri-Cameral Parliament proposals were
a blessing. They gave us the opportunity to politic since the state wanted a broader
base ... All of us who were opposed to the tri-Cameral parliament were united ... "

(Mohamed, cited in Marx 1992, p. 116).

By mid 1980s UDF membership had risen to an unprecedented level. While there were
numerous organisations affiliated to the UDF, its membership was predominately
students and youth. The active role of young people in community and trade union
organisations made them highly visible in UDF ranks and activities. Many of the
community based organisations affiliated to UDF, such as the civics and people's

committees, were initiated by young people. Swilling ( 1987) observed that by 1984, out
of the 600 UDF affiliates, 316 were youth organisations and 47 were student
organisations. Youth were regarded as "the most radical elements within the UDF"
(SASPU, 1987 p. 7).

The UDF developed as a loosely organised movement with a decentralised decision
making process. This enabled youth and other affiliated groups to maintain their
organisational autonomy. Members were encouraged to think critically, to take
initiatives, and to play an active role in the UDF national decision making process. The

UDF carne to be seen as "a movement spurred from below rather than pulled from
above" (Collinge, 1985, p. 3). UDF provided the precedents for the development of
youth organisations and the active participation of young people in liberation politics,

and thus created a culture that allowed young people to actively define themselves and
their role in the struggle.
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Township uprising and the construction of the 'youth' as violent.
The linguistic problem associated with the definition of the 1980s political unrest
reflects the complexity of the situation that developed during this period. Different

descriptions of the situation have been given by different commentators. Some rcfCr to
the situation as civil war and others analyse it in terms of an uprising, unrest or revolt.
The terms "civil war", "uprising" and ''revolt" were commonly used to describe the
situation in the mid and late 1980s. Generally, the term 'civil war' refers to armed
political insurrection where the warring factions are members of the same nation (King,
1990).

The problem of using the term in this context resides in the issue of whether South
Africa was a one nation state or a two nation state. The ANC Youth League Basic
Policy Document of 1948 states that "South Africa is a country of four chief

nationalities, three of which (Europeans, Indians and Coloureds) are minorities, and
three of which (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) suffer national oppression ... "
(National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League). The United Nations and the
Organisation of African Unity both referred to South Africa as single nation.

Alternatively, the two nation thesis was developed out of a consideration of the nature
of the political conflict that gave rise to the violence (Theodoropoulos, 1987, p. 24).

The term "uprising" denotes a temporally and geographically discrete event that exhibits

a degree of organisation. Participants in uprisings are mainly civilians who regard
themselves as "excluded from the political process" and who "believe that they can only
satisfY their demands by removing those in power or changing the system" (King, 1990,
p. 61). Township violence in the 1980s usually took this form of conflict. In attempting

to depoliticise the conflict, the government described

township uprisings not as

political but as social issues. Media coverage reflected official accounts that portrayed

the people taking part in uprisings as criminal and irrational.

This study interprets the upsurge in uprisings in the 1980s as a consequence of the lack
of alternative forms of political expression available to young people. As Scott (1987, p.

7) asserts, "political violence .. .occurs in response to the failure of constitutional or
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non-violent direct action." Contrary to official explanations and various studies of youth
violence, this thesis examines the political character of

violence by analysing its

historical conditions, including the self-perception of youth at the time. The
understanding of the self as political played a central role in the justification of political
violence. Gurr (1968) argued that political violence is instituted by a politicised rather
than an apolitical subject population.

Young people understood themselves to be the future leaders of South Africa, and this
provided the ethical justification fOr participating in political violence and politics
generally. As Xolile explains

We as the youth know that the future is in our hands because the old men,
Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, will disappear because they are old. Therefore
the people who are going to be responsible for the future South Africa will be
the youth (interview with Marks, 1995, p. 17).
A year after the formation of the UDF, township and school revolts erupted in the Vaal
Triangle. The mood of defiance spread to the rest of the country, provoking the
declaration of a State of Emergency in July 1985. The revolts revolved around the
implementation of the Black Authority Act and the tri-carneral parliamentary system.
The school boycott was sparked by the deteriorating quality of education in Black
schools, the school age limit of twenty, and the policy that denied students
representation by a democratically elected Student Representative Council (Lodge,
I 991; Johnson, I 988).

The introduction of the age limit laws in 1981 by the Department of Education and
Training (DET) was seen as an attempt by the state to minimise political activity in
schools. According to student activists, "the age limit law has hampered activists from
organising in schools for equal, compulsory education and better conditions because the
authorities now use another weapon to kick students out of schools" (Amandla, 1985
p.I3). A student placard summed up the student demands
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NO to:
DET
AGE LIMIT LAWS
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CORRUPT TEACHERS (Amandla, 1985, p.l4).

While different uprisings were sparked by different issues and were initia1ly
geographically contined, they rapidly became a national concern. Township civic
organisations united with youth and student groupings in pursuit of their demands.
Influenced by the UDF rhetoric of unity, students conceived of education, community

and industrial issues in broader political terms. This discursive shift found expression in
political meetings and pamphlets. On one demonstration, a COSAS pamphlet carried a
message to trade unions which read; ''Our struggle in the schools is your struggle in the
factories. We fight the same bosses' government, we fight the same enemy" ( Bundy,
1986, p. 54).

As the struggle intensified, the definition of the "enemy" began

to include Black

counciHors and municipal police who were accused of co11aboration. Due to their

proximity to members of the anti-apartheid movement, the 'collaborators' or 'informers'
popularly known as impimpis, were perceived as a more serious threat than the white
representatives of the system. They were subjected to the laws and disciplinary
measures of the townships' alternative penal structure dubbed the "People's Court"
(Scharf & Ngcokoto, !990).

Although educational issues were still a prime theme of student protest, broader political
issues came to dominate student and youth politics. These issues included rent, bus
fares, consumer issues and unemployment. Campaigns on issues such as rent, bus fare
and high education fees were popularised through the use of the Asinama/i (We have no
money) slogan, whlch expressed the economic conditions under which many Black
people lived. Consumer boycotts of white-owned shops were established. These
boycotts were meant to weaken the support base of apartheid by demoralising the petty
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bourgeois constituency. Such boycotts were monitored by people's committees

established by young people. (Mashinini, 1987).

The 1984 revolt had popular support ffom students, youth and other sectors of the
community. An unprecedented number of students taking part in political protests

clashed with police in what

became a regular occurrence. Murray (1987, p. 249)

estimates that "By October, nearly one million black students had taken part in school
boycotts and other fonns of mass action." The strong support for school and township
protests created a tear and panic in white communities that was used to justified the
militarisation of South African politics. Civil war was imminent.

The military occupation of the township became yet another source of political
solidarity and mobilisation for UDF and its affiliates. An era of consolidated mass and
violent resistance emerged. Trade unions, community, youth and students supported
mass political action to protest against the army occupation of the townships. Youth
were in the forefront of these protests, engaging in open battles with the anny, police

and vigilantes (Bundy, 1987). They defied the adults who warned of severe
consequences and pointed to the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Some youth activists
argued that the 1980s generation was different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. They
claimed "that people would not run away as they had in 1960" (Lodge, 1991, p. 76),
and that state violence would only antagonise them.

As political violence intensified in the townships, a militarised youth subculture
mobilised under the 'comrade' identity and new tactical approaches became evident.

The stone was supplemented by the petrol bomb. In response to the militarisation of the
political conflict through the intervention of the army and the rise of private apartheid
armies young people developed local power systems such as the Defence Committees

and the People's Courts. Under the people's panel procedure, varying degrees of
punishment were accorded. These ranged from whipping to public execution by
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"necklacing".2 The penal system and its forms of punishment were legitimised by
discourses about impipis and vigilantes as counter-revolutionaries.

The development of alternative structures signified the complete breakdown between
the state and the Black community. The state criminalised the operation of the
alternative structures and used emergency powers to restrict public debate and research
on the subject. According to Scharf and Ngcokoto ( 1990, p. 343 ), the restrictions
"severely limited what can be legally written about people's courts. Thus far only the
State's delegitimation of these structures has been forcefully inserted into the public
domain."

Despite the state's attempt to delegitimate these structures, they continued to proliferate
at an increasing rate. Public retribution and participation in political violence was
legitimised by the 'comrades' as part of the process of constructing a revolutionary,
disciplined population and minimising the obstruction of police and infonners. As Zola,
a Diepkloofyouth, asserts; "To kill a policeman is to mean we are closer to our freedom
because we are getting rid of some of the obstacles of our struggle" (Interview with
Marks, 1995, p.l4).

The people's courts not only dealt with political cases but as well with moral aod
disciplinary issues. As "defenders ofthe community", young people felt morally obliged
to use persuasive and

~ocrcive

measures to construct a subject population that would

conform to the political and moral ideals of people's power. Thandi, aoother Diepkloof
youth, states that;

The comrades solve a problem. Other boys they don't understand, they need
help. But other boys they didn't understand when the comrades talk, so that's
why the comrades have killed them. If a comrade tell a person what is bad and
they don't understand, she must kill them because she is going to do bad things

2 Execution by necklacing involves the placing of a tyre drenched with petrol around the convicted
person's neck and setting it alight. Public execution was not only practiced by the 'comrades' but also by
the police and vigilante groups who used guns, spears and machetes to execute the 'comrades'. However,
the publicity accorded to necklacing overshadowed police and vigilante practices. Although the
'comrades' were represented in official rhetoric as associated with 'necklacing', such practices were also
used by vigilante groups such as the Impis.
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like killing my grandmother und stealing money from my :;;istcrs" (Interview
with Marks, 1995, p. 21 ).
The "' body as the major target of penal repression " re-emerged in South Africa. Like
the agents of mainstream justice, young people saw the subjection of the body to pain as
a way of protecting the political ideals of the struggle from "sell-outs" or impipis. Yct,
due to its immediate and overt retributive measures, the system of street justice became
highly controversial and received more widespread criticism than the official system.

As political violence increased, the apartheid infrastructure in the townships was
destroyed, creating a climate conducive to the ungovernability campaign. According to
the New York Times (cited in Murray, 1987, p. 241 ), this situation forced the state "to
admit it had lost control of many townships and declared a state of emergency in July
1985" (Swilling, 1987, p. 30). A month after the introduction of the state of emergency,
COSAS was banned and the education system in most Coloured and African areas was
shut down. In 1986, the entire apartheid power structure in the townships showed signs
of imminent disintegration. This situation precipitated the declaration of the second state
of emergency (Bundy, 1986; Johnson, 1988; Beinart, 1994).

The impact of the state of emergency on youth politics
The years leading up to the political negotiations between the ANC and the regime were
marked by an increase in political violence, detention and banishment. In 1986, the state
reintroduced emergency measures to confine activists to prison and house arrest. This
was reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s when political activists were banished under the
Native Administration Act of 1927 J and the 1960 state of emergency. As in 1960, the
intention of the emergency regulations was to restrict political activity, movement and
collective gathering.

3 Under the Native Administration Act of 1927, the government had the power to remove and banish
individuals or groups of Africans from any location in the country. This Act was used in the 1950's to
banish and confine political and union activists in remote rural areas (Carter Karis Collections).
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It was during this context of political restriction and unrest that a national student

organisation, the South African Youth Congress (SA YCO), emerged in March 1987.
The ban imposed on COSAS and the collapse of the school culture meant that the
school as a traditional mobilising ground fOr youth politics was no longer available.
Many COSAS members moved into SA YCO ranks thus completing the transition from

'student' to 'youth' organisational process. Autonomous SAYCO affiliates proliferated,
dispersing the struggle to all sectors of the South African society. Like the UDF,

SA YCO had no centralised structure. It was a forum for the expression of a plurality of
political perspectives. Reagan explained tnat "SAYCO is not structures 'up there;' ....
SA YCO is street committees and defence committees ... In these street committees we
are able to take control of our own lives" (Sechaba, !987, p. 7).

Three months after the formation of SA YCO, a new state of emergency with finer
measures of social control was introduced. In the same year it was estimated that "'more
than I 300 youths under the age of 18 were detained in terms of the emergency
regulations ... with more than half of the 234 detainees aged 17 years or younger... "
(Cape Times, 1988, p. 38). Most of them were charged with criminal offences ranging
from crime against property to murder and terrorism.

The introduction of wide ranging powers under the state of emergency gave police the
power to detain political activists indefinitely and to restrict activities relating to
stayaways, consumer and rent boycotts. This impacted heavily on UDF, SA YCO and
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Argus, 24/2/1988, p. 2). The
Cape Times (25/2188) reported that "The government moved rapidly against leading

anti-apartheid activists ... slapping restriction orders on at least seven senior UDF office
holders, after severely curtailing the activities of 17 extra-parliamentary organisations"
(Cape Times. Feb. 25. !988).

By 1988, SA YCO's entire leadership together with some ofUDF and COSATU leaders
was either detained or banished. In !987 about 5 000 people were detained each day
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(SA Barometer, 1988, p. 37)'. Although the state of emergency was precipitated by
political unrest, youth activities in particular were dcpoliticiscd and young people were
treated as juveniles (Lodge 1991 ).

Utilising its regional structures, SA YCO regrouped within a short period of time.
Adopting an anarchist approach, the most immediate priority of SA YCO was to sustain
and increase the political pressure on the state through loosely organised militia groups.

This did not mean that the organisation had no political direction, as was implied in
official discourses. Anarchism was construed in South Africa and elsewhere in the
world in terms of 'mindlessness', 'terrorism', 'disorganisation', 'barbarism', 'savagery'
and 'criminality'. As Leach points out;

Anarchism in the public mind conjures up an image of the bomber or terrorist
under a black flag. The reality is that the term 'anarchism', meaning 'no
government', covers several belief systems and modes of action besides this

violent stereotype ( 1988, p. 195).
Anarchists regard the state, together with its structures and representatives, as the
legitimate enemy. Their activities are organised by small, communal power systems. In
South Africa this involved the development of "Peoples Communes" or "Peoples
Committees" which acted as dual power systems at a local level. These committees
"functioned as organs of insurrection for the forcible armed overth;-ow of [the] old
political order" (Mashinini, 1987, p. 5-6). As SA YCO's membership intensified the
direct 'insurrection' action against the anned forces in 1989, the state realised that its
monopoly on violence was breaking down. Like power, violence is distributed and
instituted at every point of society. As violence became widely dispersed, the conflict
escalated into a civil war.

6 The validity of some of these statistics are questionable as they were compiled by official agencies such
as the Bureau for Information and the Department of Law and Order. They may reveal more about the
governmental measures to maintain 'law and order', than they do about the process of political resistance.
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Township conflict and the construction of Black-on-Black
violence.
As the infiltration of MK guerrillas into South Africa proved diJlicult, militant township

youth became the "foot soldiers" of the "people's war" declared by the ANC in 1986.
The slogan ran .. from armed propaganda to people's war" (Work in Progress, 1988, p.3).

The •·people's war" strategy was implemented through the mobilisation of the people
into rural and urban units of Umkhonto we Sizwc. Defence Committees were
established in most Black townships and youth militancy was seen as crucial in this
ultimate stage of the anti-apartheid struggle.

The youth took virtual control of the political situation as they engaged in street
confrontations with the army, police and vigilantes. Again, the escalation of violent
resistance was seen by the state as being ·•orchestrated by communists; it was only
supported by a minority of blacks, while the majority wanted the restoration of law and
order ... " (Straker, 1992, p. 20). In his 1986 parliamentary speech, President Botha
stated that '"the violence against which the police have to react is perpetrated by ruthless
and unscrupulous people who make use of savage and barbaric methods to achieve their
goals" (Bureau for Infonnation, 1986, p. 29-30). In justifying the renewal of the State of
Emergency, the government claimed that the regulations were required to "'protect law
abiding Black South Africans and uphold civilised life in South Africa" (Bureau for
Infonnation, 1988, p. I).

The polarisation of the Black community as "law abiding" versus lawless, ''barbaric"
and uncivilised "criminals" was central to the government strategy of depoliticising the
conflict. Through the polarisation process the conflict was dispersed to sections of the
Black community. This was an attempt to make state involvement in violence less
visible. The "law abiding Black South Africans" were armed and transfonned into
apartheid private armies. They engaged in battle with the 'comrades' or anti-apartheid
youth activists. In review of its policy on violence, the ANC stated that "it was finding it
difficult to distinguish between civilian targets and enemy personnel because the
government had organised civilians into paramilitary units ... " (ANC, 1987, p. 4).
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The conflict was represented in official discourse and conservative media as 'Black-onBlack' violence. It was defined by the state as a "confrontation between two groups in
Black communities - those who favoured evolutionary reforms and revolutionaries
committed to violence" (fhe Bureau for Information, 1988, p. I ). The polarisation of
the people was reminiscent of the 1960s stratification of Africans into 'good Natives'
and 'bad Natives'. In the 1980s language the 'bad Native' was reconstructed as a
"revolutionary committed to violence''. State measures were applied to control the
reconstituted subject. Botha warned that those who "did not renounce violence, [would]
inevitably face the full power at the disposal of the State" (Botha, I 986, p. 27). The
reconstructed 'violent' identity made political activists susceptible to overt state
violence.

Youth militancy was viewed much differently by the liberation movement. Young
people's participation in political violence against the armed forces was regarded as
heroic. Means of popularising the reconstituted heroic youth identity were developed
through what Garfinkel (1972, p. 203) refers to as "ceremonies of investiture and
elevation". Eulogistic terms such as the 'young lions' and 'comrades' were constructed
to represent young activists in liberatory discourse. The 'young lions' were called upon
by the ANC to "act as the yeast, to energise and dynamise the people as a whole"
(Tambo, cited in Seekings, 1993, p. 6).

Straker (1992) found that, as mass confrontation and state violence intensified in the late
1980s, young people saw this period as

a time of euphoria as well as terror. They had a new-found sense of power and
vision for the future. They saw themselves as leading the older generation to
freedom. Liberation was believed to be in sight and they were to be the authors
of it (p. 19).
This period saw the emergence of a popular youth political culture, expressed in a
militaristic dance dubbed the "Toy-Toy", the incantation of political slogans, and in
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freedom songs sung at all political events including funcrals.4 The toy-toy in particular
gained wide popularity among young people and drew large numbers into political
activism. Act.:ording to a number of social researchers, most young people participated
in collective political activities not only to pursue political objectives but also to
develop a sense of identity and belonging. According to Sisi, a youth activist, some
comrades

joined for their own enjoyment- not really out of real understanding of the
issues ... They were attracted by the slogans and the songs. They enjoyed the
toy-toy and the singing and throwing stones and the running away from the
police. They liked action and they were not real keen on spending hours in
meetings listening to the problems of the community and strategising how best
to approach them (Straker, 1992, p. 30-31 ).
The development of the political subculture and a loosely structured organisational
process was part of the self-definition process that challenged values of the dominant
culture. The rise of the toy-toy subculture provided the means by which youth activists

could express themselves. In the context of state censorship of written political material,
it was slogans, songs, dance and street theatre that built young people's self esteem and
disseminated political information. Meetings and rallies were often punctuated by cries
of Amandla Ngawethu!- Power to the People, and "Mayibuye iAfrica -Free Africa from
colonialism! (Mzamane, 1982).

The political youth subculture was rooted in opposition to what it saw as essentially

colonial ethnocentric values. According to Gramsci, a new culture presents problems to
the dominant culture in that it challenges entrenched fundamental assumptions. Most

people find popular culture more expressive and inspiring than dominant culture
" ... because it is the result of their own free initiative" (Gramsci, cited in Holub, 1992, p.
113). As demonstrated in the toy-toy subculture, the optimistic aspects of popular

culture stand in contrast to the pessimistic and defensive framework of dominant
culture.

As the unrest intensified, funerals became almost a daily occurrence. They were transformed from
being just mourning events into sites of political 'rallies' and mobilisation. 'Don't mourn- Mobilise!',
was the slogan of the time.

4

Ill

While the political potential of young people was widely acknowledged within the
liberation movement, the shift in the field of power relations within the Black
community became a matter of controversy. Marxist activists argued for a movement
led by the working class and Black elders expressed the need for the maintenance of
cultural power relations, such as the child/adult relationship and the patriarchy system
that relegated women to family issues. Dipuo points out that "When it comes to going
out and discussing issues that affect the community, that is said to be the duty of men"
(cited in SASPU National, 1987, p. 17).

Young people were regarded as politicaliy immature and in need of "correct" direction.
According to Dube, "It is only the working class which has got the most advanced
theory ... which can lead our revolution ... Students cannot bring about a revolution by
occupying school buildings ... " (1985, p. 26). An elderly resident of Alexandra states
that

These kids have changed many things, the truth is that. Like now we are not
going to carry the donpas- it is because of the children. But they are some
things I don't like. A child is a child. I am an elderly person. Children are right
to battle for freedom, but they must respect older people. People's courts are

not the right way ( Johnson, 1988, p. 119).
While young people were seen as having a special role in the struggle, they were not
expected to transcend culturally established patterns of power. The concept of a
disciplined youth who conforms to established cultural patterns and organisational
procedure, formed an essential part of the constitution of the youth in liberatory
discourse. However, this proved to be difficult construct to promote during the
campaign to make South Africa ungovernable.
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Ungovernability and the construction of the 'comrade' and
comtsotsi identities.
The process of ungovernability began with the rejection of the municipal administration

system and was otlicially endorsed by the ANC in the late 1980s. In response to the
political developments of tht~ late 1980s the composition of the youth category changed
and new identities were com;tructed. Yet these changes did not affect the representation

of young people in apartheid discourse. Opposition political activities continued to be
defined within the concept of law and order. Nevertheless, new strategic approaches
were adopted by the security forces in response to changes in opposition politics. These

included the extension of the policing system to restore the authority of council
structures. A munic1pal police force dubbed the greenjlies was established (Lodge,

1991; Murray, 1987; Seekings, 1992).

The front-line position occupied by young people in liberation politics throughout the
1980s enabled them to be more active in defining themselves. Through their active

involvement in different liberation structures, young people were able not only to
initiate a self-formation process but also to negotiate and invert certain forms of
representations.

This trend

was

prevalent in the

advanced stages

of the

"ungovernability" campaign in 1988 and 1989. During this period the process of self-

formation gave rise to a number of identities such as inyamazane (insurgents),

amaqabane (comrades) and com-tsotsis (Lodge, 1991 ).
The com-tsotsi identity incorporated the comrade and the traditional tsotsi identities in
recognition of the political potential of the tsotsi youth. These identities became a
mobilising strategy for different political projects. The 'inyamazane' identity, which
alludes to the image of an energetic and aggressive guerrilla, was mobilised to
militarise, radicalise and draw young people into the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe.
Inspired by the escalation of the Umkhonto insurrection, the heroic inyamazane became
a role model for militant young people during the 'ungovernability' period. In the

militaristic culture the 'comrade' or amaqabane identity became a symbol of unity,
belonging, co-operation and solidarity.
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While the amaqabane or comrade identity was a unifying term that referred mostly to
Black youth activists, it also distinguished charterist from non-charterist political
activists. The term was used as a political and combat identity during violent township
clashes against the impis (lnkatha Freedom Party vigilantes) and greef!flies (Mngayi &
du Toit, 1990). Closely associated with the 'comrade' identity were terms such as the
'youth', UOF, ANC, SACP, MK, SAYCO, COSATU, Freedom Charter, 'people' and
'community'. The 'comrade' identity became a political tag during the ungovernability
era which could either protect the wearer from political violence, or act as a target for
it. Contmry to Johnson's (1988) comment that the term 'comrade' "came to be used to
refer to any black youngsters engaged in resistance" (p. 118), the term did not apply to
an undifferentiated Black youth population.

The intensification of political violence saw the comrades joined by the tsotsis who
battled their traditional foe - the police. The com-tsotsi identity was constructed to
mobilise tsotsis or 'street criminals' into formal opposition. The term 'tsotsi' was
imbued with partisan political meanings. The politicisation of tsotsis was perceived as
an essential political project during the "ungovernability" campaign. As in most civil
conflicts and wars, political actions during this period were dominated by men and
provided the conditions for the assertion of the macho status. Political violence was
conceptualised and expressed in masculine discourse.

As a traditional male terrain, participation in political violence was monopolised and
jealously guarded by the male 'comrades'. Young women were considered too weak to
fight and kept invisible in most actions involving violence, a practice reflecting the
sexual division of labour. Young men considered it their responsibility to 'protect'
women. However, as Ramphele (1991) observed discourses about women as 'weak' and
needing 'protection' were used to conceal men's fear that

they would be left to tackle domestic chores, including taking care of babies,
which they were uncomfortable to be seen doing. There was genuine fear that
the women would not survive the brutality of the police ... and there may have
been some fear of women succeeding where males had failed (p. 224-225).
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Because of the general perception of tsotsis as violent and experienced in confrontation
with the police, they were regarded by some youth activists as valuable comrades in
arms. Although it emerged in ditTcrcnt political conditions, this was reminiscent of the
PAC attempts in 1959/1960 to politicisc and mobilise the tsotsi youth constituency.

The participation of tsotsis in township politics gave rise to a variety of interpretations.
According to Cross, "'Gangsters can do things like throw petrol bombs and hijack cars
that normal people must be first taught to do, so there was a real space for the
expression of gang culture in the struggle" (cited in Seekings, 1993, p. 66).

Mkhondo (1993) expresses a different opinion of the comtsotsi category. He states that

The comtsotsis ('comrade ruffians'), as they are called in township slang,
formed gangs which contributed to the rise of violence in the townships, posing
a serious problem for the ANC. They terrorized the townships in the name of
anti-apartheid groups or falsely claimed that their actions were being authorised
by anti-apartheid forces, although most were not affiliated to the ANC or to
other political organisations (p. 137).

Similar opinions are expressed by Johnson (1988) who refers to comtsotsis as
'apolitical', 'undisciplined', 'unruly', 'lawless youths' and 'self-serving thugs' who
"damaged the inchoate relationship of trust and mutual respect which had been nurtured
between the youth and adult" (p. 118). Harding (1991, p. 16) also states that "criminal
elements, mainly among unemployed youth began to set up 'roadblocks' to steal from
commuters, which criminalised the reputation of the 'comrades'."

Such views mirrored dominant state rhetoric which polarised the Black community into
'law abiding' citizens and 'lawless thugs'. In this respect, the comtsotsi identity, rather

than deviant acts, became the focus of the evaluator. This representation ascribed a
generalised and inherently deviant role to the tsotsi youth. Tsotsis, according to these
commentators, will always be tsotsis - a view that defined their participation in youth
politics in terms of "damages" and "problems". Tsotsis appeared to have acquired an
irredeemable social status which undermined efforts to alter their total identity. This is
consistent with the notion of 'master status' (Hughes, 1945; Merton, 1938). According
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to Hughes, this status "tends to overpower, in mod crucial situations, any other
characteristics which might run counter to it" ( Hughes, 1945, p. 357).

The attempt to politicise nnd draw tsotsis into formal opposition politics provoked a
backlash. Allegations about comtsotsis extorting money from community residents were
popularised in media and propaganda material. Both the 'comrade' and the 'comtsotsi'
categories came to be represented in white and black conservative discourse as
synonymous with crime, violence and terrorism. The government Bureau fOi
Information explained that "Loosely known as 'comrades', some owe allegiance to the
ANC; others have been exploited by revolutionary groups within South Africa; yet
others are criminal elements or, simply, undisciplined vandals" (South African Bureau
for Information, I 988, p. 5).

The negative representations of these groups exposed them to state and vigilante
violence. In Natal (the home of the lnkatha Freedom Party) in particular, where the term
'comrade' or 'comtsotsi' conjured up an image of an 'enemy' and a 'criminal', young
people so labelled were exposed to collective forms of political violence. For example,
the Weekly Mail (8/5/92, p. 3) quoted witnesses to violence against the 'comrades' as
saying that the identified attackers were "Inkatha members, police and hit squad
members".

While comtsotsis participated in political violence during the ungovernability period, it
is not clear how much their activity contributed to the rise of township violence and the
tension between youth activists and African elders. The general representation of the
comtsotsis and comrade youth categories obscures the political and social diversity that
existed within those categories.

Despite the conservative view of youth as homogenous, the youth category consisted of
multiple identities. These were evident in political differences, organisational
affiliations, tactical and strategic approaches. Belonging to the 'comrade' or 'comtsotsi'
category did not imply absolute sympathy or participation in violent and criminal
activities. Similarly, membership of the ANC did not necessarily mean agreement with
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that organisation's policy on violence. However, in defining ANC members, labelling
theorists have often concentrated on the individualised 'terrorist' image of the
organisation perpetrated by the state and its supporters. Consequently, all ANC
members and those aligned with it were regarded as terrorists. The limitation of the
social labelling thesis is that it concentrates on organisational or structural processes and
neglects the self-formation process that testifies to the diversity of any given social or
political grouping (Anleu, 1991 ).

While ideological practices were essential to the reconstruction of the youth category in
the 1980s, non-discursive practices, such as youth physical activities, changes in
organisational process and liberation strategies, also provided conditions for the
de!.!onstruction and reconstruction of the youth category. Indeed, changes in the
representation of youth and the formation of discourse were largely responses to just
these non-discursive aspects. Still, in order for the identity construction process to
obtain political and social meaning certain procedures had to be followed. Cooper
shows that the process can only gain public acknowledgment by certain rituals
"determining the conditions under which discourses were spoken, and who would be
allowed to speak them" (Cooper, 1981, p. 68).

The denunciation of the old identity and annunciation of the reconstructed youth
category was facilitated through the circulation of discourse in the media, official and
liberatory propaganda structures. The public position assumed by these structures, and
their identification with the witness audience, qualified them to speak these discourses.
Garfinkel (1972, p. 204) refers to the "conditions of successful degradation ceremony"
in which the total identity of the subject population is ceremoniously transformed.

It can be argued that the ANC's lack of interest in the tsotsi youth constituency created
unfavourable conditions for the transformation of the 'tsotsi' image into a political
identity. As an authority and a qualified speaker of liberatory discourse, the ANC and
other liberation organisations did not commit themselves in support of the public
transformation of the criminal stigma of the tsotsi subculture. Despite the reference to
tsotsis as 'com-tsotsis', their public image was not altered and they continued to be
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regarded

~s

tsotsis. Although in the early years of the ANC Youth League efforts were

made at an individual level to politicisc tsotsis there was "no systematic attempt to
organise and 'convert' the far larger, and culturally pervasive, constituency of tsotsi
youth gangs" (Glaser, 1988/89, p. I).

The status degradation process that altered Black youth identity and replaced it with a
lower social status follow similar procedures as "ceremonies of investiture and
elevation" (Garfinkel, 1972). However, ceremonies of investiture were empowering and
aimed towards the elevation of the political image of young people, who were mobilised
for particular political projects. During the 1980s conflict young people were seen as a
special category with a central role to play in the struggle. Youth identities such as
"young lions" were constructed as an honour and in acknowledgment of young people's
role in the struggle.

Like the degradation ceremo· ''· this process subverted and replaced the total identities
of yonng people. After the
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school boycott, the ANC de-emphasised the term

'student' in reference to youth politics. The ANC actively promoted the use

oft~1e

term

'youth' as a political identity for 'politicised' young people and declared 1981 as "The
Year of the Youth". In the 1990s the "young lions" identity accredited to young people
during the township revolts was degraded and replaced with the "lost generation"
identity. The relationship of discontinuities in the perception of the youth category to
changes in liberation politics, suggests that the deconstruction and reconstitution of the
'yooth' identity "formed part of much broader processes of transformation in opposition
politics" (Seekings, 1993, p. 21 ).

The transformation of youth politics sd>ce the inception of the ANC Youth League in
1944 had been characterised by rapid, radical shifts in discursive and non-discursive
practices. In most cases these discontinuities were responses to changes in broader
political, social and economical circumstances. Foucaul~ argues that the formation of
discourses is constrained, not only by the role ofthe individual, but also by
circumstance. Both factors combined to change the youth category in South Africa,
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giving rise to innumerable discourses regarding youth at every juncture in the history of
opposition politics.

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which identities were shaped by discourses
regarding the subject population and how such discourses were constructed in
disciplinary language and

us~d

as a source of power. These discourses shaped state

policies and determined the treatment of young people who were exposed to social
control measures such as the state of emergency. The representation of youth activists as
'loafers', 'criminals' and 'undisciplined vandals' in official discourse during the state of
emergency was instrumental to the banishment, incarceration, execution and
confinement of thousands of young people.

The 1980s period was distinguished by an increase in political violence on both sides of
South African politics. The question of what counts as political violence has been hotly
contested in political and sociological disciplines. Political violence has been described
as action pursued by forces opposed to the state. Such descriptions imply that the state's
use of force is legitimate - merely an act of self defence. Thus , state violence such as
police violence is rationalised by "legitimist discourses" (Du To it, 1990, p. 89).

Gurr explains political violence as '" ... all collective attacks within a political community
against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as
incumbents - or its policies" (Gurr cited in King, 1990, p. 41). In Gurr's explanation, the
state seems a victim of political vi·olence rather than an active participaat. Studies such
as those by (Marks & Anderson, 1990; Scott, 1977) describe the state as an active
participant in political violence. Nieburg provides a comprehensive explanation of
political violence which includes

... acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice or targets or
victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects have
political significance, that is, tend to modifY the behaviour of others in a
bargaining situa·!ion, that has consequences for the political system (King,
1990, p. 41).
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Political violence in South Africa was implemented, not only to "modilY the behaviour
of others'', but also to alter the field of power. Violence was used by the state to destroy
the power base and to stop the opposition from advancing its political goals while the
liberation movement used it as a tool for social change to overthrow the incumbent
regime. To young Black South Africans, violence had revolutionary as well as moral
connotations

~

revolutionary because the disruption and destruction of the apartheid

state and its replacement with "People's Power" was sought; moral be..;ausc young
people felt ethically bound to use violence to defend the "people" from state sponsored
violence. Anti-apartheid activists were constructed as "people" and those obstructing the
cause of liberation as "enemies". These discourses fanned part of the everyday political
language in youth politics and demonstrate that young people were

active in

constructing others as well as themselves.

Though violence is described by Foucault as non-discursive, it is essentially a
discursively constructed phenomenon, and is legitimised and justified via discursive
processes. During the township unrest, discourses such as "oppressive and violent
state", "real liberation is not possible without bloodshed" and "youth as moral defenders
of the community", were used to legitimise young people's participation in political
violence (Marks, 1995, p. 5).

The aim of this discussion is to understand how the formation of discourses and
identities influence the way in which the subject population is perceived and treated,
and how this contributes to the shift and production of new fields of power relations. By
using Foucault's analysis of subjectification, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate
the active role of young people in defining and shaping their own identity. The political
and social implications associated with this process was examined. While the process of
self~fonnation

is explained in Foucault's theory as discursively informed, in the South

African context the process was inextricably linked to non-discursive practices as well.
Political ideologies, organisational process and political strategies formed an essential
part of the process. It can be concluded that the youth category in South Africa was
historically and politically, rather than socially and psychologically, constructed - a
conclusion that is favoured by the analyses presented in this chapter and previous ones.
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5 From liberation to formal party politics:
Black youth politics in 1989 and the early
1990s.

Introduction.
A year after the imposition of the second state of emergency in 1988, youth
organisations and trade unions regrouped in defiance of the restrictions imposed by the
emergency laws. Although severely affected by the crack-down, the youth movement
quickly regained its profile in opposition politics and cemented its relationship with the
Congress of South African Trade Unions. The South African Youth Congress (SAYCO)
membership grew rapidly and by 1988 the organisation claimed to have more than a
million registered members. The slogan was, "You can ban us but you can't silence us!"
(Sechaba, 1988, p. I).

As part of the regrouping process, a strategy of mass defiance was developed to
undermine the state of emergency and the segregation laws such as those contained in
the Separate Amenities Act. Combining with international pressure, the mass defiance
campaign of ungovernability and similar strategies made it increasingly difficult for the
state to contain the challenge to its racially based political system.

Following the second Tri-Cameral elections in 1989, the ANC reiterated its

commitment to its " ... multi-pronged offensive, including its armed component to
overthrow the regime of racist tyrarmy" (National Executive Committee of the ANC,
1989, p. 2). In the late 1980s, the armed wing of the ANC - Umkhonto -.e Sizwe -

escalated its sabotage of economic and military installations. These operations had
political rather than military significance in that they increased the ANC's internal
support, especially amongst young people (Marx, 1990).
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Despite the intensification of state violence, political resistance mounted and involved
large numbers of people at all levels of South African society. Young people were
clearly visible in all political campaigns. Youth organisations and trade unions both reemerged from the crack-down as potent opponents of the system. Confronted with an
economy increasingly diminished by consumer boycotts, international sanctions and
strikes, the state resolved to modify the field of power. In late I 989 and early I 990, the
Pretoria regime made preparations for discursive changes within the system.

Even though there exists only inconclusive analysis of the changes in the youth
category, there is growing evidence suggesting a shift from political to social
representation of young people. As developments regarding this process are still
tentative, this chapter will discuss some of the issues pertinent to this shift. To provide a
context for this shift, this chapter will briefly discuss the emergence of negotiation
discourse in South African politics. Changes within youth organisational process
following the unbanning of anti-apartheid political organisations will be explored. The
chapter focuses on the process of transition from SA YCO to the ANC Youth League in
order to emphasis the relationship between organisational practice and the generation of
discourse.

The emergence of negotiation discourse
In the late 1980s, the discourses pervading the liberation movement and apartheid
camps still centred around armed revolution and hegemony respectively. However,
during the height of the township revolts, negotiation discourses began to develop
amongst government officials and ANC activists (Adam & Moodley, I 993).

Secret talks between the government and the incarcerated ANC leader Nelson Mandela
started as early as 1985. These talks progressed to the lead up of the second tri-cameral
elections in 1989. Mandela points out that "the crisis freed" him to open dialogue with
the regime ( cited in Sechaba, 1990, p. 14-17).
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The 1989 tri-camcral elections prodm:cd comprehensive changes in the political
landscape. The new National Party President F.W. de Klcrk began to test the waters for
transforming the political and social landscape of South Africa. Seven prominent
political prisoners incarcerated since 1963 were rclea<.;ed in October 1989. While the
exiled ANC leadership welcomed this "important victory", it went on the offensive and
called for the unconditional release of Mandcla and other political prisoners and
detainees, the lifting of the state of emergency, the unbanning of :mti-apartheid political
organisations, the withdrawal of troops from the townships and an end to political
executions (ANC October 18 Statement, 1989, p. 2).

In what is widely acclaimed as a 'watersheu speech', on the 2"' February 1990 de Klerk
unbanned all anti-apartheid organisations including the Communist Party and repealed
the Separate Amenities Act. Nine days later, Mandel a was unconditionally released after
spending twenty seven years as a political prisoner (Sechaba, !990). By the time of his
release, Mandela had a high profile in local and international politics. The 'prisoner' and
'terrorist' identity was ceremoniously replaced by the new identity of 'statesman'.

Following these developments, the international community - Britain and the United
States in particular - were anxious to reward the Pretoria regime by lifting economic
sanctions. The then British Prime Minister Thatcher " ... argued strongly for the
loosening of the screws on South Africa in recognition of reforms so far undertaken or
pledged ... " (Laurence, 1990, p. I).

While the political developments of October and February represented rapid historical
discontinuities, the significant modification of the power relationship between the state
and the subject population was a much more gradual event. A number of obstacles were
to be surmounted before political negotiations resumed. The ANC insisted on the
observation of the Harare Declaration adopted by the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) in 1989. The declaration demanded the repeal of the State of Emergency, the
cessation of political executions, the unconditional release of all political prisoners and
detainees, and the removal of troops from the townships (OAU Ad-hoc Committee,
1990). A dialogue between the liberation movement and the regime required mutual
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political compromise, as the government for its part insisted on the denunciation of
armed struggle as a precondition to negotiations. These compromises were achieved
only after a shill in the ideological and strategic positions of both parties.

Youth politics and negotiation discourse.
The shift in apartheid policy occurred in the context of deteriorating political conditions
and the deepening economic crisis of the late 1980s. Continued political violence
undermined investor confidence in the state's ability to provide a stable climate for
economic investment. These changes were also attended by the end of the Cold War,
which caused a shift in global power relations. Following the collapse of the Eastern
bloc in 1989, the foreign policies of Western super powers placed less emphasis on the
'threats' of communism and 'international terrorism'. The maintenance of antiCommunist regimes such as the apartheid government became less important to
Western powers. The Pretoria regime reassessed its tenure in the new global context.

The anti-apartheid movement also reviewed its ideological and strategic position as it
could no longer rely on former communist countries for material and political support.
As Marx (1992, p. 226) notes " ... the devolution of the cold war had begun to redraw
international alliances, diminishing both Soviet support for the ANC and Western
interests in maintaining the white rule."

Although mass action and anned insurrection remained fundamental liberation
strategies, a negotiated political settlement became a central aim in the struggle for
political change in South Africa. Pragmatism and the discourses of negotiations
emerged and were largely shaped by the I 990s shift in global politics (Manzo, I 992).
These discourses begun to supplant the rhetoric of armed revolution and class analysis.
Adaro and Moodley (I993, p. 40) observed that the liberation "elites, no longer
constrained by dogma, were free to be pragmatic as they adjusted to new realities."

Changes in global power relations and in apartheid policy prompted political analysts
such as Owen (1990) to conclude that armed struggle and socialist ideological
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approaches failed to provide viable solutions to the South Afi·ican problem. In the wake

of these changes, the perception of the working class as a vanguard and young people as
heroes of the struggle was changed and an intellectual elite became the major player in
the new political dispensation. In the 1990s, pragmatism became a common

philosophical approach, especially amongst older and inteiJectual activists. Yet many
young activists remained committed to revolutionary approaches. An ideologically and
strategically polarised anti-apartheid community emerged and competed for political

space.

The relevance of anned revolution was increasingly questioned by political analysts and
the higher echelons of the liberation movement. The armed struggle was subsequently
suspended in 1990 in favour of a negotiation process. In 1990 the Star newspaper
quoted the then ANC Secretary General Nzo saying that MK " ... does not have the
capacity within South Africa to intensifY the armed struggle in any meaningful way at a
time when it sees a tactical need to do so" (cited in Ottaway, 1990, p. 40). Militant

activities were suspended as a result of these changes in the discourse of liberation.

However, MK continued to have a significant political impact by creating an element of
insecurity within the apartheid camp. Also, MK remained an effective mobilising
strategy for the ANC as young people continued to swell MK ranks. As Hani (1991, p.
11-12) stated "We are under tremendous pressure from young members of the ANC and
Youth League to provide them training." A military subculture consisting mainly ofproMK youth emerged in the 1990s to express their opposition to the suspension of the
rumed struggle. Youth in MK styled military gear carrying home-made models of AK47

rifles became a common site in many rallies and demonstrations.

The suspension of MK activities in 1990 and the escalation of state violence created a
sense of disillusion within the pro-ANC youth constituency. While the ANC committed
itself to a process of negotiation, the PAC and the Azanian People's Organisation
(AZAPO) remained supportive of armed struggle. In a manner reminiscent of the 1960
mobilisation of the militant youth constituency, the PAC rhetoric of armed struggle
attracted the

i~<tterest

of many township youth. Ottaway (1990, p. 32) observed that
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"There was substantial evidence in early 1990 that the idea of continuing the armed
struggle, the position taken by the PAC and AZAI'O, was more attractive to many
youths than the concept of negotiations.,

Faced with continued state and vigilante violence, many young people held the belief
that armed insurrection was the only means through which the political system could be
changed. Musi argued that

Violence is needed in our country so that we can remove all the bad things that
are there. This present regime is like a sickness that must be destroyed violently
so that better things can exist and the society can be more healthy. So violence
is necessary ... (cited in Marx, 1995, p. 13).

Such sentiments may exhibit a disbelief that non-violent strategies can achieve
fundamental changes in power relations. Militant young people envisaged radical
transformation rather than incremental reform.

The preference for anned struggle expressed by youth was no longer shared by older
activists who typically supported negotiations over armed struggle. Their political
perspective was very different to that of the post-Soweto generation that grew up and
operated in a mi!itarised climate. Much of the ANC leadership was ageing and had spent
many years in exile or in prison. Survey data shows that by late 1990,

The majority of adult blacks prefer negotiations to violence ... [although] most
blacks would probably still resort to violence and non-violent direct action to
protect themselves in an atmosphere of danger, especially if they believed the
security forces were no longer in control (de Kock, cited in Bulbring, 1991, p.
3).

The ANC's decision to suspend armed struggle was therefore consistent with the view
of adult blacks.

Although youth militancy was supported by the liberation movement during the
campaign to make South Africa ungovernable in the 1980's, it began to lose its political
meaning in the 1990s. Liberation discourses about the 'youth' as a problem emerged.
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Youth radicalism was now perceived as a threat to the negotiation process and there was
a hurried move to rcsocialise or re-orient young people into post-liberation politics.
According to Seekings ( 1996),

Political leaders played a major role in developing the notion of a 'youth
problem'. ANC leaders were worried that their organisation was still too weak
on the ground, and the youth might restrict the ANC's space to negotiate
constitutional changes (p. 105).

The conceptualisation of youth issues was moving away from the political arena to
economic and social contexts. ANC economic spokesperson Mboweni argued that
South Africa "... needs an emergency national youth programme aimed at education and
employment generation" (cited in Financial Mail, 1993, March 5, p. 48). Under the draft
youth policy, the ANC Youth League proposed to set "in place a juvenile justice system

aimed at rehabilitation of young offenders, within the context of drastic reduction of
crime levels and effective community policing" (ANC Youth League, 1995, p. 4).

Like the apartheid regime of the 1960s, the ANC saw the school as a possible solution
for the 'problem' presented by the 'youth' to the new political dispensation. Mandela
stated that if, "the National Party created the necessary conditions, ... the ANC and
allied organisations would appeal to the youth to discipline themselves, go back to
school and concentrate on their studies" (cited in Seekings, 1996, p. 106). School yards

were no longer perceived as sites of political mobilisation and activism but as
mechanisms of social control and discipline. The president of the Azanian Students
Convention (AZASCO), Maseko, expressed concerns about the depoliticisation and
dernobilisation of the youth/student constituencies, lamenting that "The black student
community is currently largely apolitical, demoralised and individualised" (Bundy,
1994, p. 49).

The responsibility of 'resocialising' Congress youth was entrusted to the Youth League.
The League was to act as an 'civilising influence', disseminating the ANC policy to
League membership. Willis (1993, p. 94) writes that the civilising influence process

"... keeps irrationality in check with individuals not actively creating social lives but the
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products of external society." As the organisational process changed from autonomous
to bureaucratic structures, the emphasis was put on centralised administration and
discipline. Lekgoro, head of the ANC Youth League's Organising Department, states
that

DifTerenl from the call they were trained under- that they must render the
homelands and town councils unworkable- they were now called to be
disciplined. They should not barricade streets during stay-a ways. We arc
building the Youth League in an era where the youth had to reorient their
approach to struggle (Lekgoro, 1992, p. 33}.

The League was expected to provide a centralised body which would discipline,
transfonn and carry young people into the post-liberation era. However, the League was
unable to live up to expectations, and failed to provide a 'civilising influence'. Its
support of armed struggle was criticised by advocates of the negotiation process, who
claimed it was inconsistent with ANC policy. The League warned of the implications
that the suspension of armed struggle might have on the militant youth constituency. It
stated that "The major component of MK is youth and experience of other struggles
teaches us that neglect of armed cadres can be a destabilising factor in any political
process" (ANC Youth League, I 991, p. 24).

In response to the League's views on armed struggle, some critics emphasised the
ANC's historical preference for non-violent strategies. For example, an ANC official
argued that "Those organisations which demand a military victory of the ANC have
misunderstood the approach of the ANC in the first place" (Lekota, cited in Adam &
Moodley, 1993, p. 50). Others pointed to the limitations of discourses of violence- " ...
the insurrectionary orientation has itself tended to become an elite conspiratorial
fixation at the expense of developing a broad-based youth programme" (Cronin, cited in
Makwetla, 1992, p. 34).
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Youth politics in transition: From decetralisation to
bureaucracy.
Internationally and internally, the ANC had developed a strong symbolic status as the

credible South African anti-apartheid organisation. This status meant that the ANC
exerted a powerful influence over other anti-apartheid groups, especially after political
organisations were unbanned. This influence was manifested in changes made to the
internal administrative organisation of these groups, especially the major charterist
groups such as the UDF and SA YCO, who were compelled to merge with ANC

structures. A chief cause of the ANC's organisational superiority to other groups was
the bureaucratic organisational patterns that it had developed whilst exiled. This

organisational feature distinguished the ANC from internal micropolitical organisations
such as the UDF and SA YCO which had decentralised structures (Ottaway, I 990).

After the Sharpeville massacre, the ANC Youth League became a dormant force in
liberation politics. However, an exiled ANC Youth Section began the process of
reviving the League in 1989. This involved negotiations with SAYCO's leadership to

merge all charterist youth congresses into a united structure. The process continued after
the unbanning of political organisations and the ANC Youth League was subsequently
launched in October I 990. The new organisation effectively subsumed SA YCO, whose
members were invited to join the ANC Youth League (Horizon, I 99 I).

The transformation had a huge political cost for SAYCO who had to collaborate in its
own dismantling. A majority of SAYCO membership expressed concerns about the
implications of a merger to a structure linked to a formal political party (Seekings,
I 993). Although SAYCO resolved to adopt a unitary structure in its first legal
conference in April I 990, it failed to reach a decision regarding the relationship between
SAYCO and the ANC Youth Section. The dissolution of SA YCO in favour of the
revival of the ANC Youth League was delayed until further political consultation and
the reconsttuction of ANC internal structures was complete (Work in Progress, 1990).
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Most delegates argued that SA YCO had not adequately addressed concerns and !cars
raised by the membership regarding " ... those youths to the Jell of the ANC !who J

would be left without a political home". Some fClt that the "... merger was being f<JistcJ
on the ANC by an impatient SA YCO leadership" (Work in Progress, 1990, p. 3 ). This

was interpreted as demonstrating a lack of consultation at the grass roots level - a failure
which was attributed to organisational methods developed by an underground

organisation that were no longer appropriate in a context of legality.

Bureaucracy and pragmatism began to supplant the tendencies of the 1980s youth
congresses such as militancy, spontaneity and decentralised autonomy systems. Since
the ANC Youth League was formally an ANC wing, its policies and organisational
structure were expected to reflect those of the mother body. This expectation conflicted

with the tradition of organisational autonomy which characterised youth politics in the
1970s and 1980s (Ottaway, 1990; Work in Progress, 1990).

The adoption of a centralised bureaucratic process presented obstacles for the
transference of SAYCO membership to the ANC Youth League. Two years into the
transition, the constraint of bureaucracy impacted heavily on the autonomy of individual
young people and the youth movement. Lekgoro, (1992) noted that under the new
process and contrary to previous practice,

No person can just declare himself or herself a member of the Youth League ...
For a youth to be a member, the recognised structure- must first issue a
membership fonn and card. In addition, you also pay to be a member ... Now to
be in the leadership or to be an active member, you must read and articulate all
the many documents of the Youth League and the ANC (documents ranging
from constitutions to debates on federalism) (p. 33).

This meant that a large number of post-Soweto youth wi10 had not attain"d a high
education level due to the continued disruption of schools in the 1980s were excluded.
from the ANC Youth League. As a result of bureaucratic procedures, many young
people were demobilised and drifted to the fringes of society.
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The ANC/Youth League relationship during the
negotiation phase.
By 1991, the ANC Youth League had re-entered limnal opposition politics. The rebirth
of the Youth League was marked by ambiguities in its relationship with the mother
body and the loosely defined roles of youth politics the negotiation process. Debates on
organisational independence and the League's role in negotiations developed between
the Youth League and the ANC. Disenchantment with the relegation of youth to a
subordinate political position mounted. According to a Mayihuye report, a cartoon
decorating one of the National Youth Committee's offices depicted the problem arising
from the parent/child power relationship between the ANC and the Youth League. "The
cartoon shows an unhappy baby (the Youth League) on its mother's back (the ANC)
with the baby saying : "I'll stop acting like a kid if you stop treating me like
one".(African National Congress, 1991, p. 32).

Most young people were opposed to the negotiations between the ANC and the
government and felt that, as T.P. points out,

the ANC is over-compromising compared to the regime. You are giving up
nationalisation ... I am afraid that if you don't have a backbone and stand by
your beliefs and policies you will lose support among the youth (T.P ., 1991, p.
2).

Responding to the power-sharing arrangement endorsed by the ANC and the
government in 1993, League president Peter Mokaba warned that

the aspiration of the youth should not be ignored in the negotiation process.
Young people are being relegated to 'Codesa watchers' I and feel the process
for which they fought is no longer their property. No one can do anything
properly without consulting the youth. We say that for negotiations to succeed
they must involve all the people who will be affected (cited in Financial Mail,
1993, p. 48).

I Codesa - Convention for a Democratic South Africa was an all party body established in 1991 to map
out the transition process from apartheid to an inclusive democratic system.

131

Disagreements between the ANC Youth League and the ANC can be traced back to the
formation of the League in 1944. As in the 1940s, the 1990s ANC old guard were wary

of the League developing into an independent ANC body. Responding to the League's
draft constitution which states that "The ANC Youth League shall be organisationally

autonomous", an ANC diplomat challenged this proposition. He argued that instead of
pursuing the issue of independence, the League "... should be strengthening the ANC
... ;helping to discipline the youth to assist the ANC in solving the problem of violence"
(Masondo, 1992, p. 28).

As in the 1940s, major elements of the ANC conceived of the League as a disciplinary
agency and recruiting operation for the mother body. In the 1940s young people who
initiated radical approaches were labelled by the ANC old guard as politically immature,
"young and arrogant.. .impractical [and] nai've firebrands" (Mandela, 1994, p. 131 ). In
the 1990s young people who continued to operate within radical and militant political

perspectives were represented in post-liberation politics as 'undisciplined', and

'deviants', belonging to a 'lost generation'.

Discipline, control and youth resistance.
The re-launching of the ANC Youth League allowed the ANC to regulate and discipline

youth organisations in a way which had not been possible since the suspension of
ANCYL in 1960. The ANC maintained the ANCYL's position as a subordinate wing of
the parent organisation. Mbeki (1996, p. 5) asserted that the primary task of the ANC
Youth League "is the promotion of the political and organisation agenda of the ANC. At
no stage can

th~

ANC Youth League take political positions which are separate from

those ofthe ANC. Politically, the League is the Youth League of the ANC."

The reinstatement of discipline through the ANCYL allowed the ANC leadership,

which consisted mainly of older men, to regain authority and control over the decisionmaking process. This was important because the ANC had now renounced armed
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resistance and was guided by the exigencies of negotiation. Members of alliliatcd youth
organisations that persisted to use violence were perceived as a threat to the credibility
of the ANC. Ottaway (1990) points out that "To white conservatives, any stonethrowing incident in a township fOr example is now seen as a manifestation of the
ANC' s decision to continue the armed struggle until specific conditions arc met"
(p. 3 0).

The changes in the position of young people met with some resistance. The resistance
took different forms, including the refusal of many individual young people and youth
structures to take up League membership. According to an ANC Youth League official,
little progress was made in building relationships between the League and other youth
organisations. Makwetla states that, "The Youth League has not succeeded in getting all
members ofSAYCO to join its branches" (cited in Mayibuye, 1991, p. 32). The League
Eastern Cape St:cretary for political education, Joyisa ( 1992), expressed concerns about
the decline in youth activism, reporting that "Some branches have repeatedly failed to
have their AGM's because members fail to turn up at meetings" ( p. 30).

Other forms of resistance included continued political violence and the proliferation of
gangs in townships. The young people's unwillingness to make themselves available to
the League for discipline frustrated the ANC's agenda of social control. Makwetla noted
that "Six months after the launching rally of the Youth League, we have been unable to
impact on the discipline of the youth" (cited in Mayibuye, 1991, p. 32).

The ANC's suspension of the armed struggle and the denunciation of violence in favour
of a negotiated political settlement created widespread disenchantment amongst Black
youth activists. With escalating police and vigilante violence and a lack of youth
inclusion in the process of political negotiations, most young people saw their role in
South African politics as unchanged. As Sello, a Diepkloof youth resident, puts it:

The youth have the same role today as in the 1980s. At that time the ANC told
us that we should make the country ungovernable. So today I don't think that
thing it is still the same precisely because the government tyrants are
ungovernable themselves. It is the same problems as before (Marks, 1995, p.
8).
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After the assassination of the tOrmcr MK Chicf.. of.. Stan: Chris J-lani, in 1993, there was
renewed political violence committed by young people ami the threat of civil war
echoed through the country. A month before Hani's assassination, Youth League
President Peter Mokaba warned that" ... frustrated youth posed a greater threat to

S.

A. 's stability than either the Right or a reactionary bureaucracy" (cited in Financial
Mail, 1993, p. 48).

The upsurge in violence was denounced by the ANC, apartheid officials and the
conservative media. On the day of Chris Hani's funeral ANC Secretary General Cyril
Ramaphosa denounced "the thousands of youth battling police outside the FNB stadium
with his chilling "agents provocateurs" statement." (Mamis, 1993, p. I 0). While the
conservative media was quick in denouncing youth violence, it also criticised the
ANC's lack of control over the 'youth'. The Sunday Times stated that the ANC

... feeds the beast. It continues to glorify anger rather than seJf..discipline,
destruction rather than constructive effort, emotional excess rather than dignity,
and aggression rather than conciliation. Even if we concede that the cause of
peace may be served by the glorification of violence, it is not at all clear how
the ANC leaders hope to contain the passions to which they invite crowds to
give free rein. At best it is a terribly dangerous and uncertain strategy

(18/0411993, p. 2).
But what is regarded as constituting violent behaviour and who has the authority to
define certain behaviour as violent? Does the "glorification of anger" imply the approval
of violence? These are the questions which make the concept of political violence
problematic not only in South Africa, but in any country experiencing internal political
conflict. As Skolnick puts it

Violence is an ambiguous term whose meaning is established through political
processes. The kinds of acts that become classified as 'violent' and, equally
important, those which do not become so classified, vary according to who
provides the definition and who has superior resources for disseminating and
enforcing his decision (cited in Cohen, 1976, p. 114).

In South Africa, the state, media and the liberation movement pooled their resources to
disseminate discourses such as the "lost generation" and "youth violence".
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The construction of the 'lost generation' and the deviant
youth category in post liberation politics.
Despite the dearth of written material concerning recent representations of youth m
South Africa, there are good reasons to suspect that the youth were increasingly
represented in welfarist rather than political terms. Liberatory discourses of youth such
as "young lions", "comrades" and "politicised youth" were apparently replaced by

conservative perceptions of youth as "deviants", "JoafCrs", "barbarians" and ''juveniles".
In the new political framework, youth militancy and radicalism seem to be viewed as a
liability to the

anti~apartheid

movement. Due to widespread youth opposition to the

negotiation process young people were constructed as a "lost generation" who needed
direction and control.

Seekings (1996) observes that discourses about the so-called 'lost generation• were
"becoming widespread in political and policy-related circles" (p. Ill). The term 'lost
generation' emerged in the context of the 1990s political changes and youth resistance
to the process of political negotiation. As young people continued to be highly visible in

liberation related activities, such as political violence, they were regarded by both the
state and the ANC as a generation out of control (Bundy, 1994; Seekings, 1996; Sisulu,
1992).

Different research projects were set up and consulted by government officials and the
ANC to assess the potential 'youth threat' and to develop methods of alleviating such a

'threat'. The government inquiry into this issue recommended that the 'youth' "be
taught the value of sustained, honest, hard work, self-discipline, study and regular
exercise ... " (Seekings, 1996, p.IOS). The Joint Enrichment Project (JEP) launched in
1986 by pro-ANC church organisations focused on the 'youth problem' by developing

strategies of getting 'marginalised' youth back to classrooms. According to the JEP,
'marginalised' youth are young people "who are alienated from their families or job or
school, who are out of touch with, or hostile to, the changes taking place in South
Africa" (cited in Bundy, 1994, p. 50). The liberation movement and the state shared a
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common perspective to what they regarded as a 'youth problem and thrcut' to
negotiations.

Both local and international media were instrumental in popularising the 'lost
generation' discourse. The composi!ion and 'anti-social' activities of the 'lost
generation' category featured prominently in crime news. According to Scckings
(1996), the US Time magazine of February 1991 gave its version of the 'lost generation'
category as consisting of

... as many as five million young people, from their early- 30s down to perhaps
I 0, mostly school droupouts who are unable to get jobs and unprepared to make
constructive contributions to society. They are the deprived, activists,layabouts

or thieves ... (p. 110).
Seekings (1996) quotes a Sunday Times article m which the 'lost generation'

IS

described as

schooled only in the street battles and callow rhetoric", "uneducated and
undisciplined and angry. They were threatened by peace, and 'obsolete in their
own struggle'. Their 'natural leader' was Winnie Mandela (p. Ill).

Winnie Mandela's popularity amongst the youth, coupled with her radical political
approach, was seen in most conservative and patriarchal circles as inconsistent with the
'motherhood role'. In most studies and media coverage, her role in the struggle is either
overlooked or associated with deviancy. The amplification of the imposed deviant status
by the media saw Winnie ostracised from the 1990s political dispensation. As Feminist

writers (Faludi, 1992; Snnuners, 1975; Wolf, 1994) show, the vilification of Winnie
Mandela in conservative and patriarchy discourse was not an isolated case but part of
the world-wide "undeclared war against women" waged by patriarchy.

Although the depoliticisation and criminalisation of Black youth political activities
existed alongside political representation of young people in the 1980s, it came to
dominate post-liberation discourse regarding youth. According to (Marias, 1993;
Seeking, 1993), in the 1990s sympathetic liberatory perceptions of youth were

136

outmoded by hostile conservative perceptions. The 'Young Liom;', 'commc.Jcs' and 'foot
soldiers' of the 1980s insurrection became the 'lost generation', 'children' and
'criminals' of the 1990s. Gibson point out that Black youth arc often described as

earmarked for failure ... (T)hey arc uneducated, jobless, without saleable skills
or social credentials to gain access to mainstream life. They arc rendered
obsolete before they can even begin to pursue a meaningful role! in society
(cited in Mokwena. 1992, p. 31).

In the evolving political conditions, Black youth lost their political status as activists

and fighters. Marias ( 1993) observes that "In the imaginations and rhetoric of
progressives, youth have 'mutated' from heroes (Young Lions) into victims (Save the

Children) into the demons (Lost Generation) of today" (p.l 0). The use of concepts such
as "victims" and "children" tends to represent young people as powerless su:1jects

needing adult protection and leadership. In the attempt to re-establish the authority of
the adult, young people were dichotomised into 'disciplined children' and
'undisciplined and out of control delinquents'. The latter were perceived as" ... a serious

threat to the stability of a future non-racial democracy ... " (Mkhondo, 1993, p. 137).

Commenting on youth violence in the 1980s Johnson (1988) wrote that "elements of the
new youth activists were out of control" (p. 119). However, as Straker (1992) found
such representations are inconstant with young people's self-perceptions. Views
delineating youth activists as "out of control" were repudiated by many young people.

According to Straker (1992}, many young people "felt rather that their contribution at
the forefront of the struggle was being undervalued, that they were not sufficiently
recognised as partners in the negotiation process" (p. 135). The most visible aspect of
the "youth" in the 1990s political dispensation was a criminal identity.
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Criminalising the youth.
Radicalism was seen by the new ethos of liberals and pragmatists as outside the new
parameters of meaningful political struggle. Black youths' militancy and their continued
involvement in political violence was denounced and criminaliscd by reprcsf.mtativcs of
the system as well as by sections of the anti-apartheid community.

The spread of crime to white communities after the repeal of the Group Areas Act and
continued political violence within Black communities caused public panic. The subject
population, previously represented as a homogenous entity, was now differentiated and

defined in terms of potential threat to personal and public values. Increasingly,
dangerous behaviour came to be associated with Black youth, particularly those Black
youth who had been politically active. Seekings noted that" ... it is feared that militancy
and violence is flowing into crime and gangsterism in a struggle no longer against the
'system' but against 'society' itself'. (Seekings, !993, p. 3). Stereotypes belonging to
conservative whites had conventionally associated images of the criminal or savage
with the Black population in general. However, in the 1990s, the association was
narrowed to militant Black youth and the traditional tsotsi subculture.

Both Becker (1963) and Schur (1971) argue that the labelling of deviance is predicated
on the reaction of 'mainstream' society. That is, the definition and redefinition of the
subject population as deviant is shaped by the production and dissemination of deviant
discourses. Rotenberg and Liazos chaiienge the label theory's failure to conceptualise
" ... deviance and social audiences to larger social, historical, political and economic
contexts" (cited in Anleu, 1991, p. 36).

Applying the "lost generation" and comtsotsi stereotypes, the social detenninistic theory
that emerged in the black community accommodated perceptions of youth as deviants.
The media's sensationalisation of these stereotypes resulted in a consensus in public
opinion on juvenile delinquency. Marais (1993, p.9) noted that " ... the public
imagination in South Africa today is able to picture youth collectively as a homicidal
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pestilence. Too often in the South African paranoid imagination, each black youth
embodies the potential eruption of collective assault (mass revenge?)."

The media coverage accorded to youth cnme amplified the situation, creating
widespread public panic. As Young (1973) points out

The media, then- in a sense -can create social problems- they can present
them dramatically and overwhelmingly, and most important, they can do it
suddenly. The media can very quickly and effectively fan public indignation
and engineer which one might call 'a moral panic' about a certain type of
deviant (p. 37).
Since the first democratic elections in 1994, public and media attention has focused on
the involvement of youth in criminal activity rather than political activity. The theme of
political instability as a major threat to economic growth has been upstaged by the
spectre of crime. South Africa is represented in local and international media as a 'crime
city'. For example, Margo (1996, p.l) states that "The new republic has become the
most violent country in the world outside a war zone ... "

Crime in South Africa is largely understood in relation to Black 'youth'. Politicians, the
police, social workers, teachers and priests now view the situation in welfarist rather
than political tenns. Alternative systems of social control, such as the home, are being
promoted to curb what sensational media describe as the 'carnage'. The Weekend

Australian quoted Duarte as saying that

... the long tenn solution to such youth hijackings lay in the home, with parents.
I know in Alex [Alexander Black township], kids leave the house with a 9mm
in their pockets. Their mothers know they have it, their fathers know they have
it, but they do nothing to discipline the children (15-16 June 1996 p. I).
Sensational media headlines which feature such terms as 'carnage', 'car hijacking', and
'youth crime' have become common not only in South Africa but in international
coverage of South Africa. The headline in The Weekend Australian (15-16/6/96) that
read "CARNAGE: How organised crime is hijacking South Africa's Recovery"
provides just one example of this phenomenon.
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The transition from a political to a social youth category and the increasing visibility of
young people in media crime reports made the concept of 'youth' even more
problematic. The political defmition of the 'youth' category is losing its meaning, so
that the question of who constitutes the 'youth' in contemporary South African society
is an issue fOr further investigation.

Conclusion
Youth militancy, which received the support of the liberation movement in the 1980s,
was regarded as a threatening deviation in the new political dispensation. The "lost
generation" category emerged as a label for an identified subject population which had
not 'evolved' or 'adapted' to the politics of negotiation. As the liberation movement's
old guard became more powerful in the 1990s, the "young lions" were expected to
assume their traditional role as 'children'. Discourses concerning young people were
now phrased in welfarist rather than political terms. Young people were demobilised
and their participation in national politics was restricted.

Parallels can be drawn between the relegation of young people to children's roles after
the civil war in South Africa and the relegation of women to domestic roles after the
Second World War in Western countries. Rowland (1989, p. 97) notes that during
World War II, women played a significant role in maintaining the economy but their
new role was not regarded as part of the war victory. Instead " ... women experienced
pressure to return to the home, and many did." It is not yet clear whether the young
people of South Africa will return to the role of children, but it is evident that the image
of "young lions" is being gradually retrenched. Currently, the "lost generation"
discourse is dominant and seems set to create a context for increased social control of
young people.

The changes in the representation of youth activists in an evolving polliical-climate can
be understood with the Foucaultian notion that shifts in ideological practices can
reshape the identity of a subject population. According to Garfinkel ( 1972), the process
of reshaping identities does not entail the alteration of the old identity but " ... the

140

destruction of one social object and the constitution of another ... ll is not that the old
object has been overhauled; rather it is replaced by another. One dct:larcs, 'Now, it was
otherwise in the first place"' (p. 204). Young people's response to the reconstituted
youth identity has been varied, and is a matter that requires further rcsl!arch.
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine the history of Black youth politics from 1944 to
1994 with especial reference to the changes in discourses of liberation and the
construction of youth by those discourses. Discursive as well as non-discursive changes
were examined to locate discontinuity in the representation of young people in official
discourses. How young people were constituted by themselves and others is the main
theme of this study.

Both structural and post-structural approaches were instrumental in analysing the
relationship between liberation organisations, state and youth politics. In tum, this

analysis provided the foundation for an investigation into the generation of official
discourses and their significance in the construction of youth identities. The
construction of youth identity was part of the broader political development of this
epoch and was subject to abrupt and significant changes.

Analysis of the four historical phases of Black youth politics shows that, as the political
climate and organisational practice changed, so did the representation of young people
in official discourse. Young people had a major influence in determining the generation
of these discourses. For example, militant approaches adopted by young people in
1976/77 and the political protests of the 1980s were influential in the formation of
liberatory discourses such as "heroes", "comrades" and ''young lions". Such
developments were also influential in the generation of apartheid discourse that depicted
Black young people as "criminals", "vandals", "loafers" and "violent". In the 1980s in
particular the representation of Black young people was highly contested. At a structural
level the contest occurred between two diametrically opposed sets of discourse - the
liberatory and the racist. As Seeking (1993) shows the fonner was sympathetic while the
latter was hostile to youth activities.

This study found that changes in youth identities were not only shaped by structural
representation but also through practices of self-formation. Self-formation was evident
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throughout the four phases of Black youth politics discussed in this study. The
imposition of identities were examined in terms of the subject's capacity to challenge,
resist, negotiate and subvert reconstituted identities.

The liberation movement's perception of what constituted "youth" was politically and
ideologically determined. Young people were constituted as "youth" in the discourse of
liberation according to their political potential at that time. The ANC Youth League's
manifesto, adopted in 1944, targets an undifferentiated constituency of young Africans
for recruitment. In practice, only students and young professionals were politically
constructed as "youth" by the League. Such selectivity in the construction of the
"youth" category by the Youth League was predicated by its perception of students as
amiable to its political culture and its vision of a disciplined and politicaUy conscious
youth constituency.

In the 1940s the term "youth" was politicised and came to connote "disciplim.'d",
"educated" and "politically conscious" young people. Young people, such as tsotsis,
who operated outside the League's established political culture were not included in the
category of "youth". Accordingly, tsotsis remained outside formal liberation politics.
The Youth League's definition of"youth" in the 1940s, and the subsequent alteration of
that definition, demonstrates the ambiguity of the term: "youth" is not a universal
category but one that is determined by context.

In South Africa, both the state and the liberation organisations competed over the
construction of the youth category with the constituency itself. Individuals were
excluded or included in the political opposition, according to the formulation of the
"youth" category at any give. In 1960, tsotsis were included in the youth category
formulated by the PAC. The liberatory discourse of the 1970s constructed a youth
category that was dominated by the student identity. In the 1980s the ANC redefined the
youth category by including politically active ex-student young people, and then all procharterist youth.
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As part of its revision of the youth category in the 1980s, the ANC declared 1981 as the
Year of the Youth and promoted the "youth" over the term "student" as the political
identity of young people. In accordance with the ritual for the alteration of total
identities, the changes were publicly and officially announced. This shift occurred at a
time when the ANC was building its internal support base after almost two decades of
political inactivity. The aftermath of the Soweto uprising and the high rate of youth
unemployment created a volatile situation, providing a conducive climate for
recruitment. Informal attempts to recruit tsotsi youth into fonnal liberation politics and
to alter their traditional criminal identity were made by pro-charterist youth or
'comrades'. However, due to the ANC's lack of concern about the politicisation of the
tsotsi constituency, such attempts proved unsuccessful, provoking a backlash. Tsotsis
were seen as always tsotsis and were used as a scapegoat for society's ills.

The 1980s also saw a change in the representation of young people in official state
discourse and the' media. State and media discourses represented young people in social
rather than political terms. The term "youth" was attributed to the postulate of an
undifferentiated Black youth population who were violent, criminal and rebellious.

This study has analysed the changing representation of young people with Foucault's
mode of dividing practice, discourse formation and Garfinkel's principles of conditions
of successful degradation ceremonies. These theories posit that identity is imposed upon
the subject, and that there exist certain conditions under which an identity can be
successfully imposed. In Garfinkel's theory, one such condition is that the speaker of
discourse must be a public figure and must identify with a particular audience.
According to Foucault, the process of discourse formation is also constrained by certain
conditions.

In the South African context both the liberation movement and the system were
qualified speakers of discourse with differentiated audiences. Their perceptions of youth
gained acceptance from both the liberation and apartheid audiences.

Through the

process of discourse formation and ceremonies of elevation and degradation, heroic and
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unheroic youth identities were constructed and institutionalised. Different authorities
constructed youth differently.

Throughout the liberation struggle, young people demonstrated that identities may be
used as a source of political solidarity and resistance. This study has established that the
construction of identities is a deccntralised process which is spread throughout the
microlevels of society. As Pettman (1992) shows certain categories can be rejected or
seized by the subject population in pursuit of their own interests. This notion of selfformation is an essential part of the post-structural approach.

In the 1970s, young people seized upon the categorisation of Blacks as "non-whites" to
build political solidarity among Black communities: Africans, Indians and Coloureds.
The connotation of inferiority associated with the term "Black" was replaced by a
positive connotation. The term Black was politicised and a self-constituted identity was
promoted by the student movement. 'Black as powerful' as opposed to 'Black as
inferior' became a political slogan.

This study's examination of Bantu Education shows it to be a significant development
in social control and a profound influence on the practices of self-formation in youth
politics. Further, this study has established Bantu education as a crucial factor in the reemergence of political activism on a massive scale in the 1980s. In the 1970s and the
I 980s young people played a significant role in reviving the liberation movement. The
relationship between the e1 Jergence of Black Consciousness, the Soweto uprising and
Bantu Education is central in the development in Black youth politics during this period.

Bantu Education and Black Consciousness culminated in Soweto - an event that was a
turning point in the liberation struggle. As one youth activist commented in the late
1970s "BC was a foundation, a launching pad" for the revolution to come (cited in
Marx, 1992, p. 103). Although the policy of mass schooling introduced under Bantu
Education was designed to create an internalised system of social control, it proved to
be a disaster for apartheid, providing an environment conducive to the remobilisation of
the fragmented youth constituency. The backlash to Bantu Education provides an
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analogy for the Foucaultian concept of power as not only repressive hut also productive
(Foucault, 1984).

Foucault's concepts of power, history, discourse formation and practices of selfformation provide the analytical framework for this study. The concept of discourse
formation as a process of power is a particularly relevant concept for youth workers,
policy makers and researchers alike. As the balance of power shifted in South Africa
after the 1994 elections so did the discourse and treatment of youth. Although there is a
dearth of information on the representation of young people in post-apartheid discourse,
it appears that liberatory perceptions of youth have been replaced by conservative
perceptions.

This study shows that throughout the phases of youth politics, young people took an

active role in the political processes of the liberation struggle. In a context of extreme
repression, young people at no point surrendered their autonomy. They did not regard
themselves as merely leaders of the future, but also led the way in the 1970s and the
1980s. South Africa's revolution was begun by youth but was presided over by a less

idealistic generation. In the new political order, the "Young Lions" found themselves
pushed to the fringes of society, culminating in the demise of youth politics.

In the 1990s the balance of power was significantly altered, resulting in changes in

organisational practice, and the formulation of the youth category. Discourses of a
"marginalised" and "lost generation" emerged in the early part of the 1990s, referring to

"school drop-outs" and "out of control" militant "youth" (Seekings, 1993; Straker,
1992). These developments are the latest discontinuities in the category of youth.

The approach taken by this study- a combination of structural and post-structural
approaches- is particularly relevant to the task of developing a new framework for youth

policy in South Africa. Studies, such as this one, which examine the historical
development of youth politics, and how young people are constituted by others and
themselves, should provide the basis for youth work and policy development in the new
South Africa. Despite the dominant view that the structural and post-structural
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ffameworks arc irreconcilable, a hybrid methodology is possible. In the South African
context, the relationship between structure and agency is of profOund

significL~nce

to

youth politics. An analysis of structural matters is necessary in understanding the
process of self-fOrmation and the role of young people in liberation politics. Although
not co-ordinated by a central structure, the shifts in the construction of the youth
category and the changes in the level of youth participation in politics were responses to
wider structural changes.

Gender analysis within the youth category was restricted by the dearth of documentation
on women's role in formal liberation politics. As Budlender, Mentjes and Schreiner
(1984,) found, there is a serious lack of documentation of women's participation in the
liberation struggle. Young women were made invisible in formal liberation politics as
well as in most studies on South African history. The under-representation of young
women in formal liberation politics is explained by the restrictions imposed on them by
gender roles and the selective documentation of the struggle which distorts any role they
may have had. It is important to develop historical accounts of women's roles which
avoid the prejudices of patriarchy: history is incomplete without her story.

The tentative but frequent conclusion of post-liberation historians is that women made
significant contributions to the liberation struggle (Ramphele, 1991 ). My future studies
will aim to provide more substantial insights into the role of young women in the
liberation struggle and contemporary South African politics. I shall also investigate how
young women resisted and negotiated patriarchal based gender identities.

This study offers insight into a polity dominated by apartheid conformist discourse
which represented young people as "criminals", "loafers" and "vandals". Such a polity
focuses upon the issue of social control to the detriment of the issues of selfadvancement and empowerment. Policies such as the Bantu education policy were
developed according to the constituted identity of the subject population. In order for
young people to define their own experience and to determine their own value system,
youth policy makers must jettison the doctrines of conformism and victimology, as
these doctrines represent the subject as a "recipient" or "beneficiary" waiting to be
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rescued. In South Africa. there is now a tendency to represent youth as politically "lost"
and "out of control" which is attended by their exclusion from the 1990s political
process. Despite the end of apartheid, official discourse continues to construct yvung
people as needing control and leadership.

The challenge for policy makers working in the youth sector is clear. As the study

demonstrates, there is great danger in perceiving young people as victims, or in some
way powerless in determining their futures. The usc of such approaches is problematic
in that policy is derived from official discourses and stereotypes, rather than from
information based on the active participation of the subject population. Thus most
policies reflect the perceptions of policy makers rather than the experience and needs of
the subject population. The problem with discourse driven policies is that they are often
inconsistent with perceptions held by young people of themselves and fail to reflect the

diversity within the youth category. In most cases, as demonstrated in the introduction
of mass schooling in the 1960s, changes in discourses often leads to changes in social
policy and the treatment of the subject.

As this study has highlighted, youth have been represented as problematic in apartheid
state policy. Although information is still sketchy, similar views are being expressed in

current state rhetoric. During the liberation, issues pertaining to young people could
remain unacknowledged as they were kept occupied in the struggle. However, in the
1990s the current government has inherited the legacy of a socially polarised subject

population and will need to adopt inclusive approaches which recognise the experience
and qualities of young people. The situation could be approached through a variety of
ways all of which acknowledge the difficulty for young people in relinquishing the
power they held during the struggle and also the contribution they are able to make to
the new South Africa.

The development of youth programs which are at the grass roots level will ensure the
active involvement of young people thus bridging the gap between the official
discourses and the practices of self formation. Such approaches should involve the
critical analysis of the historical and current role of young people in the transformation
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process of the South African community. Providing

young people with the

opportunities to participate in policy making will assist those working with youth to
transcend the limitations of working within victimology and dividing practices. An
analysis of existing youth policies, programmes and models of youth work practice in
South Africa is recommended.

The changing face of youth po!itics in South Africa, the identity and the role of young
people in the liberation struggle, has been of great interest to me for many years. These
factors were of great significance, not only in the history of young people, but to the
wider struggle for freedom. Young people had helped to orchestrate the revival and the
intensification of the liberation struggle whilst operating within two sets of constraints:
that of the traditional power structures and that of the liberation organisations. In the
context of the struggle, young people were given adult status to prosecute the agenda of
the liberation movement, with the tacit understanding that they were not to violate the
established values of traditional communities. Most elders felt that it was possible for
young people to challenge and fight the system without subverting traditional authority.
This misconception on the part of the elders resulted in a generational conflict.

During the 1980s young people were treated as heroes and presented in the discourse of
liberation as "Young Lions". Contemporary representation of young people is
dominated by the "lost generation" discourse. Within one decade, the Young Lions were
required to roar, but then silenced by the new political dispensation. The fate of the
Young Lions remains a topic for future research.
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